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The semiotic construction of solitude: 
Processes of internalization and externalization 
Jaan Valsiner 
Department of Psychology, Clark University 
Worcester, Ma. 01610, USA 
jvalsiner@clarku.edu 
Abstract. Human beings create their private worlds of feelings and thoughts 
through immersion in the semiosphere created through situated activity 
contexts. Processes of intemalization/externalization are at the center of 
development of human beings through the whole of their life courses. We 
consider the contexts of schooling as organized through Semiotic Demand 
Settings (SDS) for development of intrinsic motivation of the students. 
Intrinsic motivation is a process mechanism that operates as internalized and 
hyper-generalized feeling at the most central layer of internalization. It is a 
result of integration of social suggestions, hyper-generalized as an affective 
field, and turned into a value that directs future actions. 
We are alone — even in the middle of the most crowded social 
settings. Or — maybe we become especially alone under the 
conditions of such social interaction overdose? At the same time — 
we can be alone only thanks to that social embedding. It is through 
semiotic self-regulatory mechanisms that persons can overcome their 
immersion in the field of social relations (Gertz et al. 2006), and 
develop their own private worlds in the middle of the public ones. As 
Georg Simmel has pointed out, 
[...] historical development brings out the deeper real significance: that which 
in its nature is public, which in its content concerns all, becomes also 
externally, in its sociological form, more and more public; while that which in 
its inmost nature refers to the self alone — that is, the centripetal affairs of the 
individual — must also gain in sociological position a more and more private 
character, a more decisive possibility of remaining secret. (Simmel 1906: 469) 
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Education is a form of socializing the developing person into t e 
semiotic texture of the given society — and to his or her prix ate 
construction of personal subjectivity. As pointed out elsewhere 
(Valsiner 2003b) any educational situated activity context is inhe­
rently ambiguous. It constrains the learner — and by precisely that 
enables to develop new ways of knowing. Thus we can think of 
creativity as an act of constructive destruction. In education, support 
for construction of novel forms of mental functioning (Luria 1974; 
Serpell 1993; Tulviste 1991) is intricately linked with destruction of 
old forms. Some of this destruction is total and pre-planned (e.g., 
boarding school education introduced to destroy the link of new 
generation with their parents' ways of being — Jones 1925). Aside 
from outright destruction of "the old", schooling also guarantees 
proliferation of ignorance. This is inevitable since concentration on 
the mastery of new knowledge leaves out of focus the mastery of 
many other everyday life skills. 
The specific arena for this destruction and construction is the 
classroom — but not only that. It is the whole social setting that is 
localized in some geographical location (territory) with marked 
boundaries (and limits on who, when, and under what circumstances 
can cross those) that creates the unity of the process of educating. My 
goal here is to outline processes that are involved in the social act of 
guiding internalization (and externalization) in any social setting. 
Classroom may be a contemporary preferred place for it — yet it is a 
relatively new cultural place. Guidance of internalization has been 
taking place in situated activities in the streets, marketplaces, places 
for worship and war arenas. The general structure of such guidance is 
robust — people are forced to act in the given context in socially 
prescribed directions (cf. Milgram 1974) together with socially 
suggested ways of creating meanings — deeply "felt-through" per­
sonal senses — that provide personal and social stability through 
affective saturation of the actions (Valsiner 2005a). So both how to 
act and how to feel about doing so — are socially guided (Capezza 
Valsiner 2007). Personal uniqueness of internalized re-constructions 
of affective thinking is the result of social suggestions. 
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Semiotic demand settings (SDS) 
Human life proceeds through negotiation between the perception and 
action that unite the actor and context, and the suggestions for feeling, 
thinking and acting that are proliferated through communication. 
Semiotic Demand Settings (SDS) are human-made structures of 
everyday life settings where the social boundaries of talk are set 
(Valsiner 2000: 125). 
Figure 1 describes a case relation between the two opposing opi­
nions within the field of promoted talking. By engaging persons 
within that sub-field — and encouraging opposing viewpoints — the 
SDS guarantees that through hyper-talk in this domain the attention is 
not taken to "side stories" (the maybe-talk zone) and is prevented from 
touching upon the "taboo zone". It is obvious that here the real 
differences between "open" and "closed" societies disappear — both 
kinds of societies disallow talking about "taboo zones", but the "open" 
ones guide people to hyper-talk in some area of meaning construction 
(while the "closed" ones have no promoted talking zones). 
OPPOSITION 
SOCIAL MARKING 
OF THE HIGHLIGHTED 
ZONE V 
o p i n i o n  
o p i n i o n  
n o n - A  
zone of promoted 
'taboo" of talking! 
Figure 1. Semiotic Demand Setting (from Valsiner 2000: 125). 
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Any human life context — including that of school becomes 
culturally guided by some socio-institutional focusing of the person s 
attention to it in three ways. First, there is the realm of no-talk te 
sub-field of personal experiences that are excluded. The rest of the 
field is the maybe-talk. Experiences within that field can be talked 
about — but ordinarily are not, as long as there is no special goal that 
makes that talking necessary. Most of human experiences belong to 
maybe-talk. The third domain of talking — the hyper-talk — is the 
socially (and personally) highlighted part of maybe-talk that is turned 
from a state of "ordinary" talking to that of obsessive talking. 
How is the hyper-talk domain created? It starts from the social 
marking of the highlighted zone. The suggested focus (see Fig. 1) can 
operate in two ways. First, it guides the person to reflect upon the 
focused experience — the zone of "promoted talking". Secondly, it 
provides the blueprint for talking in socially legitimized ways 
(Discourse ways marked by numbers 1 and 2, leading to Opinion A 
and Opinion non-Л, respectively). The acceptability (or non-acceptabi­
lity) of opposition is thus enabled. In our everyday life contexts, this is 
the key to multi-voiced discourses in the contexts we easily call "the 
civil society" (for further analysis, see Valsiner 2005b). In the 
educational contexts — such as classrooms — the promotion of 
talking for the sake of self-expressions may create a basis for both 
thinking and talking for the sake of talking. Creative acts may emerge 
in such discourse — or be completely dis-allowed by the intense 
repetitive use of existing social representations. 
Furthermore, each of the three discursive domains — no-talk, 
maybe-talk, and hyper-talk — are in parallel either connected or 
disconnected with the action domain. The no-talk domain is most 
likely to remain connected with action domain even if the maybe-talk 
and hyper-talk are disconnected. An example of that case may be a 
society where individuals "step in" to "correct" — by action — 
anybody's violation of the no-talk zone boundaries. The state of 
disconnection from action makes these topics open for talk as the 
reality of ordinary living is not threatened by it. Furthermore the 
symbolic resources of the collective culture may guide persons to talk 
about one's affective domains (Zittoun 2006), or feel about the "taboo 
zones" as ruled out from the talking fields (Salvatore et al 7ПП6-
Valsiner 2005b; 2006a) ' 
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Such socially guided feeling and talking (as well as non-feeling 
and not talking) leads the processes of internalization and externali-
zation. In order to consider these processes as theoretically relevant 
we need to assume that there is basic difference between the person 
and the social context. We consider this difference to be inclusively 
separating the two — the person is distinct from the social context 
while being a part of it. This — separate-yet-nonseparate — state of 
affairs allows for any Subject-Object distinction to be made, which in 
its turn can lead to reflection upon the relationship of the two. Thus, a 
person completely immersed in the social context — be it by trance, 
dance, or complete devotion — cannot reflect upon oneself in that 
context. Likewise, a person completely (exclusively) separated from 
the context has no basis for viewing one's relationship with that 
context (e.g., consider the topic of "my life on the Moon") — other 
than through projecting imagined scenarios onto the issue, i.e., 
creating a relationship in order to reflect upon it (see Valsiner 1999, 
on how such relations are created). 
The capacity to construct imaginary worlds proves the centrality of 
person in any social setting. The person is both part of the here-and-
now setting (as it exists) and outside of that setting (as it is re-thought 
through importing imaginary scenarios, daydreams, new meanings). 
Creativity becomes possible thanks to such duality of contrast 
between the "as-is" and "as-if ' fields that the person lives through in 
each setting. It is made possible by the openness of metaphoric 
construction (Johansen 2006). Metaphors 
[...] are not based upon pre-existing similarities in reality: they constitute 
similarities where there were none. The meaning of a metaphor is not the sum 
of meanings of the related components: it is an untranslatable and irreducible 
surplus that exists only in relating, in the transference. (Vervaeck 1984: 49) 
Such metaphoric synthesis is the result of human psyche as it operates 
at the intersection of the here-and-now and wherever-and-whenever 
fields of meaning construction. The opposition is filled with ten­
sion — the here-and-now may seem peaceful at the moment — but the 
person feels it can change any time. Or the most turbulent social 
settings can lead to the creation of idyllic images of idealized 
worlds — gardens, happy ways of life, beliefs in fairies, miracles, and 
in Harry Potter. The person-in-context is constantly internalizing and 
externalizing one's meaningful life experiences. 
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The process of internalization/externalization 
There is no need to enter into the dispute that has been going on 
among socio-cultural researchers of whether the notion of internaliza­
tion is usable as a viable human phenomenon. I take it for granted 
as long as we take for granted that active, meaning-making human 
beings exist — that internalization is a useful concept to look at the 
person <> social world relationships. It is here axiomatically assumed 
that all human meaning construction takes place within the internali-
zation/externalization process that has a structure of layers (Valsiner 
1997, ch. 9 — see Fig. 2). We do not need to prove the viability of this 
axiomatic stand. Instead, we need to elaborate the specific mecha­
nisms of that process, and find empirical access routes to show the 









Figure 2. A multilayer model of internalization/externalization (modified, 
after Valsiner 1997: 305). 
Figure 2 outlines a hypothetical model of the internalization/ externa-
lization process where reconstruction of the in-coming (and in-taken) 
message becomes modified at each of the boundary crossings between 
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layers. Many (most) socially input messages become attenuated in 
Layer 1 — there, the attention processes sieve out non-noticed 
suggestions, and forgetting mechanisms eliminate the ones that fail to 
penetrate through the Layer 1/Layer 2 boundary. The regulation of 
incoming messages takes place through boundary buffering signals 
that emanate from Layer 3 (Al, A2). Similar boundary buffering 
signals are assumed to operate at the output (externalization) — В1 
and B2. (Lawrence, Valsiner 2003), aside from the direct links within 
each layer to the externalization line. 
It is theoretically irrelevant to discuss how many layers there may 
exist in the multi-layer model — the critical point in this construction 
is that this number is greater than one. In other terms — the boundary 
field of the "inside" and "outside" of the human psychological system 
is extended (i.e., not assumed to be unitary, all-or-none — pheno­
menon) and resistant to incoming social suggestions at each boundary. 
Focus on the boundaries 
The model of internalization/externalization focuses our attention at 
the boundary crossings between layers. The boundaries of each of the 
layers are selectively buffered against occasional passing through of 
extra-psychological symbolic material (Lawrence, Valsiner 1993; 
2003). So we have a depiction of a process where, on the one hand, 
the incoming social suggestions have to "fight for entrance" through a 
complex semi-permeable boundary system. On the other hand — the 
person sets the conditions under which the message can succeed from 
one layer to the next (Fig. 3). 
The boundary is structured — some parts of it are permeable, 
others — not. The inner core of the boundary contains a landscape of 
obstacles that the two vectors encounter, and "bounce off' from. 
These are kind of "semiotic fortifications" — outposts to protect the 
inner core of the self against the "assaults" of the messages from the 
outer layers. They are "deposited" on the boundary — maintain 
themselves at the boundary itself. These are examples of localized up-
conscious (see Valsiner 2003a) semiotic organizers — in place without 
the intentional efforts by the person. In contrast — the intentional 
boundary regulating signs (A2) are counter-signs to the "invading" 
message. They are set up to "meet" the incoming message with special 
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function of linking with it and acting accordingly — neutralizing, 
repulsing, or letting these pass as given, or amplifying t em. e 
laminal model of internalization/externalization is based on te 
assumption that the processes become observable at the "bottlenec s 
of semi-permeable boundary transitions, rather than within the fields 
of affective ideation that constitutes the "stream of consciousness" 










The BOUNDARY ZONE 
Figure 3. What happens at the boundary of internalization layers? 
If the structure of the obstacles affords it, the two vectors do meet (and 
create a new synthetic meaning that traverses further in Layer 2. But 
that is not a taken-for-granted result — in most of our meaning 
construction efforts we may "get stuck". Most of our meaning-making 
efforts are failures — only some become consolidated and arrive at a 
clear final form in Layer 3. It can be said that the human mind func­
tions "wastefully" — it produces many versions of subjective reflec­
tions in (and in-between) the layers of internalization. Only some of 
them survive the sequential selection and reconstruction system. 
What is the empirical evidence for such claims? The hyperpro-
ductivity of the "stream of consciousness" has been described already 
by William James. Such hyper-productivity of human mental ideation 
has been demonstrated well in the microgenetic studies of thinking 1 
1 For overview — Valsiner, Veer (2000: ch. 7). 
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In settings of constant uncertainty of the impending future, the best 
adaptation strategy is abundant production of generative materials 
under the established expectation that the overwhelming manifold of 
those is shared by biological evolution and psychological develop­
ment. 
What follows from the laminal internalization model is the impera­
tive for social control — the social immersion of persons in 
interaction contexts (such as classrooms) works with "surplus". It is to 
be irrationally hyperproductive in its creation of social suggestions — 
varied by different forms of iconicity of signs and by intensity of their 
entrance into the internalization system2. The developing child lives in 
the environment of episodic "symbolic attacks" on the internalization 
system of the self. These "attacks" are highly redundant in space and 
time (cf. Obeyesekere 1990 — on human over-determination by 
meaning), and basically successful (Hess, Torney 1967; Singh 1981). 
That success, however, is an integrative result of a myriad of small 
and highly varied encounters with the culturally organized world. In 
our contemporary social lives of children many of these encounters 
take place in the school context — and are set up particularly 
standardized ways in the classroom. 
Social interaction — What kind of reality is it? 
We take the phenomenon of social interaction for granted — and 
attribute causal powers to its role in human development. Yet we 
rarely stop to think what the reality of social interaction is like. A per­
son navigates through enormous variety of social settings — school 
classrooms, cocktail parties, political rallies, intimate candlelight din­
ners, discussion groups ("koosolekud"), occasional interactions with 
strangers at bus-stops, and so on. Each episode of interaction produces 
a hyper-rich variety of different socially suggestive symbolic forms. 
However, the selecting agent who makes these "semiotic inputs" 
available to the internalization/externalization system is the person 
him or herself. What we call "the role of social interaction" is a 
2 Cf. Valsiner, Hill (1989) — social suggestions to toddlers to "say by-bye" to a 
departing visitor were found to be varied over time by intensity. At the limited 
"time window" of the departure setting the intensity grew instantly, and to 
heightened level of social pressure. 
3 
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actually person's boundary-regulatory semiotic act (Valsiner 19 , 
2004). The person opens (and closes) oneself to the varied forms ot 
"social influence" — through semiotic self-regulation. 
Such episodic and self-regulated openness of the person to social 
input sets the task for educators and other agents with goals of social 
guidance of persons up in a complex way. It is not that of transfer of 
social suggestions and knowledge, or even as persuasion — but rather 
as a strategic process of locating the moments of relative openness of 
the person. Different rituals in schooling practices and in public 
conduct (e.,g., public political or religious manifestations, or execu­
tions) have historically been aimed at overcoming the resistance by 
the person to social suggestions. Most of these borrow from the his­
tory of religious practices — of which prayer is an appropriate 
example. Schools may include rituals akin to prayer in recurrent 
efforts to enhance the identity formation (e.g., "pledge of allegiance" 
in U.S. schools, or "sunset ceremony" in Krishnamurti schools — 
Thapan 1986). Such rituals can creatively combine seemingly oppo­
site general social representation fields (Valsiner 2003c; 2003d) such 
as competition and caring (Lesko 1986: 31-33). Opposites are 
constantly present in seemingly univocal meanings (Gupta, Valsiner 
2003), hence the role of ritualization of school practices is to establish 
a desired relationship between them. The second curriculum is set up 
to work out a socially fitting set of relations between the opposites — 
it is the relation between them (Sinha, Tripathi 2001), rather than 
dominance of one over the other — that enables human psychological 
functioning. 
Educational practitioners often complain about the apparent 
downfall of intrinsic motivation of pupils in classrooms. At the same 
time, it is exactly school-aged youngsters who can be found spending 
their time in "cracking the codes" of sophisticated computer systems, 
establishing new music bands, and falling in love with film stars. 
Maybe the locus of where intrinsic motivation develops is moving out 
of regular schooling contexts. Surely that worries the adults who are 
the makers of such contexts. Promotion of the establishment of 
intrinsic motivation is the goal of most social systems that attempt to 
captivate the minds of human beings, and school institutions may be 
reluctant to lose control over that function to MTV or commercial 
promotions at shopping malls. 
Intrinsic motivation 
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[...] comprises both behavioral and psychological activities that do not require 
external prompts or reinforcement contingencies. These are activities that 
people do freely and for which the only "rewards" are the inherent 
satisfactions that accompany them. (Grolnick et al. 1997: 137) 
I here consider intrinsic motivation to be a state of hyper-generalized 
feeling — that becomes describable as value — which is orienting the 
person to move ahead towards the future. Such state is a result3 of the 
ontogenetic internalization/externalization processes and cannot develop 
outside of semiotic pre-orientation (by promoter signs — Valsiner 2004). 
Yet the crucial creator of the state of being 'intrinsically motivated' 
is the person. It is the person's internalization process — resulting in 
Layer 3 integration and hyper-generalization of the affective 
meanings — that makes the establishment of such motivation possible 
(or, alternatively, blocks it). The whole educational system is in a preca­
rious state, trying to guide that process — yet being buffered and altered 
in that effort by the person's counter-actions and selective mechanisms 
at the boundary crossings (refer back to Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). 
Thus, children are not "taught" prejudices by their parental 
environments where such prejudices exist, but it is the children 
themselves who create their novel prejudices observing the conduct of 
adults in different real-life settings, and building it in children's own 
peer group interaction. Even if the family environment is free of 
promoted prejudices, the wider social world beyond the family is 
filled with them. Even as teachers may be treating all pupils in an 
egalitarian way, the children themselves establish their socially 
differentiated "class societies" in the school classroom, creating preju­
dices to establish and maintain the group boundaries. 
The complex task for any educational system is the coordination of 
external (to the pupils) action limitations and the promotion of their 
internalizing of socially desired symbolic materials. If an educational 
system relies only on one of these two mechanisms — limiting or 
(iexclusive 'or' here) promotion — it necessarily fails. Gordon Allport 
years ago expressed his criticism of the U.S. educational system: 
3 This perspective differs from the Self-Determination Theory (that considers 
internalization unnecessary for intrinsic motivation — Grolnick et al. 1997: 137). 
Intrinsic motivation is here viewed as the ultimate result of socialization processes 
(internalization/externalization) that has lost the link with the personal-cultural 
history of its emergence. Even if intrinsic motivation may look ontologically 
individual-focused, it is ontogenetically socio-cultural. 
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The problem, as I see it, is one of interiorizing motivation. To put it in a 
student's words: "I am fed up with having everybody else cheer me on. 
to work to please myself rather than others, but I don't know how to о it . 
[...] In school, the child is rewarded and punished by good grades an a 
grades. Even in college, As and Bs are pats on the back, Ds and Fs are 
punishments. To gain love, the student must read books and toe the academic 
line. Finally he obtains his degree (which is a symbol of academic love) and is 
freed from his external form of motivation. What then happens? 
We know that a shockingly high percentage of college graduates rarely or 
never read another book after receiving their bachelor's degree. Why should they0 
Their love now comes from their employer, their wife, their children, not from the 
approval of parents and teachers. For them, intellectual curiosity never became a 
motive in its own right. External rewards are appropriate props in early childhood. 
But we educators, being limited by our current inadequate theories of learning, do 
not know how to help the student free himself from the props of reward and 
develop a functionally autonomous zeal for learning. With our slavish dependence 
on reinforcement theory, I think it surprising that we arouse as much internal 
motivation as we do. (Allport 1968: 177-178) 
Writing on education surely brings out the necessary recognition of the 
role of the socio-cultural guidance of human development. Education is 
our contemporary version of a social institution that has been the greatest 
controller of human minds (Luria 1974). It has historically grown out of 
ideologically framed contexts — mostly religious ones. It has thus 
features of both religious and secular worlds — as it stays in between 
these, organizing the migration of young people between the home and 
non-home territories. 
Socio-cultural activity settings in place: 
Confession and prayer 
Lives of people in any social institutional framework are organized by 
sets of local everyday rituals. These are regular — sometimes barely 
noticeable — activities that nevertheless act as cultural organizers of 
the self. Different religions of the World have been prolific in es­
tablishing such events — yet these have remained out of focus of 
study for the social sciences, despite clear historical and cross-reli­
gions' proof (see Rio, Alvarez 1995) that socio-cultural sciences have 
much to learn from them. 
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Confession in context 
Social institutions attempt to predict the unpredictable — person's 
conduct in the future — through the control of the uncontrollable — 
person's conduct here-and-now. Religious institutions have created 
(and used) settings that socio-cultural researchers have nicely labeled 
situated activity settings for their ideological purposes over centuries. 
The form for such settings can be encoded in specific design of 
functional furniture (see Fig. 4). 
The use of such furniture is clearly circumscribed — Catholic con­
fession entails the positioning of the body in a sub-dominant (kneeling) 
position (although on the right hand side of Figure 4 it is possible to 
see a seating option). Setting the body up in particular position is a 
powerful antecedent condition for feeling in a certain way (Laird 
2006). The anonymity of the priest is guaranteed by the curtain that 
only he can remove. The identity of the confessor is quasi-private — 
facing the priest (behind the wall), yet visible for others in the church. 
Figure 4. Furniture as cultural guidance: A confessional (Sierck-les-
Bains; author's photo). 
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What kinds of functions do confessions perform? They can be viewe 
as historical antecedents of psychotherapy — albeit one on client-
zv л centered kind. The religious institution within which the confession 
takes place retains the power control over its outcomes (forgiving the 
person the "confessed sins"). Different aspects of everyday reality 
may be fitted differently into the definition of what is forgiven or 
punished. While mediaeval inquisition in Europe was hunting down 
the worried women who had had dreams of intercourse with the Devil 
(Stephens 2002: ch. 4), its counterpart in colonial Mexico was by far 
more realistically lenient (Behar 1987). The confessional in the 
Middle Ages operated as an analogue to our contemporary psycho­
analysts' couch (see Flandrin 1985) — yet with less comfort and 
unwavering demand for full submission of the self to the authority. 
What happens in this specifically furnished situated activity context 
was put into place in year 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council that re­
directed the act of persons' relating with the deity from performing 
publicly visible acts of penace to the verbal act of confession (and its 
corresponding speech act of absolution — Brooks 2000: 90-96). The 
focus on acting out was replaced by acting-out-while turning inwards 
in the confessional. The reforms brought in by the Fourth Lateran 
Council were aimed at maintaining social control — the local church 
institutions were strengthened (by giving the local priests the role of 
absolving the parishioners' sins in the confession) while the local 
priests themselves were brought under further control by the church 
(by way of requiring their own regular confessions — Tambling 1990: 
38). Not surprisingly the focus on intra-psychological "sin-searching" 
proliferated in the European societies after the 13th Century — guided 
by the social institution of the Inquisition to evaluate different kinds of 
"sins" and punish them. 
Negotiating private and public domains: 
sermon and prayer 
Religions invent contexts in which the ultimate fears of the person 
about future happenings are consoled through luring the person's 
affective domain into the social influence sphere of the social 
institution. The mechanism here is creating either a context for the 
direct submission of the person to the institution (e.g., as is well 
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known from European Catholic traditions of pre-Reformation times, 
paralleled by Muslim traditions over time until ours), or its parallel 
form of indirect submission. The latter was brought into European 
cultural history by the Protestant reformation in the 16th century, and 
proliferated through its secularization in conjunction with the 
invention of the representation of the 'civil society' (Valsiner 2005b). 
The indirect form of submission relies on the delegation of the feeling 
of control into the individual psyche — together with mechanisms that 
would bind the person to the given belief system through one's 
internalized and hyper-generalized feeling systems. Thus, the person 
is expected to act in ways expected by the institution believing one 
does it on one's own 'free will' — yet in ways expected by the 
institution. 
The contrast between the two forms of submission have been 
clearly demonstrated in different studies conducted in educational 
settings. While Western middle-class children in "open classrooms" 
are queried about which class task they want to do (Smollett 1975), 
the children in a Moroccan (Qur'anic) classroom are set up to act in 
unison in relation to tasks that must be done (Miller 1977). 
The whole issue of different forms of submission is worked out on 
the basis of bodily actions. Different traditions of voluntary bodily 
mutilations in order to gain 'salvation' have been documented in 
Mediaeval Europe (flagellants) and elsewhere (Obeyesekere 1981). 
All of the process of participation in a context of sermons, prayers, 
and confessions is carefully regulated through normative bodily 
activity. 
What is prayer? 
Prayer is a fonn of petition — by the person to an imaginary 
interlocutor. It is an ancient cultural creation, as it 
[...] began probably with the man himself. It is perhaps the only common trait 
of all religions, their very heart, and the most universal expression of piety. It 
is always optative or expressive of some wish, either to obtain some good or 
avoid some evil. It is often accompanied by rites and ceremonies, or 
reinforced by magic spells, or perhaps by the mimetic acts suggestive or 
symbolic of the desire, while the speech forms are often stereotyped, and 
potent phrases or incantations. (Hall 1917: 488—489) 
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The petitions of prayer may be embedded in the social framework о 
sermons. Different symbolic objects — including written resources 
may be present in the context of sermons. Consider a glimpse into the 
hinterland of the Islamic schooling (Comoro Islands), where 
The concept of the sacred text presupposes a particular notion of "reading". 
[...] For the most sacred texts signifiers and signified are one, and thus, in a 
sense, not "writing" at all. "Reading" is then merely the following of the 
written lines in order to produce the texts in sound — that is, recitation. Each 
reading is actually a reproduction. This effect is heightened by the fact that 
most villagers do not understand Arabic, but in fact the Western concept of 
"translation" has no meaning here — texts must be enunciated in their original 
dialect — and decoding is largely beside the point. (Lambek 1990: 26) 
Precisely similar was the setting of sermons in Mediaeval Catholi­
cism— where the performative side of the ritual — including the 
sequential task of Bible reading — was meaningful for the followers 
precisely because it was meaningless as to its contents. Instead, the 
very act of recital of long sequences of non-understandable text by the 
priest guaranteed the desired social effect. That effect entailed two 
components — the external publicly visible ritual (performed by the 
priest) and internal private devotional dialogue. Thus, it is not 
surprising that a Catholic English bishop from mid-16th century 
suggested that 
[...] it is much better for them [the participants] not to understand the 
common service of the church because when they hear others praying in a 
loud voice, in the language they understand, they are letted from prayer 
themselves, and so come they to such a sickness and negligence in praying, 
that at length as we have well seen in these late days, in manner pray not at 
all. (Quoted via Targoff 2001: 15, added emphasis) 
Obviously, knowledge of contents — as well as social comparison — 
was seen as an obstacle to the control of the souls through the sermon. 
The Catholic rituals were based on the dramatization of the whole 
context of sermon — so it was imperative that all the congregation 
maintained their full attention on the performance (including the 
reading of non-understandable texts). The full attention was supposed 
to lead to internalized attachment to the teaching through the 
collective social contagion. Hence the persons were kept "in the field" 
through the dramatic events of the sermon. 
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The Refonnation changed the modality — from the primacy of 
visual attention (with the additional hearing of melodic and foreign 
incantations) to that of auditory attention — the participants now were 
expected to hear - and actively listen4 to — the meanings of the words 
in their native tongue. Priests who previously could "mumble and 
tumble" Latin sermons without devotion, were now — in the 
Protestant mode of mid-16th century — to read sermons in English 
with "due and distinct pronunciation, whereby all the people may have 
true knowledge" (Targoff 2001: 23). 
The change in the strategies of the Church was of course not meant 
for the benefit of the people. This was evident from prohibitions 
against participants who gave up listening (and hearing) in favor of 
their own individual reading of the newly introduced Prayer Book (in 
English in 1549). The congregation was led by the new kinds of 
priests to become submissive through their meaning-making activity 
under the guidance of the "more knowledgeable other"5 — the priest. 
The persons were expected to be submissive through their own will. 
Yet there were limits to the use of that individual will — numerous 
cases of punishments in late 16th century6 indicated that the next step 
of creative reading of the texts — solely by oneself and for oneself — 
was not socially tolerable. 
Interestingly, the move from foreign language (Latin) to local 
languages did not diminish the role of Latin as a symbolic marker of 
4 The Protestant Reformation did not liberate the persons from their religious 
affiliations (as we know, secular ideologies developed slowly in Europe and in 
some countries in the Western hemisphere have failed to develop in full up to 
today — see Mernissi 2002: 101-103. In the 16th century one form of religious 
"capture of the mind" was replaced by a new one — that worked on the directly 
opposite psychological basis — that of understanding of meanings and their 
internalized re-organization. Yet that understanding was meant to be affectively 
hyper-generalized to capture the whole of the person. 
I use this terminology pointedly — to show a parallel with our contemporary 
use of Vygotsky's notion of "zone of proximal development" in very similar 
ways — in blatant overlook of the person-centered notion of teachingolearning 
(iobuchenie) that Vygotsky had in mind — Valsiner, Veer 1993; Veer, Valsiner 
1991.) 
6 For example, a blacksmith in Durham was persecuted by court in 1570 "[...] 
for reading of an English book, or primer, while as the priest was saying of his 
service, not minding what the priest read, but tending his own book and prayer" 
(Targoff 2001: 26). 
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the elite classes. It turns out it found its way from the church to school 
classroom: 
One consequence of this was that schooling саше to be separated even further 
from life in general, because there were no other contexts in which this 
language could be used for communicative purposes. Learning Latin, even 
more clearly than before, became an end in itself and an important element in 
the career of the chosen few who went on to study. But what was said and 
done during these lessons had very little relevance to the younger boys of the 
time. Students read texts in Latin over and over again during lessons, and they 
practiced grammar and regurgitated quotations and long excerpts. But, very 
likely, they were not able to connect this activity to their social life in general; 
the ritual was itself means and ends. (Säljö 2004: 182) 
There is some social role that means which become ends-in-them-
selves play in any society. Obviously one of the major functions is the 
making of social class distinctions. The learned people from the 
Middle Ages up to almost end of 20th Century needed to have learned 
Latin to distinguish themselves from the common people. In the 19th 
century, Russian aristocracy learned French before mastering Russian 
for the same purpose. In our contemporary psychology we hear 
complaints by non-native English speakers that their papers are 
ruthlessly rejected by native English speaking reviewers for "poor 
language". Even if this power-negotiation arena were to be reversed 
now and all psychology become published in Latin, the competitive 
class distinction making would remain the same'. Socio-cultural 
researchers have naively assumed that elimination of barriers between 
people, social groups, communities, and societies leads to the blissful 
and openly democratic communion with others. But at the demise of 
any "Berlin wall" in between divided cities, countries, or people are 
new walls that are in the process of construction. The assumption of 
"boundaries-free sharing" is appealing — yet unrealistic — human 
beings live on the basis of distinctions they constantly make (and re­
make). 
This process of re-making boundaries is well visible in the 16th 
century Europe where the Protestant Reformation took place. 
European societies were undergoing political and social changes that 
forced the religious institutions to undergo change. As any social 
In the beginning of the 20th century efforts were made to establish Esperanto as 
the standard international language of psychology. 
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change it entailed bouts of violence — directed at the symbolic 
religious objects of central relevance for the sermons. Crowds of 
iconoclasts raided churches to destroy sculpted and painted images, 
and altars — or at least verbally dishonor them (Wandel 1995). The 
submission context had given rise to its opposition — revolt against 
the symbols used to regulate people's conduct before. 
A Meadian look at prayer 
Prayer has features that are similar to psychotherapeutic techniques 
(Valsil'yuk 2005). From a researcher's perspective, prayer is a form of 
self-dialogue that is oriented upon the opening of the resistance 
boundaries of internalization/externalization through dynamic rituals, 
thus constituting a situated activity setting that directs the develop­
ment of hyper-generalized affective fields of meaning. Such fields 
guide all of human conduct (Valsiner 2005a). The act of prayer can be 
analyzed as a special case of a Meadian scheme of double function of 
the self-generated message (see Fig. 5). 
OUTWARD PROJECTION 
ASSUMED 
ROLES AND IDEAS, 
PROJECTED INTO OTHERS 
IMPORTATION INTO THE SELF (RESULTS) 
Figure 5. Microgenesis of the future: two feedback loops (after G. H. 
Mead). 
The making of the future entails inherent and inevitable duality. This 
is captured in Fig. 5 that represents the basic notion of "self s 
otherness" that G. H. Mead formulated in early 20th century (Mead 
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1912; 1913). Mead's idea is very parallel to the person<>setting 
duality notion that is the root of this exposition. In order to create 
oneself one has to create "the other" — both inside the self (I<>me 
linked opposition) and extra-personally {myselfo others linked 
opposition). Mead's perspective is based on the recognition that 
feedback from one's own outward actions to the intra-self system is 
inevitable. A person says something to another and in the process of 
doing so hears oneself doing it before the other responds. So — the 
first response to the selfs efforts to express oneself is by the self (the 
immediate feedback loop in Fig. 5), and it is only after that that the 
other may respond. 
It becomes evident from Figure 5 that two primary alterity 
relations — I <>me and outward projection о immediate feedback — 
constitute the domains where the person's Self <> Other relations are 
being worked out in the course of everyday living. In some sense, the 
self contains one's own "other" — a point made axiomatically by 
Dialogical Self theorists (Salgado 2006). Thus, the person is social 
through treating one's own self as "the other", in addition to the 
obvious importation of the social input from other human beings, in 
the communicative act. If we add to this one's own assuming social 
roles and its feed-forward onto the Iome system we can see the 
redundancy of communication and action in Mead's scheme. The 
other important feature in Mead's scheme is its open-endedness in 
both internal (I<>me relations) and external (person <> "other") loops. 
The latter of course guarantees uncertainty of living, yet the former is 
the key for innovation in case the external loop becomes "fixed" or 
stable. Hence the self-system is inherently novelty-constructive on 
both sides. 
If we were to apply the Meadian scheme of Fig. 5 to the context of 
prayer we find a self-organized experimental situation where the 
external feedback loop is temporarily eliminated (i.e., the object of the 
prayers actually does not respond — and in fact is not expected to 
respond — see Fig. 6). The regular process of prayer is an act of 
externalization that is feeding back into the internalization line as soon 
as it is being created. 
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ONLINE CONFESSION AND ABSOLUTION OF SINS 
In this section, you are given the opportunity to receive 
forgiveness for your sins, if this concept is in your belief system. 
You can be certain that we are sincere in this offer and that you 
are worthy to receive it. 
If you do believe this concept, you can receive forgiveness for 
your sins immediately. Doing this here online is a way of relieving 
yourself of your burden in a private, yet significant way. You can 
tell everything that is troubling your mjnd, get it out of your 
system and ask God for help. 
Through this action, you are inviting God into your heart to lift your burden from 
you and give you peace. You are putting your reguest out into the universe where 
you can receive the love and guidance you are seeking. 
This act of confession is not reguired by the Universal Life Church, or its 
Seminary, but we are offering it here for those to whom it can bring some peace 
of mind. You can confess vour sins in writing below or vou can do it in 
your own mind ancj just press the button. 
Pleage Know that we don't read tho?Q em?»!?. They flrq destroyed as soop 
as they arrive beçaMSg we feel that УОЧГ CQnfe^ion fc fretvyçen VQUrself 
and vour God. By destroying them, we set them free to travel the universe and 
find their destination. 
ABSOLUTION OF SINS APPLICATION FORM 
By filling out this form to confess your sin, you are requesting absolution - forgiveness of 
sin - and you acknowledge that you have considered your actions, are sorry for what you 
have done and sincerely desire to improve in the future. 





Please click "ABSOLUTION" only once 
Figure 6. A contemporary web-based confession system (added emphasis 
by underlining and boldface — J. V; from http://www.ulcseminary.org/ 
absolutionofsins.php). 
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General conclusions 
Human subjectivity is socially guided by promoter signs (Valsiner 
2004) — semiotic fields if forward-oriented function to guide the 
person towards socially desirable outcomes. Yet the history of how 
such outcomes themselves are socially constructed as desirable 
remains outside of consideration. By inventing hyper-generalized 
signs like "creativity", or "justice", or "sin" — human beings set up a 
guidance for their own actions and feelings (Valsiner 1999). 
Different interaction settings feed into the internalization proces­
ses — yet they cannot determine the latter. There are many public 
places — classrooms, public rituals, cinemas, etc. — where over-pro­
duction of meanings (Obeyesekere 1990) is given a socially oriented 
structure. People's activities in such settings lead to new forms of 
"boundary action". Persons who participate in social settings become 
separate from the settings through that very participation. While being 
embedded in the "here-and-now" setting, their semiotic construction 
leads them to create an ideational, "there-and-then" setting. The two 
worlds of meanings — "here-and-now" and "there-and-then" — 
constitute the partners of the constant internal dialogue of the person. 
The human psyche is constantly in tension about the internal move­
ment from "here and now" to somewhere else — not specifying, most 
of the time, where that "somewhere else" is and what it entails 
(Boesch 1997; Valsiner 2006b). 
All social development is based on the united opposition of Selfo 
Other, acted out in constant relating by the Self with the Other. The 
profoundly social experience — made possible through semiotic 
mediation — becomes deeply private one, as 
Man is the only being who knows he is alone, and the only one who seeks out 
another. His nature — if that word can be used in reference to man, who has 
"invented" himself by saying "No" to the nature — consists of his longing to 
realize himself in another. Man is nostalgia and a search for communion. 
Therefore, when he is aware of himself he is aware of his lack of another, that 
is, of his solitude. (Paz 1985: 195) 
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Семиотическое образование одиночества: 
процессы интернализации и экстернализации 
Люди создают себе личное окружение, где чувства и мысли про­
являются через семиосферу, созданную ситуационными контекстами 
действий. Центральным звеном человеческого развития являются 
интернализация и экстернализация — процессы, которые действуют 
в течении всей жизни. Контексты обучения организованы по­
средством семиотических ситуаций запроса (Semiotic Demand Set­
ting) и направляют развитие внутренней мотивации обучаемых. 
9 Available at http://www.semioticon.com/virtuals/risk/distrust.pdf. 
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Внутренная мотивация является процессом, который действует через 
обобщенные семиотические поля эмоций в наиболее центральных 
слоях интернализации. Это результат социального внушения — 
внушение обозначено как аффективное семиотическое поле, которое 
становится ценностью и начинает направлять последующие 
действия. 
Üksilduse semiootiline kujunemine: 
internalisatsiooni ja eksternalisatsiooni protsessid 
Inimesed loovad endale isikliku keskkonna, kus tunded ja mõtted tekivad 
läbi tegevuslikult seostatud semiosfääri. Inimese arengu keskprotsessiks 
on internaliseerumine ja eksternaliseerumine, mis kestavad läbi kogu elu. 
Koolituskontekstid on organiseeritud semiootiliste nÕudetingimuste kon­
tekstide (Semiotic Demand Setting) poolt ning nad suunavad õpilaste 
sisemise motivatsiooni arengut. Sisemine motivatsioon on protsess, mis 
toimib läbi intemaliseerunud üldistatud semiootiliste tunde väljade — just 
nimelt internaliseerumise keskseimas kihis. See on sotsiaalse sugereeri­
mise tulemus — sugestioon on üldistatud kui afektiivne väli, mis muutub 
väärtuseks ning hakkab tegutsema kui järgnevate tegevuste suunaja. 
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Abstract: Philosophers and social scientists of diverse orientations have sug­
gested that the pragmatics of semiosis is germane to a dynamic account of 
meaning as process. Semiosis, the central focus of C. S. Peirce's pragmatic 
philosophy, may hold a key to perennial problems regarding meaning. Indeed, 
Peirce's thought should be deemed seminal when placed within the cognitive 
sciences, especially with respect to his concept of the sign. According to 
Peirce's pragmatic model, semiosis is a triadic, time-bound, context-sensitive, 
interpreter-dependent, materially extended dynamic process. Semiosis in­
volves inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and 
events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of making 
and taking them. 
Pragmatism2, in its original formulation, can be defined as a theory of 
meaning.3 At first developed by C. S. Peirce, in the 1870s, in the am­
bience of a series of informal meeting under the guise of the Meta­
Also: Department of Computer Engineering and Industrial Automation, 
FEEC; University of Campinas, Campinas-SP, Brazil. 
2 We haved decided to use the more general term 'pragmatism', instead of the 
more specific, Peircean based term, 'pragmaticism', since our discussion includes 
'pragmatic' philosophers other than Peirce. 
3 We write 'original formulation' in order to differentiate between the strain of 
pragmatism that will be the focus of this inquiry and the more recent strain, often 
going by the name of 'neopragmatism', among the most notable proponents of 
which are Richard Rorty (1979; 1982) and Donald Davidson (1984). 
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physical Club at Harvard (see Fisch 1986), the theory is publicly pre­
sented by William James in 1898 (.Philosophical Conceptions and 
Practical Results), and thereafter formulated by John Dewey and F. C. 
S. Schiller. Despite the fact that Peirce continued to refer to pragma­
tism as an 'old idea', and include, among its precursors, Socrates, Ar­
istotle, Spinoza, and Kant, John Locke was in fact the first philosopher 
to precisely formulate a semiotic (pragmatic) theory of meaning (Waal 
2001:24). 
Conceived as strictly a 'logical principle', Peirce is against the 
transformation of pragmatism into a speculative philosophical attitude 
(Hookway 2004). At the same time, Peirce's pragmatism bears affin­
ity with Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a means of clari­
fying philosophical problems — most of which are pseudo-
problems — and of ignoring genuine problems or paradoxes that al­
low for no apparent solution, at least with respect to pragmatism's 
'logical principles'. As a matter of fact, scholars of pragmatism and 
Wittgenstein orientation tend to oscillate between what they consider 
'logical principles', 'methods', and 'rules'. Their philosophical thrust 
is 'therapeutic' rather than 'doctrinaire', and if the pragmatic philoso­
pher is an architectonic system builder, he nevertheless concedes that 
an absolutely final product, complete and free of all inconsistencies, 
can hardly be at hand, given (1) the concrete, practical affairs of 
pragmatism, and (2) our human fallibilism (Chisholm 1952). 
Introduced in 1878 in 'How to make our ideas clear', Peirce de­
fines pragmatism as a rule to clarify ideas, concepts, and propositions. 
In a latter essay published almost thirty years later in The Nation 
(1907), Peirce describes the central core of pragmatism in these con­
ditional terms: 'The full meaning of a conceptually grounded predicate 
implies certain types of events that would likely occur during the 
course of experience, according to a certain set of antecedent condi­
tions' (CSP-MS 318; CP 5.468).4 What, in this vein, is the most ap­
propriate means of introducing pragmatism? In his Harvard Lectures 
4 Following the scholarly tradition, Peirce's work will be referred to as CP 
(followed by volume and paragraph number for quotes from The Collected Papers 
of Charles S. Peirce, Peirce 1866-1913), EP (followed by volume and page num­
ber for quotes from The Essential Peirce, Peirce 1893-1913), MS (followed by 
reference number in accordance to Peirce 1967 for quotes from Peirce's manu­
scripts), and W (followed by volume and page number for quotes from Writings of 
Charles S. Peirce, Peirce 1839-1914). 
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of 1903 Peirce chose to introduce his philosophical posture through 
examples from what he called 'normative science'. He based the or­
ganization of these examples on the what we will label the concepts of 
inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, the world, and inter­
preters. 
Semiosis implies process. In this regard, we follow Rescher in his 
definition of a process as "[...] a coordinated group of changes in the 
complexion of reality, an organized family of occurrences that are 
systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally" 
(Rescher 1996: 38). Semiotics entails the project of 'cutting' minute 
portions of the process and actualizing them as signs for observation, 
formal study, analysis, and synthesis. The result, historically, brought 
about the spectrum of human intellectual endeavors including mathe­
matics, logic, the physical and biological sciences, the social sciences, 
and philosophy and the 'normative sciences' (aesthetics, ethics, logic) 
(see Parker 1998; Potter 1997). The entire range of these intellectual 
semiotic endeavors, as well as the semiotics of everyday life including 
feelings, emotions, and concepts, make up the whole of human semi­
otics, carved out of the semiosic continuum. 
1. Peirce's concept of semiotics 
Peirce's concept of Semiotics as the 'formal science of signs', and the 
pragmatic notion of meaning as the 'action of signs' (semiosis), have 
had a deep impact in philosophy, psychology, theoretical biology, and 
cognitive sciences (see Jakobson 1960; Thom 1975; Prigogine, Sten-
gers 1983; Freeman 1983; Fetzer 1988; 1997; Colapietro 1989; Tier-
celin 1995; Hoffmeyer 1996; Houser et al. 1997; Brunning, Forster 
1997; Deacon 1997; Freadman 2004; Hookway 2002; 2004; Misak 
2004; Pietarinen 2005; Magnani 2007; Stjernfelt forthcoming). First 
and foremost, Peirce's semiotics is grounded on a list of categories — 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness — which corresponds to an exhaus­
tive system of hierarchically organized classes of relations (Houser et 
al. 1997). This system makes up the formal foundation of his philoso­
phy (Parker 1998) and of his model of semiotic action (Murphey 
1993:303-306). 
In brief, the categories can be defined as: (1) Firstness: what is 
such as it is, without reference to anything else; (2) Secondness: what 
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is such as it is, in relation with something else, but without relation 
with any third entity; (3) Thirdness: what is such as it is, insofar as it 
is capable of bringing a second entity into relation with a first one in 
the same way that it brings itself into relation with the first and the 
second entities. Firstness is the category of vagueness, freedom, nov­
elty and originality — 'firstness is the mode of being which consists in 
its subject's being positively such as it is regardless of anything else. 
That can only be a possibility' (CP 1.25). Secondness is the category 
of reaction, opposition, differentiation, existence — 'generally speak­
ing genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon another, — 
brute action' [...] 'I consider the idea of any dyadic relation not in­
volving any third as an idea of secondness' (CP 8.330). Thirdness is 
the category of mediation, habit, generality, growth, and conceptuali­
zation or cognition (CP 1.340). In another way of putting the catego­
ries: Firstness is possibility, what might become, Secondness is what is 
taken to be what is within some particular context, and Thirdness is 
what in all probability would be, given a certain set of conditions (for 
further on categories, see Hookway 1985; Murphey 1993; Potter 
1997). 
1.1. The Peircean sign 
Peirce defined semiosis as an irreducible triadic relation between a 
Sign, its Object (the object, act or event with which it inter-relates) 
and its Interprétant (that which is becoming interpreted through its 
inter-action with its interpreter) — we will hereafter refer to this sign 
triad as S, O, and I (CP 2.171, CP 2.274). That is, according to Peirce, 
any description of semiosis involves a relation constituted by three 
irreducibly connected terms, which are its minimal constitutive ele­
ments (MS 318:81; CP 2.242). In Peirce's words: 
My definition of a sign is: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so 
determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself\ called 
its Object, while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential 
Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interprétant created by the Sign, 
that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object. (CP 
8.177; emphasis in the original) 
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Peirce conceives a 'Sign' or 'Representamen' as a 'First' (S) which 
stands in a genuine triadic relation with a 'Second', called its 'Object' 
(O), which is in the process of 'determining a Third', called its 'Inter­
prétant' (Г), which assumes the same triadic relation with that Object 
(CP 2.274). The triadic relation between S, О and I is regarded by 
Peirce as irreducible, in the sense that it is not decomposable into any 
simpler relation. Thus the term 'sign' was used by Peirce to designate 
the irreducible triadic process between S, О and I as well as to refer to 
the first term of the triad. Some commentators proposed that we 
should distinguish between the 'sign in this strict sense' and the 'sign 
in a broad sense' (e.g., Johansen 1993: 62). Signs, conceived in the 
broad sense, are never alone. The triadic process of sign making and 
sign taking is just that: process. 
1.2. The sign process 
As Savan (1986: 134) argues, an interprétant is both the third term of a 
given triadic relation and the first term (sign) of a subsequent triadic 
relation. This is the reason why semiosis cannot be defined as an 
isolated triad; it necessarily involves the continuous development of 
triads actualized from semiosis (see Merrell 1995). In Savan's (1987— 
1988: 43) words, the terms interprétant, sign and object compose a 
triad whose definition can only be circular; each one of the three terms 
is defined by the other two. The only properties to be found in 5, О 
and / are in the functional role; there is no distinct essential or 
substantive property, for at any given instant what was an S can become 
an О or an I, and the same can be said of О and I (Tienne 1992). 
Indeed, one of the most remarkable characteristics of Peirce's the­
ory of signs is its dynamical nature. The complex (S-O-I) is the focal-
factor of a dynamical process (Hausman 1993: 72). As a truly process 
thinker, it was quite natural that Peirce conceived semiosis as basi­
cally a process in which triads are systematically linked to one another 
so as to form a web. Sign processes are inter-relatedly extended within 
the spatiotemporal dimension, so that something physical has to in­
stantiate or realize them. This means that signs cannot act unless they 
are spatiotemporally realized (see Emmeche 2003; Deacon 1999). If a 
sign is to have any active mode of being, it must be materially em­
bodied. 
6 
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1.3. Meaning and semiosis 
Peirce defined meaning as the consequence of triadic inter-relations of 
S-O-I as a whole (EP 2:429), as well through differential correlates 
among the sign, the object (MS 11, EP 2:274), and the interprétant 
(EP 2:496, EP 2:499; CP 4:536) (see Fitzgerald 1966: 84; Bergman 
2000). This notion of meaning is derived from his definition of the 
sign as a medium for the communication of a form or a habit embod­
ied in the object to the interprétant, so as to determine the interpreter's 
behavior through inter-related inter-action with the sign (see Tienne 
2003; Hulswitt 2001; Bergman 2000). Peirce spoke of the sign as a 
'conveyer', as a 'medium' (MS 793), as 'embodying meaning'. 
A Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. [...] As 
a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which de­
termines it, and to its Interprétant which it determines. [...] That which is 
communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interprétant is a Form; 
that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that 
something would happen under certain conditions. (MS 793: 1-3; EP2, p. 544, 
n. 22) 
In short, for Peirce a sign is both 'a Medium for the communication of 
a Form' and 'a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and 
to its Interprétant which it determines'. If we consider both definitions 
of a sign, we can say that semiosis is a triadic process of communica­
tion of a form from the object to the interprétant by the sign mediation. 
1.4. Form communication 
Form is defined as having the 'being of predicate' (EP 2.544) and it is 
also pragmatically formulated as a 'conditional proposition' stating 
that certain things would happen under specific circumstances (EP 
2.388). But for Peirce, form is nothing like a 'thing' (Tienne 2003), 
but something that is embodied in the object (EP 2.544, n. 22) as a 
habit, a 'rule of action' (CP 5.397, CP 2.643), a 'disposition' (CP 
5.495, CP 2.170), a 'real potential' (EP 2.388) or, simply, a 'perma­
nence of some relation' (CP 1.415). 
Form can also be defined as potentiality ('real potential', EP 
2.388). If we consider this definition, we will also come to the conclu-
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sion that form can show the nature of both firstness and thirdness. 
Consider that potentiality is not the same as mere possibility. For the 
sake of our argument, consider Peirce's treatment of Quality as a 
'mere abstract potentiality' (CP 1.422). It is abstraction not in the 
sense of a reduction of complexity to formal simplicity, but in the 
sense that the quality in question has been 'abstracted' ('cut') from the 
continuum of possibilities. 
Quality, then, has the nature of Firstness, being essentially inde­
terminate and vague. But we can also talk about a generality of Qual­
ity. In this case, we are beyond the domain of pure Firstness, since 
generality refers to some law-like tendency. Peirce works in this case 
with a merging of Firstness and Thirdness. As an abstract potentiality, 
Quality is closer to a blend of Firstness and Thirdness, than to pure 
Firstness. Such a treatment seems to be compatible with Peirce's cate­
gorical scheme, since, as Potter (1997: 94) stresses, the categorical 
structure which Peirce uses is 'highly subtle and complex, admitting 
of various combinations'. 
For Murphey, there is a transition from the notion of meaning as a 
qualitative conception carried by a sign to a relational notion accord­
ing to which the meaning of a concept consists in a 'law relating op­
erations performed upon the object or conditions of perceptions to 
perceived effects' (Flower, Murphey 1977: 589). The qualitative con­
ception involves reference to the sign's ground, while the 'law' or 
necessary conditions of perception are relational rather than qualita­
tive — 'If the meaning of a concept of an object is to consist in the 
conditionals relating operations on the object to perceived effects, 
these conditionals will in fact be habits' (Flower, Murphey 1977: 
590). 
This brings about a constrained set of effects of the Object on the 
interpreter through the mediation of the Sign. In short, Peirce defines a 
Sign both as 'a Medium for the communication of a Form' and as 'a 
triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpré­
tant which it determines'. If we consider both definitions of a Sign, we 
can say that semiosis is a triadic process of communication of a form 
from the Object to the Interprétant by the Sign mediation. 
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1.5. The emerging process as form-becoming 
Meaning can also be conceived as the emergence of a process involv­
ing S, О and 1 through mediation of I. It can be seen as a process 
working as a constraining factor of possible patterns of interpretative 
behaviors. Taking the notion of a form into account, an understanding 
of meaning becomes a dynamic, processual inter-action by the inter­
preter of a sign through co-participation between that sign and the in­
terpreter. A possible form emerges through this mutual co-participa­
tion. In this manner a genuine sign without a co-participant is mean­
ingless. Since the sign maker and taker as interpreter emerges out of 
co-participation with the sign, the existence of a possible form is em­
bodied in S, О and I, and a habit is intrinsic to the sign and the inter­
preter acting on the sign. This entails a constrained set of effects on 
the interpreter that can be fruitfully connected to Rosenthal's (1994) 
pragmatic approach to meaning as an emergent relational pattern of 
behavior.5 
The form-becoming is the realization of a habit of inter-action em­
bodied in the Object to the interpreter so as to constrain its behavior. 
This brings about a constrained set of effects of the Object on the in­
terpreter through the mediation of the Sign. 
2. Habit forming 
It is well known among Peirce scholars that habit occupies a central 
position in Peirce's pragmatism (for a summary see Almeder 1980; 
Hookway 1985). Peirce's habit entails a disposition to act in a certain 
ways under certain circumstances, especially when the carrier of the 
habit is stimulated, animated, or guided by certain motives (CP 5.480). 
The meaning of a Peircean sign is most adequately understood 
through the habits of action, reaction, and thought they provoke, sus­
tain, and modify in the event that the habit carrier wishes to bring 
about a change of the customary response to a given sign. When 
The term 'emergence' has both an ordinary use, in which people employ the 
expression 'the emergence ofx' just to mean that \x has appeared', and a technical 
use. Stephan (1998: 639) writes that 'in most technical uses, "emergent" denotes a 
second order property of certain first order properties (or structures), namely, the 
first order properties that are emergent' (see Queiroz, El-Hani 2006). 
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somebody says a diamond is 'hard', that person means that a dia­
mond's nature includes the ability to cut glass and other substances. 
That person's disposition to conceive of a diamond in this way — 
rather than simply conceiving it for ornamental purposes — consti­
tutes, pragmatically, what 'hardness' means, and 'diamond' means in 
terms of its characteristics and its nature. In this manner, a sign (tri-
adically) communicates a habit (potentiality, disposition) embodied in 
the object to its interprétant. If this person in question had once con­
sidered diamonds strictly in terms of rare gems, and ornamentation, 
then the characteristics and nature of diamonds were previously some­
thing other than they now are. Consequently, the meaning of 'dia­
mond', and the habit of deriving such meaning, changed when a dia­
mond became a means for qualifying 'hardness'. This is to say that the 
notion of semiosis as form communicated from S to О to / through 
mediation allows us to conceive of semiosis, and meaning and mean­
ing change, in a non-substantive, processual way, as a constraining 
factor of possible patterns of interpretative behavior through habit and 
change of habit. 
3. Distinguishing Peirce 
from other theories of signs and their meaning 
3.1. Frege's legacy 
Classical theories of reference assume a strong connection between a 
sign, its meaning, and its reference. Knowing the meaning of a sign is 
knowing how it refers. Gottlob Frege simplified this formula (Frege 
1970; Dummett 1972). He drew a distinction between 'sense' (Sinn) 
and 'reference' (Bedeutung). 'Sense' is grasped when a sign is under­
stood, and this 'sense' determines its 'reference'. Frege is often re­
garded as the prime initiator of 'logicism' — the wedding of logic and 
mathematics, with the former hopefully becoming the repository of all 
thought and the latter the queen of the sciences. According to Frege, if 
language could be liberated from vagueness and ambiguity, it could 
become a respectable instrument of unequivocal meaning and thought. 
In other words, by 'logicizing' language, its weaknesses could be 
strengthened, its blemishes could be erased, and future mistakes could 
be avoided. From the Olympian reaches of the highest rooftops the 
world could eventually be seen from a detached God's-eye view. 
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The task Frege set for himself by way of this 'sense/reference' dis­
tinction was monumental: to establish a method for determining link­
ages between the objective world and its representation in signs. 
Equality of meaning of different signs referring to the same object 
became the watchword. The dilemma was that Frege's grand game 
plan involved rendering two virtually incompatible domains virtually 
equivalent: language on the one hand, and the furniture of the world 
on the other. Frege argued that while two signs with the same 'refer­
ence'— Venus, for example — could have two senses — the 'morning 
star' and the 'evening star' — two signs with the same sense could not 
enjoy the luxury of different 'reference'. By way of definitions, the 
intension (sense) of a sign consists of the conception of the sign, irre­
spective of that to which it refers. Extension (reference) consists of the 
things to which that conception refers. Intension used in this context 
must be distinguished from intension (of intensionality), a phenome-
nological term entailing the property of consciousness whereby it re­
fers to or intends an object. The intensional object is not necessarily 
existent, but can be merely what the mental act is about, whereas ex­
tension presumably involves the 'real' furniture of the objective world 
(Avni 1990). 
Thus, 'Venus is Venus' is a tautology. In contrast, 'That star up 
there in the dark expanse is Venus' is not. It bears reference, exten­
sion. 'The evening star is Venus' has both reference and sense, inten­
sion. But 'The morning star is Venus' also spots reference and sense. 
Reference is one ('Venus') but sense is two ('evening star', and 
'morning star'). However, Frege assures us that no problem exists 
inasmuch as we specify 'reference' to objects in the physical world, so 
it is still smooth sailing toward clear and distinct thinking and mean­
ing. Apparently the relations between Frege's signs and the world is 
not that of symmetry, but asymmetry. However, this problem was in a 
manner of speaking pushed under the rug, for the sign's intensionality 
(sense) was highlighted somewhat at the expense of extensionality 
(reference), and language itself, that apparently ubiquitous partner to 
mind, held the trump card. Which is what we might have expected, 
since Frege stacked the deck from the beginning. 
But more questions arise: Do sentences impart any information re­
garding their presumed objects of 'reference' (Venus, morning star, 
evening star), or simply about the signs themselves ('Venus', 'morn­
ing star', 'evening star')? If the latter is the case, then how comes it 
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that we would like to be comforted by the soothing idea that 'refer­
ence' is fixed, while meanings may suffer alterations? If meanings 
change, how can signs actually 'refer to' the same things in the world? 
If signs do not necessarily 'refer to' the same things but to variable 
'semiotic entities', then do the 'real' things of the world actually make 
much difference regarding the engendering of meaning? Can mean­
ings be something found in things 'referred to', or are meanings em­
bodied within their respective signs? Or in the final analysis, do words 
hook onto world. 
3.2. Saussure 
The Swiss linguist whose life parallels that of Peirce eschews diach-
rony and develops a tunnel-minded obsession with synchrony. Lan­
guage, at a particular synchronic slice, is conceived to be virtually 
immutable; it is for the purpose of analytic practice a bedrock of order 
and stability. According to this notion, meaning remains fundamen­
tally the same independently of any and all individual sign users with 
specific contexts; language is no slave to the wishes and whims of the 
individual; if change there be, it comes about through the linguistic 
practices of the entire community. Language is ultimately grounded in 
rock-solid objectivity. It must exist outside all individual conscious­
ness in order that there might be communication at all; yet at the same 
time it must be ready and available to any and all speakers, who in the 
beginning internalized it, and as individuals, are now slaves to lan­
guage, unlike Humpty-Dumpty whose words mean exactly what he 
wants them to mean (Saussure 1966). 
Language study in terms of a static, autonomous synchronic slice 
divorced of the evolutionary history of language carries the implica­
tion that: (1) there is little to no consideration of time, (2) language is 
self-sufficient and has no need of the physical world and lines of cor­
respondence between signs and objects, (3) meaning is constructed 
exclusively within language, (4) meaning, derived from a signi-
fier/signified binary relationship, is in the brain-mind of the speaker 
and hearer, and to the entire speech community to which they belong, 
(5) consequently there is no legitimate appreciation of the process of 
sign development and evolution of signs (Harris 1987). 
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In sum, if we take Saussure at face value, we have hardly more re­
course than to toss time, process, change, history, and the idea of 
contextuality, in the trash heap. Understandably, Saussure has come 
under attack in recent decades from a variety of views (Derrida 1974; 
Harris 2002; Thibault 1996). 
3.3. Information theory 
The mathematical theory of communication is a branch of mathemat­
ics that arose out of communication theory. As Shannon and Weaver 
defined it, '[t]he fundamental problem of communication is that of 
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message 
selected at another point' (Shannon, Weaver 1949: 31). According to 
Adams (2003: 472), 'at the foundation of information theory is the 
development of methods to measure the amount of information gener­
ated by an event or events, and mathematical treatments of the trans­
mission characteristics of communication channels'. It relies on the 
theory of probability to model information sources, flow, and commu­
nication channels. Information is measured in terms of the unexpect­
edness of the sequence of signals, written H = £ pt log (1 //?,), where p, 
is the probability of the z'th form of signal. 
This theory allows one to define information as the measure of the 
probability of selection of a particular message among the set of all 
possible messages. The probabilistic measure of information provided 
by this theory is non-semantic, indifferent to meaning (Shannon, 
Weaver 1949: 31). 
A sign is decoded by the emitter and transmitted through a me­
dium, then encoded by the receiver. The medium can be compact and 
diffuse air patterns between speaker and listener, black marks on paper 
between writer and reader, or electrical impulses between telephone 
messages sent and messages received. Francisco Varela calls this the 
'conduit tube' theory (1979). It is as if the emitter sent signs through a 
conduit tube and they are received by the receiver, and, if by some 
miracle the receiver takes in an exact replication of those signs, 
meaning is preserved. But actually, there virtually no regard for 
meaning in information theory. Rather, information theory is based on 
the statistical probability of a set of signs creating an intelligible com­
bination, a relatively intelligible combination in spite of some back­
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ground noise, or of the set become a mere scramble, noise. Meaning is 
by and large ignored. 
3.4. Kripke 
Kripke generally follows the 'causal theory' of reference according to 
which the object 'causes' particular mental events that then call up 
meaning (Kripke 1972; 1977; 1980). In some way, 'the referent must 
be historically, or, we might say, causally connected to the speech act' 
(Donellan 1972: 377). The causal theory explains the power of words 
in their referring to objects in terms of causal chains that include the 
objects of signs and the speaker's and hearer's representations of 
them. A singular sign 'rigidly designates' a particular object; this 
designation is a matter of the appropriate causal links holding between 
the object and the sign's use. This theory 'seems to promise not only a 
unified treatment of the various object-involving phenomena [by way 
of knowledge, memory, belief, empirical evidence], but a naturalistic 
and possibly even physicalist one as well' (Stampe 1979: 87). 
This is an 'objectivist-realist' view (in this regard see Kripke's 
(1982) reaction to Wittgenstein's skeptical argument). Consequently, 
imaginary signs, or fictions, cannot work like objectivist linguistic 
constructions. If they did, there would be no knowing whether or not 
life is just a dream. But it is not a dream, according to the objectivist-
realist, for the world is real. And this reality is accessible, if we could 
just get things right by correctly hooking worlds onto the furniture of 
the world. Representation, reference, and meaning, then, are quite le­
gitimate. There is according to this theory definitely a correspondence 
between language and objects, acts, and events. The upshot is that 
meaning is derived from this dualistic combination of sign and thing. 
Context is consequently given little consideration (Hacking 1993). 
3.5. Lakoff and Johnson 
Understanding entails the world we made, our semiotic world, and the 
way we experience it. Such understanding involves body and mind as 
a whole, as bodymind, and our capacities and skills, values, moods 
and attitudes, within our entire cultural tradition. Meaning as a body-
7 
50 Joâo Queiroz, Floyd Merrell 
mind process is a matter of creating 'schemes' as models of knowing 
and meaning making (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). 1 Schemes involve 
the way we are bound up within a linguistic community, our aesthetic 
sensibilities, logical and rational modes of comprehending out world, 
and our ethical standards. 
Understanding entails, in this manner, and to use the terms of our 
argument, our inter-active, inter-relatedness with and from within our 
world, our cultural institutions, our linguistic tradition, and our his-
toricized context. It is our concretely sensed world as well as our 
world of abstractions. The whole of our contextualized understanding 
comes to bear on the meaning we arrive at with respect to each and 
every sign (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). We would tend to concur at least 
with this aspect of Lakoff and Johnson's general view of meaning, and 
it is by and large commensurate with Peirce's thought. 
4. In capsule form 
Table 1 offers a schematic picture of the diverse concepts of meaning 
since Frege's time. A study of the similarities and contrasts among the 
capsules making up the scheme leads one to the observation that 
solely the Peircean Mode, (1) adequately accounts for semiosic-
semiotic processes in time in terms of past-present-future, (2) 
correlates time with three forms of semiosis according to the nature of 
the categories, (3) considers differences (a) between the components 
of the sign, (b) between signs and other signs, (c) between the 
categories, (d) between mind, body and world, and (e) 'in here' and 
'out there' and empirical and non-empirical, as a matter of degree 
rather than kind, dynamic potential continuity rather than static 
discontinuity, process rather than product, (4) embodies the mind, and 
the embodied mind is involved to a greater or lesser degree according 
to the sign type and the category or categories in question, and (5) 
genuinely includes context dependency of signs, their objects, their 
interpretation, and their interpreters — since those interpreters are, 
themselves, signs among signs. The five non-Peircean theories 
encapsulated in Table 1 account for at least one or more of the five 
qualifications, but only Peirce's concept of the sign and meaning 
includes all of them. 
Table 1. A comparison of some concepts of meaning. 
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5. On the pragmatic maxim 
From 1878 until the end of his life, Peirce made various attempts at es­
tablishing a general principle to account for meaning. He called that 
principle the 'pragmatic maxim'. The maxim is the means for con­
structing the meaning of a sign as a consequence of practical validation 
of the sign put in the form of a proposition whose nature is that of: (1) a 
conjecture as to the possible meaning of the sign (Firstness), (3) the 
conjecture formulated as a hypothesis — what would likely result and 
render the possible meaning likely, if certain conditions inhere (Third-
ness), and (2) the hypothesis put to the test in order to ascertain whether 
or not the possible meaning is acceptable (Secondness). 
Priority is placed on: (1) imagining what might transpire regarding 
the sign in question when put within the contexts of other signs, (2) 
conceiving of a viable hypothesis that might be the consequence of the 
sign's inter-action within that context, and (3) determining the conse­
quences of such practical inter-action. Experience, or sensibility, is the 
chief watchword: 'Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible ef­
fects'. And the consequence of experience yields a tentative answer to 
the problem of meaning: 'The possible practical consequences of a 
concept constitute the sum total of the concept' (EP 2: 139). For 
Hookway (2004: 121), the maxim must prove the consequence of 
'identifying and describing these sensible effects' of the sign — Peirce 
emphasizes this verificationist theme in his pragmatism when he 
writes that he only desires 
to point out how impossible it is that we have an idea in our minds which re­
lates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything 
is our idea of its sensible effects. (W3: 266) 
This is to imply that just as signs become other signs in the continuous 
semiosic-semiotic process, so also meanings are always becoming 
something other than what they were becoming, and this becoming is 
the consequence of a set of initial conditions that are acted on by a 
potential knower. In Peirce's words: 
In general, we may say that meanings are inexhaustible. We are too apt to 
think that what one means to do and the meaning of a word are quite unrelated 
meanings of the word 'meaning', or that they are only connected by both re­
ferring to some actual operation of the mind. Professor Royce especially in his 
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great work The World and the Individual has done much to break up this mis­
take. In truth the only difference is that when a person means to do anything 
he is in some state in consequence of which the brute reactions between things 
will be moulded [in] to conformity to the form to which the man's mind is it­
self moulded, while the meaning of a word really lies in the way in which it 
might, in a proper position in a proposition believed, tend to mould the con­
duct of a person into conformity to that to which it is itself moulded. Not only 
will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mould reactions to itself, 
but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this 
element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is 
that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the fu­
ture. (CP 1.343) 
5.1. How the maxim works 
In Peirce's first rendition of the maxim in 1878, which is the most 
commonly cited, we have the following: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402; also 5.2, 5.9, 
5.18,5.427, and MS 327) 
Notice how a combination of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness is 
implied in the maxim. We are asked to consider the practical bearings 
of the effects (Secondness) that whatever is under consideration might 
conceivably have (Firstness) given certain prevailing conditions 
(Thirdness). Then, we will have what we conceive would be result if 
the perceived world were of such-and-such a nature, according to what 
we imagine might possibly be the case (Nesher 1983). 
However, since what emerges out of our imaginative faculties is 
not only unpredictable but virtually without definite limits, the nature 
of what we would expect will ensue according to the myriad ways our 
world would be perceived and conceived would be equally unlimited, 
given all possible times and places, here and there and in the past, pre­
sent, and future. The maxim, in this regard, plays on our imagining 
what might possibly be the case in one of an unlimited number of 
contexts. So there can be no closure, since tomorrow might usher in 
some unforeseen possibilities of the imagination or of the perceived 
and conceived world that might end in new probabilities (of Third­
ness) of actualization in the world (of Secondness). 
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The maxim has to do with the semiotic subject's construction of 
her world. It is a matter of her making what appears to be the case the 
case, at least for her at a given space-time juncture. It is a method not 
for determining whether a set of signs, characteristically in the form of 
a sentence or set of sentences, is timelessly and undeniably 'true'. 
Rather, it is an indeterminately variable method for inter-acting with 
signs in such a way that the 'semiotic world' with which they inter­
relate appears to be the case. And in the process their meaning 
emerges: the maxim enables signs — including the semiotic agents, 
ourselves — to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps. 
This is to say that the maxim essentially stipulates that the meaning 
of a sign regarding what appears to be the case is the product of all 
conceivable consequences presented by other sentences — and their 
own consequences — engendered from the original sentence. This 
product of all conceivable consequences entails the translation of the 
initial sign or sentence into a series of conditional sentences the ante­
cedents of each of which prescribe certain interactions between the 
interpreter and the signs in question. The consequences, ideally, con­
sist of observable sign phenomena that should or would make them­
selves manifest in the event that the original signs or sentences are 
indeed 'true'. 
But 'truth', we repeat, is not the specific goal when applying the 
pragmatic maxim. The specific task at hand is to draw meaning from 
the signs being processed by way of their interactive interrelations. 
The interpreter takes the initial signs and creates a hypothetical situa­
tion by imagining what would most likely ensue. Then he puts his hy­
pothetical signs to the test in terms of a thought experiment 'in here' 
or by interacting with the signs' objects 'out there' in order to see if he 
was right. If his hypothesis turns out to appear correct for the time 
being, the possibility nonetheless remains that other hypothetical may 
at future moments present themselves, compelling her to repeat the 
operation. If his initial hypothesis is found deficient, then back to the 
drawing board for an alternative hypothetical, in which case she re­
peats the operation. And so on. 
Semiosis and pragmatism 55 
5.2. The maxim is never infallible 
We should by no means take the maxim as a method to 'perfect clear­
ness', as Peirce's long-time friend, William James put it (James 1920: 
411-412; Potter 1996: 94). The maxim is capable of putting us on the 
road toward clarity, but never perfect clarity. Perfect clarity does not 
exist for us, since all signs according to Peirce and as we have ob­
served, given their nature as signs, are to a greater or lesser degree 
caught up in vagueness, for, fallible as we are, there is always some 
degree of uncertainty in our sign interpretations. 
What the maxim does is put us on the track toward some future 
time when we will hopefully know more than we now know (in other 
words, our knowing will hopefully be less vague). It tells us to enter­
tain our imagination that so-and-so might be the case of the object, 
act, or event in questions if certain conditions are in place. The object, 
act, or event possesses certain characteristics, but at this point they are 
no more than that: possibilities (Firstness) as far as our awareness 
goes. None of these possibilities has yet become actual (Secondness) 
for the sign maker and taker. If and when it is actualized for us, then, 
and only then, can we properly conceptualize it as a sign (interprétant, 
Thirdness). In the sense of the futurity of the maxim, then, we have 
the possibility that, along with our imaginary conception of the matter 
at hand, we should by the maxim be able to get an idea in terms of 
what most likely would happen in the event that certain circumstances 
would be actualized. 
In the final analysis, a Peircean meaning of the sign is not a thing 
or an entity. It is an emergent process resulting from the inter-action 
between S-O-I within particular contexts. This is to say that a sign's 
meaning emerges through realizing the consequences of certain inter­
action between the sign and other signs brought about by the seeker of 
that sign's meaning. In this manner, it cannot be said that meaning is 
in the sign, in some talking and thinking head, in the referent of the 
sign, or in the medium by which the sign is transported to its potential 
receiver and interpreter. This point was very emphatically made by 
Hilary Putnam (1975; 1988). 
But that is not all. Just as a given interpreter has acquired habits of 
feeling and sensing and thought within a social context that includes 
the community to which the interpreter belongs, so also meaning is by 
no means exclusively an individual affair. Anybody who interprets a 
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sign bring the baggage of the entire life of the social conventions by 
means of which he learned what he knows through habituation of his 
social practices. This includes past experiences and present experi­
ences that collaborate to create expectations regarding what the future 
holds in store. Sign meaning, then, also integrates other signs and their 
own interpreters — since any and all interpreters are signs among 
signs. It includes the entire community of semiotic agents. 
The focus, then rests chiefly on the interprétant (/) of the sign. In 
principle, it could imply an infinite regress were it not for the inter­
preter putting a stop to the process by 'cutting' out an I that, in col­
laboration with S and О that had previously been 'cut' out, produces 
an effect on the interpreter himself. When the interpreter has inter­
acted with the S, О and /, as a result of this effect, he then creates an­
other S. This / includes the original sign's meaning, which has become 
in essence another sign 'cut' from the continuum within this altered 
context of the interpreter, now having constructed the original sign's 
interpretation. Since every context of an emergent sign is compara­
ble — but never identical — to past contexts, the sign's interpretation 
creates a new context in the virtually immediate future, and hence the 
S becomes something other than what it was in the process of becom­
ing, and so also the O, both of which call for mediation by a poten­
tially different I. And the triadic process begins anew. In this manner 
it can be said that Peircean signs are self-correcting (see Ransdell 
1977: 162). 
6.1. Meaning in the making within a human context — 
meaning as form becoming 
As an illustration of meaning change within altering contexts that give 
rise to the emergence of signs becoming other signs, consider the case 
of the term 'atom'. 'Atoms' were according to the Greek Democritus 
minuscule 'solid, indivible spheres'. This is spacetime slice] out of the 
continuum of semiosic possibilities. During John Dalton's days at the 
beginning stages of the scientific revolution, when 'atoms' of one sub­
stance were conceived to combine with 'atoms' of another substance 
to form conglomerates or 'molecules', 'atoms' were conceived as 
solid spheres with minute 'hooks' that could attach one 'atom' with 
another 'atom' to form a new substance. This is spacetime slices 
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During the later half of the nineteenth century under the influence of 
Maxwell-Faraday 'field theory', 'atoms' were conceived as micro­
scopic spatial 'vortices': spacetime slice3. After John Rutherford dis­
covered in the early years of the twentieth century that 'atoms' actu­
ally consisted of collections of 'subatomic' entities, he created the 
visual image of an 'atom' as akin to a plum pudding, with the 'suba­
tomic' entities embedded in the 'atomic' medium: spacetime slice^ 
Shortly thereafter, Niels Bohr created the picture of an 'atom' as a 
'nucleus' surrounded by gyrating 'subatomic' entities, somewhat like 
a tiny solar system. An 'atom' is in this sense largely 'vacuous': 
spacetime slices. In the 1920s Werner Heisenberg proposed that an 
'atom' is describable as an abstract mathematical 'matrix', thus doing 
away with picture theories altogether: spacetime sliceö. A short time 
later, the de Broglie-Schrödinger interpretation had it that an 'atom' is 
a 'wave amplitude'. It becomes substantive only after inter-action with 
some co-participant entity, which could be the observer through his 
detecting instrument. In this interpretation, an 'atom' is picturable, if 
at all, as a hazy cloud of possibilities: spacetime slice. 
What, then, is the meaning of 'atom'? If we consider each space-
time slice as a 'world' in and of itself, then each 'world' is a static 
increment followed by a successive and equally static 'world'. This is 
the equivalent of McTaggart's (McTaggart, McTaggart 1927) atempo-
ral S-series. There is a 'world' before, and a 'world' after. But there is 
no flow of time. There is no temporal present sliding along the knife 
edge of time becoming something other than what it was becoming in 
the past and becoming something that will have been becoming in the 
future. This temporality would be McTaggart's A-series. A Saussurean 
conception would be akin to the B-series. Kripke's 'causal' theory of 
meaning also ignores process, as does information theory, that focuses 
on decoding and recoding messages that remain intact when trans­
ferred through the sign medium. Frege's concept of meaning renders 
an account of different interpretations, through time, of sense regard­
ing the same reference, but it does not account for any change of ref­
erence as it is conceived within varying contexts. Only the Peircean 
processual approach to the sign adequately includes the equivalent of 
McTaggart's A-series time. 
Peircean meaning, in the final analysis, is indeterminately variable. 
It is a triadic, context-sensitive, interpreter-dependent, materially ex­
tended and embodied dynamic process. As such, it involves inter-
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relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and 
events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of 
making and taking them. 
6.2. Implications of the Peircean theory of meaning 
Peirce's theory, outlined in this essay, is of the nature of processual 
becoming, from possibility (Firstness) to actuality (Secondness) to 
potentiality (Thirdness in mediation with Firstness and Secondness) as 
one of the indeterminate number of possibilities, any of which could 
have been actualized in place of what was selected for actualization). 
In this sense, account is given of genuine triadic semiosis. Semiosis 
includes not merely signs of intellection (thought-signs) but also signs 
of feeling, and inter-related inter-action (bodymind-signs). In this re­
spect, Lakoff and Johnson warrant a favorable nod. 
But there is more to this story. It bears on the notion that whatever 
logic there may be, it cannot be other than multi-valued. And above 
all, as illustrated in the previous paragraphs, it must include time. The 
notion of meaning must be non-linearly applied, and change must be 
allowed. What is meaningful in one spacetime slice can become 
meaningless in another one, and what is meaningful within one space-
time slice can have emerged from what was meaningful within a pre­
vious spacetime slice but has become meaningless within the present 
spacetime slice. Hence the notion of becoming is all-important. What 
is becoming does so in the process of present becoming, which was 
past becoming and will have been future becoming. 'Atoms' as 'solid 
spheres' eventually became 'atoms' as 'largely vacuous', and those in 
their own turn became 'cloud-like wave amplitudes'. The concept of 
becoming is imperative, because all that is semiosis, is flux. 
6.3. Peirce, and the others 
Peirce's view of meaning complements Putnam's (1975; 1981; 1988). 
Putnam refuses to compromise on his reservations regarding tradi­
tional theories of meaning. He emphasizes time and time again that 
there is no 'God's-eye view' of the world. There is no omniscient 
grasp of the whole context within which meaning emerges, in all its 
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possible ramifications. The world is simply too rich for the poverty of 
our interpretive capacity. Consequently: ( 1 ) Meaning is neither in any 
correspondence between a sign and its reference, nor is it the case that 
meaning or sense (Sinn) determines reference (Bedeutung) (contra 
Frege); (2) Meaning is neither in the brain-mind as an autonomous 
organism, nor is it in a synchronic slice of language as an autono­
mous entity (contra Saussure); (3) Meaning is not in the referent that 
'causes ' stimulation within the brain-mind evoking a certain response 
to a sign (contra Kripke); (4) Meaning is in the entirety of contextual-
ized bodymind inter-action, but it is not in the solicitation of relatively 
static schemes (contra Lakoff and Johnson). 
The Peircean notion of meaning, in short, can be described as a 
matter of form-becoming emerging from S to О and from S to I 
through mediation. This allows us to conceive meaning as a non­
substantive, co-participatory fluctuating and flowing processual man­
ner. Meaning as form-becoming is an emergent inter-active, inter-
relational pattern of behavior. 
Conclusion 
Thus: 
(1) the meaning of a sign depends upon comparable past contexts of 
what is taken to be the same sign, in the present context, and in imag­
ined, conjectured, or hypothetical future contexts; sign meaning is a 
time-bound process; 
(2) meaning bears on regularity of inter-related inter-action in the 
form of general modes of behavior guided by habit; 
(3) meaning entails a process of imagination, consideration of possible 
consequences, and inter-action with particular aspects of the physical 
world — or mental worlds in terms of purely 'thought-signs' — in this 
sense it is most fundamental to Peirce's 'realist' philosophy;6 
(4) just as for Peirce it is impossible to think without signs, so also 
thought itself is impossible without the material incorporation of some 
6 It bears mentioning that Peirce labels his philosophical posture 'objective 
idealism'. 'Idealism' in view of the input of imagination as described above, and 
'objective' in terms of the sign's, interpretant's and interpreter's inter-action with 
the object and the object reciprocally with them. 
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aspect of the world, and meaning is impossible without co-
participation of S, O, and /(CP 1.538, 2.253, 5.265, 5.314, 5.470). 
When applying this general semiotic approach to biological and 
social systems, meaning will most often be an interpreter-dependent 
objective process. It cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situ­
ated (and actively distributed) communicational agent (potential or 
effective). It is both interpreter-dependent and objective because in­
formation triadically connects S, O, and an effect (/) on the interpreter. 
In sum, according to Peirce's pragmatic model, semiosis, is a tri-
adic, dynamic, context-dependent (situated), interpreter-dependent 
(dialogic), materially extended (embodied) dynamic process. It is a 
social-cognitive process, not merely a static, symbolic system. It em­
phasizes process rather than product, development rather than finality. 
Peirce's emphasis rests not on content, essence, or substance, but, 
more properly, on dynamics inter-relations. 
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Семиозис и прагматизм: к динамическому понятию значения 
Философы и представители социальных наук различных ориентаций 
сошлись во мнении о том, что прагматика семиозиса подходит для 
динамического описания значения как процесса. Семиозис как 
центральное понятие прагматической философии Чарльза Сандерса 
Пирса может стать ключом к давним проблемам, связанным со зна­
чением. Действительно, идеи Пирса можно считать плодотворными, 
если их поместить в рамки когнитивных наук (особенно в связи с его 
понятием знака). Согласно пирсовской прагматической модели 
семиозис является триадическим, связанным со временем, чувстви­
тельным к контексту, зависимым от интерпретатора, материально 
протяженным динамическим процессом. Семиозис привносит 
взаимозависимость и взаимодействие между знаками, их объектами, 
действиями и событиями, происходящими в мире, и семиотическими 
агентами, которые являются их отправителями и получателями. 
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Semioos ja pragmatism: Tähenduse dünaamilise mõiste suunas 
Erineva orientatsiooniga filosoofid ja sotsiaalteadlased on esile toonud, et 
semioosi pragmaatika on kohane kiijeldamaks dünaamiliselt tähendust kui 
protsessi. Semioos kui C. S. Peirce'i pragmaatilise filosoofia kese võib 
olla võtmeks tähendusega seotud kauastele probleemidele. Tõepoolest, 
Peirce'i ideid tuleb pidada viljakaiks, kui need paigutada kognitiivteadus-
tesse, eriti seoses tema märgi mõistega. Peirce'i pragmaatilise mudeli 
kohaselt on semioos triaadne, ajaseoseline, kontekstitundlik, interpretee­
rijast sõltuv, materiaalse ulatuvusega dünaamiline protsess. Semioos toob 
kaasa vastastikuse suhestatuse ja vastastikuse toime märkide, nende ob­
jektide, tegude ja sündmuste ning semiootiliste toimijate vahel, kes on 
nende allikaks ja vastuvõtjaks. 
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Abstract. In the view of the author, the main problem of semiotics is the un­
derstanding and advancing of understanding. To contribute to the solution of 
this problem, a distinction is suggested between two types of understanding: 
en logy and empathy. The subject of en logy reduces what he understands to 
himself as a code: he hears only what he is himself. The subject of empathy 
reduces what she understands to herself as a text: she sees only what she is 
striving to become. Enlogy is possible due to the identity of the communicants 
as a present unified code. Empathy is possible due to the identity of the com­
municants as a future common text. Mastering the code is a by-product of em­
pathy; the texts rests on the enlogy that already is possible. Enlogy and em­
pathy do not pereceive each other as understanding. Therefore their mutual 
understanding remains the hardest problem of understanding. To fulfil its task, 
semiotics has to address this problem. 
In this paper, I am concerned with semiotics as a study of the possi­
bility of understanding and a striving for understanding. 
The word 'understanding' has, of course, been construed in many 
different ways. A relevant distinction will emerge here. 
A scene from family life 
In order to introduce the problem let me cite a scene from family life. 
"You don't understand me." 
"I do!" 
"Your saying so shows you don't." 
1 Also: Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu. 
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Are we to take this seriously? Can understanding be an obstacle to 
understanding? It seems that it can — and so understanding reveals its 
self-contradictoriness. Let us have a closer look. 
If I am able to parse your sentences and to identify your words, 
then I understand what you are saying, and so I understand you. I un­
derstand you as using a grammatical sentence of a language I under­
stand. Whenever you say something I understand, you are picking out 
one of the sentences the language allows to form and to understand. I 
understand you precisely because I share your language. I understand 
you before you ever say anything — because I understand whatever 
you could say — provided you follow the rules of a language common 
to us. By understanding whatever you say I understand you — as you 
are what you could say; you are the language, you always were. I un­
derstand you as long as I am the same language. 
However, is what I am understanding really youl You would say: 
of course not. You are not your language. A language could never 
have enough room for you. Your language is just a means for you. 
You are what you are telling me. However, what you are saying is 
never you. I have to understand you from your messages though you 
never are present in them. I have to understand you though you are 
unsayable. In order to do so I have to find you in myself, or rather, I 
have to become you. This is possible since we are just becoming what 
we are. So, understanding involves being aware that understanding is 
still not there. I can understand you due to my producing and operat­
ing on a common ground which is conceived as both you and me. 
Meaning as sense and significance 
Let me explain this in other words. We distinguish between different 
ways of having meaning for us, namely, making sense and having sig­
nificance. 
What makes sense for me is what can be embraced by my codes or 
stereotypes that are ready already. What makes sense is what doesn't 
force or expect me to change myself. 
By contrast, what has significance for me is what shows me 
something outside of me and is telling me something. 
In communication, people usually have expectations concerning 
both sense and significance. A message is expected to be clear and 
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understandable: it is supposed to make sense. On the other hand, it is 
not expected to be trivial, it should be telling, it should be understand­
able why it was sent us: it is supposed to have significance. These two 
expectations have different, even opposite directions. In order to be 
meaningful for us, a message shouldn't be new, or else it wouldn't 
make sense and so it wouldn't be understandable; and in order to be 
significant for us, it should be new, or else it wouldn't have signifi­
cance and so it wouldn't be understandable. 
Here we can see that understanding can be construed in two ways: 
understanding consists either in detecting sense or in detecting sig­
nificance. 
Lotman on the paradox of communication 
Juri Lotman in his work addresses issues similar to what has been 
noted in the previous section. Throughout his lectures, Lotman has 
cited the following paradox: 
If two individuals are absolutely different from each other, if they do not have 
anything in common, then meaningful communication between them is im­
possible. But if two individuals are absolutely identical, then, also, communi­
cation is impossible — actually, it is possible, but they just do not have any­
thing to tell each other. (Kull 2005: 176) 
In the terms of the previous section, the missing 'meaning' is con­
strued either as 'sense' (common codes) or as 'significance' (having 
something to tell each other). 
If we imagine a sender and a receiver with the same codes and entirely lacking 
memory then the understanding between them will be ideal but the value of 
the information transferred will be minimal, and the information itself will be 
strictly limited. [...] It can be said that the sender and the receiver which are 
ideally similar will understand each other ideally but they won't have any­
thing to talk about [...]. 
In normal human communication, and what is more, in the normal func­
tioning of the language, an original lack of identity between the speaker and 
the hearer is assumed. 
Under these conditions, the situation of an intersection between the lin­
guistic spaces of the speaker and the hearer becomes normal [...]. 
In the situation of the lack of intersection, communication is assumed to 
be impossible, the complete intersection (identity of [the linguistic spaces — 
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A. L.] A and В) deprives the communication of content. So, a certain intersec­
tion of the spaces and, at the same time, an intersection of two mutually 
fighting tendencies: the striving to facilitate the understanding, which will 
continually try to enlarge the domain of intersection, and the striving to in­
crease the value of the message, which is connected with the tendency maxi­
mally to increase the difference between A and B. [...] 
The space of intersection between A and В becomes the natural base for 
communication. And the non-intersecting parts of the spaces seem to be ex­
cluded from the dialogue. However, here we meet one more contradiction: the 
exchange of information within the intersecting part of the sense space suffers 
from the same vice of triviality. The value of the dialogue turns out to be con­
nected not with the intersecting space but with the information transfer be­
tween the non-intersecting parts. This renders us faced with an unsolvable 
contradiction: we are interested in communication with namely the sphere that 
makes communication more difficult, and, in the limit — renders it impossi­
ble.2 (Lotman 1992: 15-16, translation mine — A. L.) 
2 "Если мы представим себе передающего и принимающего с одинаковы­
ми кодами и полностью лишенными памяти, то понимание между ними 
будет идеальным, но ценность передаваемой информации минимальной, а 
сама информация — строго ограниченной. [...] Можно сказать, что идеально 
одинаковые передающий и принимающий хорошо будут понимать друг 
друга, но им не о чем будет говорить. [...] 
В нормальном человеческом общении и, более того, в нормальном функ­
ционировании языка заложено предположение об исходной неидентичности 
говорящего и слушающего. 
В этих условиях нормальной становится ситуация пересечения языко­
вого пространства говорящего и слушающего [...]. 
В ситуации непересечения общение предполагается невозможным, пол­
ное пересечение (идентичность А и В) делает общение бессодержательным. 
Таким образом, допускается определенное пересечение этих пространств и 
одновременно пересечение двух противоборствующих тенденций: стремле­
ние к облегчению понимания, которое будет постоянно пытаться расширить 
область пересечения, и стремление к увеличению ценности сообщения, что 
связано с тенденцией максимально увеличить различие между А и В. [...] 
Пространство пересечения А и В становится естественной базой для 
общения. Между тем как непересекающиеся части этих пространств, каза­
лось бы, из диалога исключены. Однако мы здесь оказываемся еще перед 
одним противоречием: обмен информацией в пределах пересекающейся 
части смыслового пространства страдает все тем же пороком тривиальности. 
Ценность диалога оказывается связанной не с той пересекающейся частью, а 
с передачей информации между непересекающимися частями. Это ставит 
нас лицом к лицу с неразрешимым противоречием: мы заинтересованы в 
общении именно с той сферой, которая затрудняет общение, а в пределе 
делает его невозможным." 
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What did Peirce not understand 
Charles Sanders Peirce did not understand the laws of nature. In his 
paper "The Architecture of Theories" he wrote: 
To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the 
mind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplica­
ble and irrational, is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely 
the sort of facts that need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should 
sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explana­
tion; but if it shows heads every time, we wish to know how this result has 
been brought about. Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason. 
Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for 
uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution. (Peirce 1992: 
288) 
I take ' inexclipable' to mean 'ununderstandable' in a sense, since a 
thing is made understandable by explanation. So, in a sense, Peirce 
does not understand laws of nature. Nor the exact formulation of a law 
neither subsuming it under a more general law renders it understand­
able. For Peirce, understanding seems to involve affinity with the un-
derstander, a common history and participation in a common process. 
The process in question is habit taking. A natural law is to be con­
ceived to be a habit of nature, and understanding it is taking a habit as 
well: 
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that 
matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. (Peirce 1992: 
293) 
Empathy and enlogy 
As the short names of the different conceptions of understanding I 
want to distinguish between, I propose 'empathy' and 'enlogy'. 
'Empathy' is a common word, meaning 'putting oneself into an­
other's shoes'3. It origins from the Greek words en 'in, inside' and 
The word has been coined after the Greek word empatheia 'physical affec­
tion; passion; partiality' (Liddell, Scott 1940: sub empatheia) but it has a new 
meaning following the German word Einfühlung (literally: 'feeling into') intro-
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pathos (multiple meanings, among them 'what happens to or in some­
one or someone' and 'what on feels like ). So, empathy can be con­
ceived as: what is happening (as if) to me or inside of me. 
I propose to broaden this concept, having in view the examples 
above — understanding that requires not understanding, and the un­
derstanding Peirce sought after. The empathie understander models on 
herself what is to be understood. She understands anything only by 
understanding herself. She understands herself as evolving from a 
long history, and anything else is understandable as far as it has com­
mon roots with herself. Understanding is part of that history, or better, 
all of her history is understanding. Her history can't take end. While 
she is understanding, she doesn't understand. 
In contrast, I use the word 'enlogy'5 by analogy to 'empathy', 
evoking the Greek word 'logos' that has notoriously numerous mean­
ings, including 7aw\ 'rule' and 'reason' (Liddell, Scott 1940: sub 
logos, 2006/06/04). Reminding our examples, enlogy is meant to be 
understanding by rules of language and the kind of understanding 
Peirce denied. By understanding the laws of nature one understands 
nature. This is all one needs. Enlogic understanding has no history, 
and every enlogy is complete, non-processual. 
Meaning transmission and meaning generation 
Texts are products of two kinds of semiotic processes: meaning 
transmission and meaning generation. 
In the general system of culture, the texts fulfil at least two main functions: 
adequate transmission of meanings and generation of new meanings.6 (Lot-
man 1992 [1981]: 150) 
duced by Rudolf Lotze in 1858 (Harper, Douglas 2001. Online Etymology Diction­
ary, sub empathy, http://www.etymonline.com., 2006/06/02). 
4 The meanings include: 'that which happens to a person or thing', 'good or bad 
experience', 'calamity, misfortune', 'emotion, passion', 'state, condition', 'hap­
penings or changes in things', 'properties, qualities of things' partiality' (Liddell, 
Scott 1940: sub pathos). 
3 The word enlogy (in Russian: энлогия) in a different though close meaning 
was introduced by Dvorkin 1983 and later widely used by Chebanov (e.g., Che-
banov 1995). 
6  "В общей системе культуры тексты выполняют по крайней мере две основ­
ные функции: адекватную передачу значений и порождение новых смыслов." 
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In order to understand a text enlogically, we are to recognize it as a 
variant of a paradigm, a textual instance of a sign system (code or lan­
guage). A sign system provides the possible meaningful ('senseful') 
syntagmata in the framework of that system. The paradigm also can be 
a text-code ('an intermediate link between language and texts',7 Lot-
man 1992 [1981]: 150). 
[The function of adequate transmission of meanings] is best fulfilled in the 
case of the fullest coincidence of the codes of the speaker and the hearer and, 
consequently, in the case of the maximum unambiguity of the text.8 (Lotman 
1992 [1981]: 150) 
The core of enlogic understanding is reducing texts to variants of 
paradigms. A sign system is a paradigm providing the possible texts in 
that sign system. A text-code can be conceived as a single sign occur­
ring in different variants. 
Enlogy isn't limited to subsuming under a single, known code. The 
enlogic striving of understanding is at work even when a text is en­
coded by several codes which still might only be sought after. Lotman 
seems to identify the key of the ability of texts to generate new senses 
in the plurality of codes: 
Culture is, in principle, polyglottic, and texts always are realized in the space 
of at least two semiotic systems. [...] being encoded by many codes is a law 
for an overwhelming number of texts of culture [...].9 (Lotman 1992: 143) 
[...] the text itself, being semiotically heterogeneous, enters the game with the 
codes decoding it and influences it in a deforming way. In result, in the proc­
ess of the advance of the text from the addresser to the addressee, a shift of 
sense and its increase takes places. Therefore, this function [of the text] can be 
called creative. [...] the text is heterogenous and heterostructural, it is a mani­
festation of several languages at the same time. The complex relationships of 
dialogue and play between the text's manifold substructures constituting its 
7 "[...] между языком и текстами промежуточного звена [...]." 
8  "[...] выполняется наилучшим образом при наиболее полном совпадении 
кодов говорящего и слушающего и, следовательно, при максимальной 
однозначности текста." 
9  "Культура в принципе полиглотична, и тексты ее всегда реализуются в 
пространстве как минимум двух семиотических систем. [...] зашифрован­
ное^ многими кодами есть закон для подавляющего числа текстов куль­
туры [...]". 
10 
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inward polyglottism, are mechanisms to generate senses. (Lotman 1992. 
145) 
The text [...] doesn't stand before us as a manifestation of some one language: 
to constitute it, at least two languages are needed. [...] the text in its second 
function is not a passive receptacle, a bearer of content that has been put into 
it from outside, but a generator. 1 1  (Lotman 1992 [1981]: 151-152) 
The two functions of texts roughly correspond to enlogy and empathy 
as two functions or two strategies or two ideals of understanding. 
Enlogy is finding you in myself, whereas empathy is my becoming 
you. In enlogy, you are the code of your text(s) in me; in empathy, 
you are the ideal end of the evolution of your text while my under­
standing. Enlogy is every time complete since understanding a code is 
understanding a whole; empathy is never at end because you always 
stay beyond your text. 
Lotman suggests that meanings (senses) constitute no fixed stock. 
They can be generated, that is, newly created. In terms of enlogy, this 
would mean that I am not just finding myself as you but I am becom­
ing a new self. That would be a contradiction. So, Lotman points to 
the limits to enlogy. The process he describes has an empathie char­
acter. However, he does not leave the point of view of enlogy and 
continues to use the concept of code. So, empathy shows itself in an­
other perspective. 
10 "[...] сам текст, будучи семиотически неоднородным, вступает в игру с 
дешифрующими его кодами и оказывает на них деформирующее воздейст­
вие. В результате в процессе продвижения текста от адресанта к адресату 
происходит сдвиг смысла и его приращение. Поэтому данную функцию 
можно назвать творческой. [...] текст гетерогенен и гетероструктурен, он 
есть манифестация одновременно нескольких языков. Сложные диалоги­
ческие и игровые соотношения между разнообразными подструктурами 
текста, образующими его внутренний полиглотизм, являются механизмами 
смыслообразования." 
1 1  "Текст [...] предстает перед нами не как манифестация какого-либо 
одного языка — для его образования требуются как минимум два языка. [...] 
текст во второй своей функции является не пассивным вместилищем, 
носителем извне вложенного в него содержания, а генератором." 
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Complexity 
It seems to be natural to conceive the complexity of a text as the diffi­
culty of its understanding. So, we should distinguish between enlogic 
and empathie complexity. 
In enlogy, the more complex is the text the more simple must be 
the code, and vice versa. It is obvious to distinguish between two lev­
els of text complexity and code simplicity. First, it might be that every 
text type is encoded apart so that the text is not analyzable by means 
of the code but simply is to be recognized as a certain type text. Then 
the texts are simple (unanalyzable!) but the code is complex as it must 
enlist all possible text types. Second, it might be that the code pro­
vides a grammar allowing to parse a huge, maybe endless amount of 
different text types. Then the code is simpler as it charges memory at a 
lesser amount and the texts are more complex since they have analyz­
able structure. 
Now I propose to interpolate this scale of complexity in both di­
rections. First, let us see how texts could be even simpler. Take a sen­
tence in a foreign language. If you know the language you can parse 
the sentence and understand it. If you only start learning the language 
it might be that you understand the sentence as a whole though you 
cannot parse it. At that level of understanding you should know all 
sentences by heart to understand them. Can it be anything still more 
primitive? Certainly! Imagine that you understand no sentence itself 
but can repeat any sentence in order to ask what it means. And finally, 
maybe you are even not able to repeat sentences, and so you should 
point to each token sentence in order to learn its meaning. In those 
cases, respectively, you can identify type sentences only in a chain of 
repeating, or you can identify only tokens. So, in order to know the 
language at those levels, memory should have room for all chains of 
repeating or even for every token sentence! Normally, those levels are 
perceived as pre-code levels. 
Code is what enables us to recognize the sense of a text. The sim­
pler is the code the more difficult task is the recognition since the code 
is the less similar to the text. We have to recognize a token text, then a 
chain of token texts, then a type text and then the linguistic form of 
the text. In each case, the new level of code is impossible in terms of 
the previous level. The unity is constituted according to a new princi-
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pie. For example, the grammar of a language cannot be mastered sim­
ply by memorizing the senses of words, sentences or texts. 
Further we move as if to the post-code level. Suppose we have to 
understand poetry that creatively uses language. It contains words and 
patterns not provided by language codes, and it allows different vari­
ants of decoding even where the codes are still at work. How then is 
understanding possible? Is the concept of code still somehow ex-
trapolatable here? Understanding poetry is possible, and this is due to 
the level of language mastering exceeding the following of grammati­
cal models. And here, the language mastering is mastering the lan­
guage itself rather than mastering its grammar, or in the other words, 
the codes in the usual sense. The language itself is a code (a post­
code). We can't describe this code and we don't understand it in terms 
of (usual) codes exactly because it is a code of a higher level and the 
way of understanding depends on the level of code. 
Enlogy can be conceived as clarity about the sense of the text. The 
requirements for clarity depend on the level of enlogic understanding. 
Enlogy is accomplished by subsuming the text under a code. How­
ever, enlogy can also be conceived as a permanent ability to under­
stand the senses of a variety of texts. 
By contrast, empathy involves generating new texts in order in­
definitely to approximate understanding the significance of the text. 
Each text produced by the process of understanding is an intermediate 
step of understanding and non-understanding. This process is what 
Peirce called semiosis.1' Interprétants are newly produced texts as 
expressions of understanding, and at the same time, in their quality of 
representamina (or 'signs') in new semioses, they are sources of non-
understanding. 
Each text in the chain of interpretation is understandable in the 
framework of some enlogy. On the other hand, for empathy this un­
derstanding of sense is trivial, as significance manifests itself only in 
the choice of the vanant envisaged by a certain code. For enlogy, this 
choice is irrelevant. The choice is a by-product of instantiating a code. 
12 Peirce uses the word semiosis in a manuscript titled as "Pragmatism": "[...] 
by 'semiosis' I mean [...] an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a coopera­
tion of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interprétant, this tri-relative 
influence not being in any ways resolvable into actions between pairs" (Peirce 
1998:411). 
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The code, in its turn, is a by-product of the chain of interpreta­
tion. " Complexity in terms of empathy increases along with decrease 
of complexity in terms of enlogy. On each level of code complexity, 
the process of interpretation is working towards the next level. As the 
next level is not present, it is compensated by code changes. As there 
is no envisaged text variant, significance is expressed by combining 
codes. Lotman describes this process as dialogue and sense-generating 
creativity of texts (see above). 
Understanding: discrepancy of expectations 
Lotman's presentation of the communication in "the situation of an 
intersection between the linguistic spaces of the speaker and the 
hearer" (cited above) refers to a scale where significance is increased 
on account of the diversification of the stock of codes (which eventu­
ally is to yield a new level of code). 
Is it here the case that "lack of intersection" means the absolute 
difference of the communicants, and the "complete intersection" 
means their absolute identity? Both identity and difference can be 
meant in substantially different ways. Lotman thematises "linguistic 
spaces" as the criterion of identity and difference (intersection). That 
amounts to code mastering as the criterion of similarity of communi­
cants. Communicants similar in that way produce texts (messages) 
making sense to each other exactly due to this similarity. Further, we 
can't literally say that communicants similar in this aspect have noth­
ing to tell each other. Obviously, significance need not and typically 
doesn't lie in codes. It turns out that the character of the troubles at the 
two ends of the scale lies in two different dimensions: communicants 
identical in terms of significant content cannot communicate in a sig­
nificant way, and communicants entirely different in terms of codes 
cannot communicate in a way making sense. The expectations in the 
two cases are totally different! And if we look for the conditions of the 
possibility of communication then we don't look just for a middle 
ground between two extremes but we combine two types of expecta­
tions. 
13 Peirce describes this process as habit-taking, habits being final interprétants 
(e.g., Peirce 1998: 412—418). 
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We are used to think that codes are mere means of conveying and 
receiving messages. However, the two types of expectations are not 
only different but incommensurable and even antagonistic. The ex­
pectations are either enlogic or empathie. Understanding sense and 
understanding significance are different interests. The texts make 
sense when the communicants have a common "linguistic space". 
And the texts have significance when the content to communicate is 
different between the communicants. 
Different expectations in terms of understanding lead to different 
communicative behaviour as in our family scene above. There is a sort 
of lack of understanding that has its source precisely in the difference 
of expectations in two types of communicative agents. Of course, usu­
ally both attitudes are combined in one and the same agent. Neverthe­
less, modelling communication in terms of types of agents might be a 
useful method of analysis. It seems that the existing semiotic theories 
pay little or no attention to the distinction in question. 
Meno's paradox 
In the context of the semiotic paradoxes, Kull (2005) mentions 
Meno's paradox: 
It has been formulated in the Platonic dialogue Meno, and it states that one 
cannot search for what one does not know and does not need to search for 
what one already knows. If so, then learning turns out to be impossible. 
Learning as acquiring knowledge of something else is essentially a sign proc­
ess, and in this sense it requires an embeddedness into the sphere of signs. 
(Kull 2005: 176) 
However, Plato's (or Socrates') solution to that problem raised by 
Meno seems to be different. The problem is raised by Meno as fol­
lows: 
Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it 
is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you 
should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing you did not 
know? 
Socrates: I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's 
argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he 
knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows — 
The duality of understanding and the understanding of duality 79 
since he knows it, there is no need to search — nor for what he does not 
know, for he does not know what to look for. (80d-e; Plato 1997: 880, trans­
lated by B. M. A. Grube) 
Plato's (Socrates') solution is that learning is recollection: 
Socrates: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would 
be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recol­
lect what you do not know at present — that is, what you do not recollect? 
Meno: Somehow, Socrates, I think that what you say is right. (86b; Plato 
1997:886) 
Of course, what Plato (Socrates) says should not be taken literally. But 
what is the lesson? We should find an analogy with the situation of 
incommunicability as cited above. 
The specific thing Meno and Socrates were searching for was the 
definition of virtue. If we conceive learning as communication with 
reality then the definition of virtue both conveys us a certain code for 
understanding (the sense of) our experience and mediates (significant) 
knowledge about reality. When we know the definition we have 
nothing to search for as empathy has come to an end. When we don't 
know the definition we lack the crucial code to learn it. 
My interpretation of Plato's (Socrates') purport is as follows. We 
can't acquire new codes immediately by means of our old codes. The 
new codes are generated as by-products of empathy. This is what 
Plato (Socrates) means by 'recollection'. There are two sources of the 
possibility of understanding. First, the communicants share 'linguistic 
spaces' (in Plato's example, we know something we still have to rec­
ollect). Second, they share a common striving (amounting to a striving 
to learn) that makes understanding possible even when there is no lan­
guage mastering. 
Understanding: a challenge for semiotics 
We started from an example from everyday life where it became 
manifest that lack of understanding can be due to different models of 
understanding at work. So we need one more concept of understand­
ing besides enlogy and empathy: understanding between enlogy and 
empathy. 
80 Andres Luure 
Mastering this concept requires overcoming one-sided orientation 
towards either enlogy or empathy in semiotics. To avoid reduction, the 
interdependence between enlogy and empathy (as sketched above) 
should be addressed. Further, an adequate approach to the real prob­
lem of understanding needs a positive conception of understanding 
between enlogy and empathy. 
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Дуальность понимания и понимание дуальности в семиотике 
В качестве основной проблемы семиотики автор видит понимание 
понимания и содействие пониманию. К решению этой проблемы в 
статье предлагается различить две формы понимания — энлогию и 
эмпатию. Субьект энлогии сводит понимаемое к самому себе как 
коду: он слышит в понимаемом только то, чем он сам является. 
Субьект эмпатии сводит понимаемое к самому себе как тексту: он 
видит в понимаемом только то, чем он сам стремится стать. Энлогия 
возможна благодаря тождественности коммуникантов в качестве на­
личного единого кода. Эмпатия возможна благодаря тождествен­
ности коммуникантов в качестве будущего общего текста. Владение 
кодом является побочным продуктом эмпатии; текст опирается на ту 
энлогию, которая уже возможна. Энлогия и эмпатия не восприни­
мают друг друга как понимание. Поэтому самой трудной проблемой 
понимания останется их взаимопонимание. Чтобы выполнить свою 
задачу, семиотика должна заняться этой проблемой. 
Mõistmise duaalsus ja duaalsuse mõistmine semiootikas 
Autor näeb semiootika põhiprobleemina mõistmise mõistmist ja mõist­
mise edendamist. Et selle probleemi lahendamisele kaasa aidata, paku­
takse artiklis välja eristus kahe mõistmise vormi (arusaamine ehk enloo-
giline mõistmine ja mõistmine kitsamas mõttes ehk empaatiline mõist­
mine) vahel. Arusaaja taandab arusaadava iseendale kui koodile, kuuldes 
arusaadavas ainult seda, mis ta ise on. Mõistja taandab mõistetava iseen­
dale kui tekstile, nähes mõistetavas ainult seda, milleks ta ise püüab saa­
da. Enloogia on võimalik tänu kommunikantide samasusele olemasoleva 
ühtse koodina. Empaatia on võimalik tänu kommunikantide samasusele 
tulevase ühise tekstina. Koodi valdamine on empaatia kõrvalsaadus; tekst 
tugineb enloogiale, mis on juba võimalik. Enloogiline ja empaatiline 
mõistja ei mõista teineteisele omast mõistmist mõistmisena. Seetõttu jääb 
raskeimaks mõistmisprobleemiks nende omavaheline mõistmine. Et oma 
ülesannet täita, peab semiootika selle probleemiga tegelema. 
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Abstract. The conceptualization of the lifeworld of any species includes a re­
formation of the matter found in the environment into concepts which make 
up the species-specific Umwelt. This paper argues that the human agency in 
conceptualising the Umwelt necessarily transforms what we usually call "na­
ture" into so-called "culture". Ultimatively, this human activity has two con­
sequences which we cannot escape, but which have an influence not only on 
our perception of the environment, but also on our theorising about what has 
been called the "nature-culture divide", the "semiotic threshold" respectively: 
First, any environmental perception is at once conceived of in cultural terms. 
Second, whatever "nature" may be, our including it into the cultural discourse 
removes it from our immediate cognition. 
1. Some fundamental thoughts about the nature of nature 
There are various ways in which the human species connects what it 
calls nature with what is termed culture. In our everyday lives we are 
pretty sure where to find nature and where to detect culture. Two ex­
treme oppositions are, e.g., an untended wild patch of forest, which is 
located towards the nature pole, versus a building constructed from 
glass, metal, and shining marble, which is a highly sophisticated cul­
tural artefact. Doubtlessly, it is this open distinction; the experiential, 
i.e., the visual, tactile, acoustic, and other perceptible signs, which in 
the first case seem to come into being without human interference, and 
in the latter case are exclusively human in origin, which lead us to 
make a distinction between nature and culture also on higher, seien-
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tific levels. At the same time, we cannot but accept the fact that all 
materials that we use to create cultural artefacts do come from a natu­
ral sphere". Still, in order to show that there is no divide between na­
ture and culture, it is not enough to insist that the stuff culture is made 
of is natural. The ultimate bridge between the two realms is concep­
tual, and it is rooted in the very practice by which we transform our 
environment into our species-specific Umwelt. 
In order to show the mechanics of conceptual transformation of 
nature into culture, I shall make use of Jakob von Uexküll's theory of 
the functional circle. Admittedly, in doing so I avoid the nature-
culture divide only seemingly. As we will see later, a divide between 
nature and culture that was existent for us as a species must exist in­
side our Umwelt. Following John Deely (2001), I suggest that there is 
a threefold division of "spheres" in our universe. First, there is the 
environment, from which we draw the raw matter which we later 
transform into signs. Of the environment, we cannot be sure. We shall 
never know in how far the environment is factual or not. There are, 
however, two spheres of which we are at least conscious and from 
which we derive our reflections. These are the spheres of the objective 
and the subjective. I do not want to go into detail concerning the divi­
sions between subject world and object world here. Suffice it to say in 
the context of this paper that both the objective and the subjective play 
out by making use of signs. This means that both are already situated 
inside the human Umwelt. The Umwelt is cognitively separated from 
the environment. I suggest that any of the nature concepts that we en­
counter in popular or scientific discourse is already a transformation 
of matter from the environment into our Umwelt. Hence, these nature 
concepts are part of culture indeed, as all of our concepts are governed 
by our species-specific traits, which are naturally cultural. 
As mentioned above, recognising our nature concepts as being part 
of culture only seemingly bridges the divide between nature and cul­
ture. "Real", or "true" nature must be situated where culture has no 
rule, which ultimatively means that nature should be completely de­
tached from culture. In my reasoning, culture is the one force that en­
ables us to chart our Umwelt, meaning that "true" nature can only exist 
where culture does not execute this force. Nature, if we insist on using 
this term for something non-cultural, would hence logically be re­
moved to the general sphere of the environment. For purposes of in­
vestigating objects or species that are different from humans, it may 
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be useful to employ the term nature also as part of our Umwelt. Still, 
we must be conscious of the fact that any concept we use for said ob­
jects or species is already cultural. This is the ultimate deconstruction 
of the nature-culture divide. 
At the same time, this conception of nature as something being part 
of the general environment allows us to define an individual semiotic 
sphere for any species, equalling their species-specific Umwelt. Inso­
far, the environment, or nature for that matter, are resources for 
semiosis not only for humans, but also for other species. Again, Jakob 
von Uexküll's functional circle allows us to define such individual 
spheres of semiosis. As you will notice, in this line of thinking it 
seems that, e.g., the Umwelt of a tiger would be removed from nature 
as is the human's. From our perspective, this seems ridiculous, as we 
consider tigers to be part of nature. In exemplifying my above ideas, 
let me rephrase the relations as follows: The human agent takes the 
tiger for something "natural". By attributing the term "tiger" to the 
animal, the latter is, however, at once culturalised. The term tiger, its 
connotations, denotations, and any further acts of semiosis where it is 
included play out on the cultural level. For the tiger, however, differ­
ent acts of semiosis are important in order to construct his Umwelt. 
For him, nature or culture as terms are completely irrelevant. Still, his 
conceiving of other animals, e.g., a human, as prey, is already a spe­
cies-specific reinterpretation of the environment. Hence, the same 
principles apply to human or tiger perception of the environment. Let 
us now take a closer look on how our conception of nature being sepa­
rated from culture is structured. 
2. The semiotic paradox of divides 
The habit of taking on material from natural resources to the human 
body in order to produce clothing for shelter, accessories for decora­
tive purposes, tools, or weapons, is as old as human culture. But does 
this practice indeed make up a divide between this so-called exclusive 
human domain and naturel Is there really a dividing line between 
semioticised material within culture and the unused matter beyond? 
An argument in favour of this divide was that the said materials only 
gain the value of signs as soon as they are being used by the standards 
of cultural signification (Eco 1976: 21). The whole argument ulti-
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mately boils down to the question of whether a nonsemiotic world 
exists, by its very existence defining the more sophisticated, however 
somewhat smaller cultural domain. This question can be pursued in 
two ways. First, we could try to prove that there is a nonsemiotic 
world by finding something that has yet not gathered the value of a 
sign. The second way of defining the nonsemiotic is to state that there 
are beings in a biological world whose perceptions, communication, 
and lives are not meeting the standards of semiosis as we find it in 
humans. Let us explore these two lines of reasoning first. 
2.1. The nonsemiotic world of items 
Instead of item, we may also use the terms "thing", "object", or "mate­
rial". Nearly all terms, however, have been introduced to one cosmo-
logical model or another. Appropriate terminology therefore is diffi­
cult to approach. What here is called items is that which is defined as 
"not (yet) being a sign". What are "non-signs"? I admit that this paper 
challenges the existence of non-signs altogether. I suspect that they are 
a theoretical construction to introduce yet another negative definition 
of what signs are. According to Saussure, e.g., the nonsemiotic world 
is an "uncharted nebula" (1916: 111-112). This is a negative defini­
tion par excellence, and also a genial delimitation of theorizing: It de­
fines everything known as signs, and at the same time spares Saussure 
to actually name something which is not a sign. As we will see later, 
Saussure's approach bears some similarity to this paper's arguments, 
as there clearly are areas and things in the world which are not known 
to us. We know of the unknown and if only for the reason that our 
measuring apparatus has been able to penetrate some of the vast un­
known of the universe, leaving yet uncharted areas behind the final 
frontier. Still, the postulation that whatever matter is unknown re­
mains in a "nebula" of non-signs is a hypothesis only serving for reas­
suring us of the significant value of our knowledge. Moreover, it re­
duces semiotic theory to mere anthropocentrism. 
For another example, St. Augustine (397: 624-625; cf. Nöth 1990: 
82) gives a more clear account of what non-signs are. He makes a dif­
ference between "signs" and "things". Keeping close to the definition 
of a sign as something which stands for something else, i.e., aliquid 
pro aliquo, he lists items such as "wood, stone, cattle or other things 
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of that kind'1 as non-signs. Nöth calls this approach "naïve realism". 
Indeed, here the question must be raised again if a sign will only be a 
sign if it will be sorted with other, similar signs, in a system appropri­
ate to human understanding. Also, does the sign cease to be a sign if 
appearing out of this systemic context? Clearly, wood, stone and cattle 
can take on most diverse sign values. We will discuss the case of liv­
ing creatures later on. Concentrating here on the examples of wood 
and stone suffice it to say that they already gained sign value as soon 
as St. Augustine listed them as specimen of non-signs: Wood or stone 
standing for non-signs, they paradoxically become signs for non-signs. 
Another well-known approach, which has also been employed for 
dividing the cosmos into the spheres dominated by humans and other 
creatures, is the one devising the so-called semiotic thresholds. Um­
berto Eco (1976: 16-28) employed the term of the threshold to delimit 
the semiotic field. The interesting aspect here is that it is the meth­
odological and disciplinary perspective of a semiotic science which 
governs the view of the cosmos. Below the lower semiotic threshold, 
there are those phenomena not guided by social convention, delimiting 
the semiotic field to the socio-cultural sphere. Beyond the upper semi­
otic threshold, according to Eco, there are those phenomena studied by 
other sciences than semiotic. Most interestingly, Eco sees any possible 
object as attached with semiotic as well as nonsemiotic value. As soon 
as something is studied as a sign, it becomes subjected to the semiotic 
field. If the same item is then studied as, say, a tool, it drifts from the 
semiotic field and is confined to the sphere beyond the upper semiotic 
threshold. Concerning Eco's semiotic thresholds, it is most notewor­
thy that his third threshold is neglected in all reflection on the subject 
matter. Eco calls this third threshold the epistemological, and as I take 
it, this is the inspiring force behind all threshold thinking. The first 
and the second threshold explain how the semiotic field may be de­
limited. These limits seem to originate from an intrinsic semiotic re­
flection. The third threshold, however, explains that there is in truth an 
extrinsic reason for delimitating the semiotic field in the first place. 
Semioticians seem to be afraid to admit that semiotic has no field ex­
cept maybe the realm of pure thought, as Peirce sometimes reflects 
(cf. CP 4.6). Indeed, as soon as we apply semiotic theory to any sub­
ject matter, semiotic becomes involved with other disciplines. So it 
must be, as beyond their mental nature, signs do signify perceptions 
that are usually investigated by said other disciplines. This makes se-
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miotic a transdiscipline as such, but yields the disadvantage of attrib­
uting no specific field to it. It is therefore understandable that Eco 
feared to admit the true nature of semiotic and confined it to the study 
of culture instead. This is indeed a political decision, not a semiotic 
one. 
While it is only obvious to acknowledge that the field of, e.g., 
physics, sports, mathematics, etc. is separated from the semiotic field 
if seen from the perspectives of the monodisciplinary physicist, 
sportsman, or mathematician (these not calling themselves semioti-
cians1), I should argue that the schizophrenic nature of items as Eco 
sees them is not given. As soon as semiotic puts itself to the task of 
examining anything according to its sign value, this item cannot ever 
again disappear from the semiotic field. Neither can the semioticians 
see an item oscillating between the semiotic and the non-semiotic, or 
else they were disregarding their own discipline. In other words: 
Whereas any other (possibly merely ignorant) person may not see 
things as semiotic, they must be so for the semiotician. In any other 
case, semiotic would be reduced to an alternative science that had not 
even the field of thought for its own. 
While I do not only embrace but admit the possible accusation of 
pansemiotism here, my main objection against the upper semiotic 
threshold is especially nurtured by Eco drawing disciplinary borders. 
His division between semiotic and nonsemiotic remains artificial and 
is already guided by cultural propositions, for clearly the concept of 
disciplinary fields is not inspired by nature as such. Semiotic, how­
ever, should be seen as a transdiscipline par excellence, as such busy­
ing itself with signs from any field of human knowledge. 
1 Note, however, that the point has been made that there are not only explicit 
studies of semiotic, which would cover the theories of the sign proper, but also 
implicit semiotic, which "covers the many semioticians avant la lettre who have 
contributed to the theory of signs since Plato and Aristotle but also includes semi-
otically relevant current studies in the many neighboring fields of semiotics", as 
Nöth (1990: 4) remarks. In accordance with Peirce, I hold the limits of these 
neighboring fields as virtually nonexistent. In this judgment I follow his intention 
to "outline a theory so comprehensive that [...] the entire work of human reason 
[...] shall appear as filling up of its details". In this regard, physics, sports, and 
mathematics are fields of semiotic. For the example of sports, see e.g., Hilden­
brandt (1997), Bockrath (2001), Friedrich (2001) and the special issue of the 
Zeitschrift far Semiotik 19(4), 1997, on the topic. 
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2.2. The nonsemiotic world of beings 
In the realm beneath the lower semiotic threshold, we find the proc­
esses of communication in animals and plants. While the upper thres­
hold of Eco's is a rather disciplinary border, as mentioned above, the 
lower one definitely separates biological life from the human sphere 
of signification. This second divide hence does not yet separate the 
body from its environment, but the cultural from the natural sphere. 
Everything above that threshold, according to Eco, in the realm of 
culture, is coded in a specific, cultural way. Naturally, the question is 
what "culturally coded" means. The point has been made that by dis­
covering more and more sophisticated sign systems in the realm of 
animals, or even plants, the semiotic threshold has been lowered and 
is being lowered still. I do not wish to go into the question of whether 
animals are capable of producing signs and to observe signifying ac­
tions in a way comparable to human custom. This would be a com­
pletely different endeavor beyond the scope of this paper (but compare 
Martinelli 2002, for a detailed analysis of this subject matter). 
More detailed work on the delimitations of the cultural has been 
done by Lotman, who admittedly was not so much interested in ex­
cluding animal and plant life from human culture rather than defining 
the possible limitations of the latter. We must, in contemplating these 
differences, keep in mind the binary, or dyadic, fundament of Russian 
semiotic. A thorough study of Lotman's work therefore will reveal 
that the limitations of culture also comprise the limits between various 
strands of culture, and most notably those between the own and the 
foreign, thus creating structural dichotomies as models. The space of 
culture in Lotman's theory is called the semiosphere, contrasting the 
biosphere of biological life (Lotman 1990: 125). The important fea­
tures of culture are communication, language, and the intricate means 
of using these to trade culture to following generations (Lotman 1990: 
124; see also Lotman 1981: 125; and cf. Nöth 2000: 133). 
The borders between the semiosphere and the non-semiotic may, 
however, also be understood as the borders between the signs already 
culturally coded and those not yet culturally coded. Such a division 
would render the entire universe semiotic, true to Peircean theory, and 
would hence differentiate only between certain types of coding: Cul-
12 
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tural and non-cultural.2 The possibility of dividing the world into these 
domains must remain questionable, however (cf. Nöth, Kull 2001). 
Another point made by Lotman (1981: 26-27) concerns the rules 
and methods of how information is stored and communicated by cul­
ture. Certainly there are distinct differences here between "culture" 
and "mere biological life". I do not wish to argue against it. However, 
sign processes will transcend the borders, and culture, too, depends on 
the biological processes which support cognition and mental activity. 
There is not possibly any culture without biological life, and in order 
to function properly and interact with the surrounding world, a culture 
will have to incorporate biological life from the so-called non-semiotic 
world substantially. The process of semiosis therefore transcends the 
nature-culture divide and requires a redefinition of the various semi­
otic spheres which constitute the universe. 
The semiosphere is externally constituted by that which is not in 
agreement with the coded structures within (Lotman 1990: 131-142). 
Nöth (2000: 133) explains that there can be semiotic space within and 
without the semiosphere; however, it seems that the emphasis on cul­
ture denies that there are semiospheres to be assumed in nature, hence 
the contrasting term biosphere. In the biosphere, we may assume by 
negating Lotman's characteristics of the semiosphere, there is no in­
formation not inherited, there are no specialised means to organise 
information, and there are no rules to determine the overall system of 
information communication (cf. Lotman 1981: 26-27). It is exactly 
this terminological emphasis on communication which renders the 
biosphere so obscure, as "language" is the basis for cultural action, 
and the "social conflicts" and the "semiotic systems" located in the 
semiosphere are the cultural "messages" which are formulated in 
"texts" (cf. Lotman 1981: 27-29), so leaving the seemingly non-
linguistic biosphere behind. This logocentrist view on culture has the 
unfortunate effect that it draws a definite border which is difficult to 
overcome. Following these lines of argumentation, a linguistic basis 
2 I prefer to avoid the term "natural" here, as this would imply that there be a 
coding system of nature similar to a coding system of culture. Truly, there are 
many other coding systems; either they should be summarized under the label 
"nature", including culture, or the term nature should be avoided. As this paper 
argues, there can be no nature-culture dyad. Both are intertwined and form the 
unity of the cosmos. 
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of coding would have to be found in the biosphere so to qualify it for 
semiotic consideration.3 
2.3. Dissolutions of the semiotic-nonsemiotic divide? 
There are several semiotic approaches that may serve to either weaken 
or even overcome the divides between the semiotic and the non­
semiotic. One of the more traditional approaches to this aim is Grei­
mas' text semiotic. He undertakes to give a possible definition of what 
"natural signs" (Greimas 1987: 20) could be. However, from the out­
set, Greimas does not move from the cultural sphere in his argumen­
tation. His examples are strictly culture-governed: First, he mentions 
examples illustrating "cause and effect", such as a cloud signifying 
rain, rain in the cause signifying autumn and so forth, or the knee-jerk 
reflex signifying good health. Admittedly, Greimas agrees that these 
interpretations are bound to peculiar cultural spheres (Greimas 1987: 
21). Still, he does not go so far as to admit that any phenomena may 
also attain sign value beyond culture whatsoever, hence a cloud re­
sembling a physicosemiotic body in itself, or the knee-jerk reflex be­
ing a biosemiotic sign signifying a chain of sign events in the body 
without so much as a cultural interpretation being necessary in the 
first place. Greimas' approach may be acknowledged as a "bridge 
spacing the gap" between pansemiotism and anthroposemiotism, but it 
must be admitted that the semiotisation of the natural environment 
takes place in a "semiotics of nature based on cultural codes of inter­
pretation of this environment" (Nöth 2000). This means the "natural 
world is only significant in a human-made way. Natural semiotic is 
3 It should be pointed out here that the metaphor of the "text" that has been 
favored throughout the twentieth century by semioticians indeed lacks some 
qualities which are necessary to illustrate transcending sign systems. Texts are 
human artifacts, they are two-dimensional, they consist of one material only, 
namely whatever substance the threads of code consist of. The metaphor of the 
forest seems more appropriate. It shows many qualities of the view on sign sys­
tems used in this paper: Forests are natural, or they can be planted and hence be 
human made. The forest is made up by many different species, and even more 
interactions between them. Also, the forest consists of prominent signs and hidden 
signs. It is a mesh of signs much more complicated than a text, governed by a 
multitude of rules, and, last but not least, it will always transcend the cultural 
sphere into nature. 
92 Guido Ipsen 
rendered an exclusive result of the human codification of nature" 
(Nöth 2000; all quotes my translation, G. /.). Nöth calls this perspec­
tive "intersemiotic"; it should be pointed out, however, that the per­
spective remains anthropocentric, as Greimas himself declares: "A 
human world is detached from the totality of the "natural" world, 
which is what is specific to each cultural community. Only those 
events of the world which have people as subjects are part of such a 
semiotic; natural events (e.g., earthquakes) are excluded" (Greimas 
1987: 30). Greimas "natural semiotics" therefore is less a bridge be­
tween the semiotic spheres than a proof of the thesis of this paper, 
namely that any contemplation of the natural world, regardless of its 
independent semiotic value, must result in a culturalisation of the 
natural. 
A theory truly dissolving the semiotic-nonsemiotic divide is 
Peirce's approach. He claims that "all this universe is perfused with 
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448 fn). This 
remark has been widely disputed, especially in regard of the question 
whether everything really can be a sign. Again, I shall not venture into 
this discussion here. It is, however, fundamental that by the process of 
signification, where from firstness via secondness to thirdness all sign-
forms may appear, the variety of signs reaches far beyond those bound 
to convention. The latter, in Peircean terminology symbols, or leg-
isigns, are just one of the many classes of signs he devises in his sys­
tem.4 
2.4. Hybridization and the pansemiotic bridge 
Even if we pursue a course that clearly divides culture from nature, 
as, e.g., Umberto Eco did, we have to accept that a basic tendency of, 
e.g., using tools, is also existent in the world of animals. Otters use 
stones for breaking shells, chimpanzees "fish" ants by use of sticks, 
and many animals build shelters. 
In these examples, we may see how the nature-culture divide is 
being weakened from below. At the same time, humans have continu­
From the many varying approaches Peirce takes to this subject matter, I may 
be so bold as to propose here that the Peircean classification of signs in itself is 
merely an artificial system devised by the great scholar in order to metaphorize his 
theory, which in itself is rather processual than class- or system-oriented. 
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ously been extending the variety of resources nature offers. This inclu­
sion of as yet protosemiotic3 matter into the process of cultural devel­
opment produces hybrid artefacts. They are hybrid because they con­
sist of so-called "natural" material — i.e., material that does not origi­
nally have cultural value or purpose — and a cultural concept of how 
to use the item. We must understand that this process started at the 
most archaic levels of evolution. Culture — in whatever terms we may 
define it — always carries a basic function. It helps the human being 
understand the cosmos by "humanizing" it. By this I mean that the 
items and material found in the cosmos are evaluated according to 
their uses and functions to the human being.6 They hence have a dou­
ble sign value. First, the natural signs — which, I argue, do exist be­
yond the confines of our mind — interact on the foundations of natu­
ral laws, or relations beyond the obvious to the human mind. Second, 
items and materials gain a second sign value by their being taken on to 
human culture. This distinction being only existent in theory but both 
sign spheres occupying the same physical world, it is obvious that 
these signs must become hybridized. 
From these preliminary thoughts it becomes clear that in discuss­
ing hybridity, the material form of items must not be the focus of in­
vestigation. Indeed, matter and concept together form a hybrid arte­
fact. Hence, a stone in the field neglected by any passers-by is not a 
culturally hybrid item; still it has its proper place in the sign systems 
of minerals. It evinces form, radiation, and constituents which termi­
nate its place in the cosmic evolution. However, as soon as somebody 
3 Protosemiotic here refers to possible-signs that are as yet non-signs only in 
regard to purely human signification. Indeed, for the human being — as I may add 
here for emphasis — signification is not only a possibility, it is a must, perhaps 
even a "curse". Humans will never be able to fully understand nonhuman signifi­
cation, as they can not leave the cognitive apparatus of their species behind. Also, 
meaning for us is always given; even in producing new meaning, we must refer to 
existing ones (cf. Greimas 1966). The transformation of the protosemiotic to the 
semiotic adheres to the same principles, governed, however, by the rules of human 
signification alone. I should also like to agree with Nöth (2001: 14—15), who em­
phasizes that the acknowledgement of semiosic processes beyond the confines of 
culture goes along with the rediscovery of Peirce's concept of semiosis, a concept 
large enough to cover for much more than cultural signification. 
6 Taking this argument literally, it follows that God was wrong when he asked 
Adam to give everything its proper name. He should rather have said that Adam 
was to give every item on earth its most appropriate name according to Adam's 
subjective view of the universe, so to conceptualize the world by human terms. 
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picks up the stone for any purpose, the stone is immersed in human 
culture. Its pure "naturalness", if you allow for such a term, is ulti­
mately lost. Its colour may now be regarded as beautiful, its mineral 
contents as valuable. Its form may appear useful as a wedge or a door­
stopper or its heaviness as a weight. In this way, any item, material, or 
appearance in the universe may eventually become "culturalized". 
The most prominent hybrid artefact in this sense is the human body 
itself. Hybridisation of the body is usually conceived of as being di­
rected towards the appearance or composition of the body. Hybridiza­
tion in these terms means taking on material to the body in order to 
intensify its beauty, to give it shelter, or to replace lost organs or 
limbs, i.e., replace them by prostheses, in order to maintain the func­
tionality of the human body. All of these meanings of hybrid bodies 
are true of course. Nevertheless, hybridization of the body also in­
volves the amalgamation of material and concept. The application of 
paint to the face does not produce beauty or significance automati­
cally. Those colours, powders, and fragrances are culturally coded, as 
is the way the make-up is applied to eyelids, cheeks, or lips. In this 
example, we find hybridity in the appearance of the body. 
As soon as it comes to more complicated examples such as shel­
tering the body, we find that concept and material are actually gradu­
ally moving away from the body into the semiotic sphere surrounding 
it. Shelter for the body may well mean clothing — something that in­
deed still changes appearance and composition of the body itself — 
but it can also refer to a cave, or a house. In both cases, something is 
coded with a bodily function — namely, maintenance of temperature, 
protection from rain, etc. — yet not directly connected with the body. 
The bricks, beams, and tiles of the house are not a part of the body, 
neither is the rocky surface of the cave. Still, both are immersed into 
the bodily coded culture. The materials have been reimbodied in cul­
tural contexts. In other words: Beyond their possible semiotic qualities 
in a hypothetically nonsemiotic nature, rock, wood, and stone are now 
part of the culturally coded interprétant.7 
From this semiotic process of immersing nature into culture, two 
statements follow: First, hybridization of the body only begins with 
This argument challenges the notion that a difference exists between usage 
and meaning', the point, however, already has been made by semiotic studies of 
commodities. Cf. Douglas, Isherwood (1979: 62); Csikszentmihalyi, Rochberg-
Halton (1981); or Appadurai (1986). 
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using stones as tools, or animal fur as clothing. Any habit, technology, 
or other cultural practice results in hybridization of the body and its 
Umwelt. In modernity, it has reached the level of melting metal from 
ore and refining plastics from oil, using sophisticated machines for 
calculation, firing rockets to the end of destruction, etc. Humans are 
thus able to produce prostheses for a large variety of uses in the hu­
man body. In this variety, both special cases, such as medical applica­
tions and everyday usage of materials in fashion or other fields are 
included. The consequence is the extension of the culture into nature, 
a result which makes it easier to understand the Umwelt, and at the 
same time reduces it, since the Umwelt becomes itself a part of the 
semiosic process within the interpreter. 
The second statement follows from the first. If anything used by 
humans, if everything conceptualised, graded, considered, or calcu­
lated becomes part of the human culture, there is virtually nothing 
"purely natural" left in the universe, save for objects or concepts as yet 
unknown to humankind (and I do not refer here to, e.g., as yet unseen 
doors). For any theory depending on a nature-culture divide, this is an 
ultimate problem. Nature in itself, as long as it is by definition de­
manded to exist completely unattained by culture, would remain un-
observable. This phenomenon may be described as the ecological 
paradox. Peircean semiotic, however, offers a valid solution to this 
problem, which I will try to sketch. The second statement draws on 
the fundamental notion of how the universe must be designed. Obvi­
ously, the universe is divided into those objects which are culturally 
coded and those which are not (and rendered unknown). In the process 
of human semiosis, the extensions of the human body have reduced 
those areas on the planet Earth which are excluded from that cultural 
coding to a little number, now comprising only the deepest depths of 
the oceans, several happy species of insects and plants, and the tiniest 
spaces of the microcosm. Man strives to also extend his sphere of 
knowledge to these. Nature has thus almost entirely been conquered 
by culture. This makes it hard to define the confines of "real" nature in 
the ecological or semiotic discourse. Whatever we speak of when re­
ferring to nature has long since been made part of our culture. Ani­
mals and plants, ores and minerals have acquired cultural value, in­
deed any attempt at excluding animals or plants from what is fre­
quently called cultural behaviour can only result in paradoxically in­
cluding, reimbodying, immersing these same animals and plants into 
96 Guido Ipsen 
culture, as necessarily they must be culturally coded — and graded — 
before being able to serve as counterexamples. 
The result of these thoughts is that we need to establish a pansemi-
otic view in order to understand the effects of cultural signification in 
the larger semiotic sphere which comprises the cosmos. Pansemiotism 
has been condemned by more conservative semioticians (cf. Nöth 
2001: 15). Pansemiotism has thus almost become an accusation close 
to an insult.8 Nöth prefers to use it cautiously with a question mark. 
He argues that 
to describe Peirce's universal semiotics as a pansemiotic theory is a gross 
simplification. Semiosis, in the framework of Peirce's theory, presupposes 
thirdness, but the world does not only consist of phenomena of thirdness, but 
also of phenomena of firstness and secondness, which are not yet semiotic 
phenomena, although they may have 'quasi-semiotic' characteristics, since 
Peirce's theory of continuity does not establish a mere dichotomy between 
semiosis and nonsemiosis, but distinguishes many transitions between genuine 
and degenerate quasi-semiosis. (Nöth 2001: 15) 
I should like to focus on the point of continuity here. Indeed Peirce's 
thorough system of categories of signs and semiosic processes allows 
for two interpretations, the first of which would suit those semioti­
cians who prefer to draw borders between nature and culture, semiotic 
and nonsemiotic and so forth. This interpretation would locate defi­
nitely quasi-semiosic processes below said semiotic thresholds, so to 
be neglected by semiotic. The second interpretation, which is prefer­
able, should emphasize the continuous nature of Peirce's theory and 
allow us to neglect the existence of thresholds in the first place. We 
may thus create a pansemiotic bridge covering the gap between nature 
and culture which is the vehicle for an understanding of the transcen­
dence of sign processes in the cosmos. 
Some semioticians also despise the pansemiotic view for the same reasons 
Eco introduced his threshold: They require the concept of difference in order to 
specify semiotic. A colleague of mine once argued that "if everything is semiotic, 
semiotic does not exist , hence falling for the old trap of negative dyads. How­
ever, such thinking leads to unwelcome and inappropriate constructivism. For 
example, we do accept the existence of the universe although we know of nothing 
that is not the universe. Also, definition along the lines of Peircean thought should 
result in an additive reasoning, not a negative. Difference in Peirce is only located 
at the root of semiosis, not in its interpretative result. 
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3. The transformation of nature into culture 
We have seen that the concepts of division that are still existent in 
semiotic theory may be overcome by applying a theory of continuity. 
In the following, I should like to make use of two theoremes that ex­
emplify how we culturalise, i.e., make part of our Umwelt the sign 
resources of nature. The first is the cosmological dimension of the 
theory of semiosis by Peirce, the second is the functional circle by von 
Uexküll. 
3.1. Sign formation on a cosmological scale: Peirce 
In the process of semiosis, Peirce well defines a process where the 
semiotic world cannibalises the non-semiotic world. Semiosis started 
from the point of utter chaos and will (ultimately but still hypotheti­
cal^) result in a universe governed by the rule of thirdness. Peirce, 
however, does not speak of the universe as only consisting of signs if 
chartered by human thought. According to Peirce, as mentioned 
above, the entire universe is composed of signs.9 
It is plural, not monadic systems which govern the universe and, 
following from that, human cognition. This is not a new insight, but 
has long been observed by the pragmatist tradition. Note, however, 
that "pluralism" does not exclusively focus on concepts such as differ­
ence. Rather, plurality is conceived of as a logical concept at the root 
of any cognition. The minimal form of plurality, namely binarity, is 
contained in any thought, as Peirce emphasizes. Each meaning is al­
ready a form of reaction: 
4 Hence, a distinct and fundamental division has to be made between Peircean 
and Saussurean views of the universe. In the latter's conception, anything not 
coded by cultural signs remains vague and unchartered — virtually nonexistent. 
From Peirce's point of view, also forces of nature are in itself semiotic. He de­
vised a complex variety of sign types for any possible phenomenon. Hence, if 
there was something nonsemiotic, according to Peirce such a thing or concept 
should not only be beyond our knowing of it, but also beyond any possibility of 
hypothetical existence. 
10 Difference in plurality and hybridity does play a role in structuralist and/or 
poststructuralist theory, where the essence of sign relations will always depend on 
the exclusive position of a sign in a system which constitutes itself in difference to 
other signs in the system. 
13 
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We can make no effort where we experience no resistance, no reaction. The 
sense of effort is a two-sided sense, revealing at once a something within and 
another something without. There is binarity in the idea of brute force; it is its 
principal ingredient. For the idea of brute force is little more than that of reac­
tion; and this is pure binarity. Imagine two objects which are not merely 
thought as two, but of which something is true such that neither could be re­
moved without destroying the fact supposed true of the other. Take, for exam­
ple, a husband and wife. Here there is nothing but a real twoness; but it con­
stitutes a reaction, in the sense that the husband makes the wife a wife in fact 
(not merely in some comparing thought); while the wife makes the husband a 
husband. (CP 2.84) 
The result of binarity, namely the relation between elements, naturally 
belongs to the category of secondness. It connects the phenomena of 
firstness (mere feelings yet bearing no true meaning), as without sec­
ondness nothing could be experienced: 
The world would be reduced to a quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would 
be an utter absence of binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes 
plurality. I may call its form Firstness, Ori en ce, or Originality. (CP 2.85) 
This plurality inherent to the signs results from the process of semio­
sis, the principally endless chain of experiences leading to ever new 
signs which will again be incorporated into the process. Experience 
requires continuity, and continuity is a projection on the past: Experi­
ence is "esse in praeterito" (CP 2.84). As experience — as a result of 
semiosis — is found in the interprétant, or effect of the sign, plurality 
is an important criteria for thirdness: "The general idea of plurality is 
involved in the fundamental concept of thirdness, a concept without 
which there can be no suggestion of such a thing as logic, or such a 
character as truth" (CP 4.332). Hence, plurality means multitude in 
signs and thus in the cognisable world ("variety of nature", cf. CP 
1.160; 8.307). The universe in itself is plural, its singular appearances 
are our own constructs. They do not lie in the nature of the universe 
itself: 
In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration [of the 
universe], our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these per­
ceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons qualities are 
immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The pre­
misses of nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of 
facts that go to make up the variety of nature. (CP 5.119) 
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In the words of this paper: Experience in essence is continuous. The 
"internal" and the "external" of the mind flow together in the signs; 
representamina of manifold kind, be they acoustic, pictorial, tactile, 
olfactory, etc., together form new interprétants. 
If this plurality is active in all the universe, then the human mind is 
an agent of transformation. The relations between the elements of ex­
perience are established by the interpreters. Whatever becomes part of 
the human Umwelt must pass this agency. There cannot be an Umwelt 
without a mind, or an Umwelt without the environment. 
3.2. The construction of the Umwelt: von Uexküll 
Jakob von Uexküll devised a most comprehensive model of how a 
subject by receiving perceptions from the diverse environment con­
structs its own Umwelt. In his biological foundation of the model, he 
shows how the perceptual and effector organs are connecting the inte­
rior, subjective realm of the perceiver with the exterior environment. 
Uexküll's first aim is to show how the action and reaction of a subject 
in the environment is governed and at the same time restricted by its 
organic delimitations. Or, in other words, the organic setup of the 
subject meets its requirements to survive in the environment (Uexküll, 
Kriszat 1970: 6-14). 
The object world in the functional circle makes itself "known" to 
the subject by the stimuli that may be perceived by the organism's 
receptors. The perceptual organ then processes the stimuli. As a result, 
the perceptual organ (in other words, the brain) returns a perspective 
on the environment that in due course causes a reaction, i.e., a species-
specific action that fits the environmental setup. By reacting, the or­
ganism will also have an effect on the environment which is therefore 
changed and will henceforth be perceived differently (see Fig. 1). 
Uexküll uses the very simple example of the tick in order to illus­
trate the various components of the functional circle. I should like to 
paraphrase here his terminology to the end of showing how humans 
reconstruct nature by means of culture. First, we must note that the 
receptors, the perceptual and effector organ, and the effector are each 
species-specific. This means that any species gains its own view on 
the environment that we may be able to reflect, but which we will 
never be able to fully comprehend or reconstruct (cf. Martineiii 2002). 
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I argue that the human species-specific perspective is the cultural one. 
This means that any perception of the environment is turned into 
something cultural by the perceptual organ. The Umwelt of humans 
consists of elements that are part of our conceptual framework. Hence, 
we cannot see, e.g., trees as trees, or cattle as cattle. Even if we do not 
choose to perceive the former as the resource of wood and the latter as 
food, we cannot help but accept that both trees and cattle are part of 
classifying systems which are human in origin and do not stem from 
the possible environmental sign value these objects may exhibit. Any 
perception is conceptualised according to the pre-existing conceptual 







Figure 1. Uexküll's functional circle {Funktionskreis). 
This process has various consequences. First, what for the "value" of 
nature in the context of our Umwelt? Kalevi Kull approaches the 
question from the perspective of biosemiotics (Kull 2001: 353-365). 
Naturally, all questions of value stem from a cultural ground. Here, we 
can clearly perceive how it is an exclusively cultural framework by 
which environmental issues are decided. From the perspective of the 
human, the question of value of nature is in truth the question of a part 
of his Umwelt, which turns out to be culture. The factual value of na­
ture is in consequence removed to the sphere of the environment and 
cannot be judged as of the environment we only get a subjective im­
pression. Second, as the mechanics of von Uexküll's functional circle 
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environment. I should like to use this principle in my theory as fol­
lows: Since we strive for ever deeper knowledge of the environment, 
we turn more and more details of it into cultural concepts. Hence, by 
mere existing, but also by scientific reflection and investigation we are 
virtually "consuming" the environment, even if not exhausting it 
physically. The conceptualisation of nature reduces it to which is not 
yet known, as only the latter cannot yet be part of our conceptualised 
Umwelt. Third, the question of responsibility towards the environ­
ment/nature must be redefined. The ecological discourse has produced 
an awareness about protecting and saving the environment. This is 
essentially mistaken for nature. The ecologists cannot escape their 
cultural grounding: Responsibility for nature is connected with cul­
tural concepts such as value, resources, rarities, etc. Hence, protection 
of the environment turns out to be a self-protective tendency of the 
human being in its Umwelt. 
4. Résumé: The ecological paradox 
I have seemingly arrived at a dead end: If everything is nature, and 
everything at the same time is culture, then where is the point of 
making a difference between the two in the first place? I should like to 
point out here that it is not the purpose of this paper to avoid termino­
logical differences. The study of writing, of sports, and of architecture 
is different from the study of whales, of flowers, or of the planets. The 
former may clearly be attributed to culture, the latter to nature. 
Still, we have come to think of whales as something "valuable", 
"precious". We have come to think of planets as something "worth to 
study", and flowers may represent "love", as the rose does, or mourn­
ing, or a thousand other sentiments. Anything can become a sign; any 
"natural" thing may become "culturalized". Hence, the natural re­
sources may dwindle in substance, but they have long ceased to exist 
as a sign resource in themselves: They have become included in hu­
man culture. 
The only true paradox is hence human beings engaging in a dis­
course on nature. As soon as nature becomes a topic of discourse, it is 
not nature any more, but a part of culture. This fact has been ignored 
by Lotman and others because they do not acknowledge the sign value 
of things beyond human signification. But the tree is worth while as a 
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tree, as the growing thing which does not even bear a name. In Peir­
cean terms: There is a natural thirdness of nature which enters our 
perception only by way of cultural firstness. Cultural thirdness then is 
the alienation of these sign values. The tree as the oak, birch, etc. in 
our biological sign systems has nothing to do whatsoever with that 
"tree" which is natural in itself. 
I name this the ecological paradox. Even by discussing the meas­
ures to protect nature, we are diminishing it. We cannot escape it; the 
way of human signification dictates that semiosis results in symbols, 
or thirdness. However, by acknowledging this process, and possibly 
deconstructing it, we may be able to go beyond the nature of our cul­
ture and see that there is a different, alien, but quite real culture of 
nature. Both form the unity of the universe, and nurture each other. 
Let us appreciate this holistic perspective, to which semiotic opens a 
door. The necessity of abandoning old notions such as the threshold 
thinking, as well as reconsidering our notion of what nature, culture, 
and the environment truly are, lies only at the beginning of that proc­
ess. Uexküll and Peirce offer us tools to chart anew our semiotic 
sphere and gain a better perspective. The two key concepts are conti­
nuity of semiosis and semiotisation of the environment. 
References 
Appadurai, Aijun (ed.) 1986. The Social Life of Things. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Augustine, Aurelius 1952 [397]. On Christian doctrine. (Shaw, J. F., trans.) In: St. 
Augustine, Confessions... Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 619-698. 
Bockrath, Franz (ed.) 2001. Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen 
Ausdruck— im Sport. Hamburg: Czwalina. 
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly; Rochberg-Halton, Eugene 1981. The Meaning of 
Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Deely, John 2001. A sign is what? A dialogue between a semiotician and a would-
be realist. Sign Systems Studies 29(2): 705-743. 
Douglas, Mary; Isherwood, Baron 1982 [1979]. The World of Goods. New York: 
Norton. 
Eco, Umberto 1976. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Friedrich, Georg (ed.) 2001. Zeichen und Anzeichen — Analysen und Prognosen 
des Sports. Hamburg: Czwalina. 
Greimas, Algirdas Julien 1966. Sémantique structurale. Paris: Larousse. 
From environment to culture: Aspects of continuity 103 
— 1987. On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory. London: Frances 
Pinter. 
Hietzge, Maud Corinna (ed.) 1997. Semiotik des Sports [- Zeitschrift fur Semiotik 
29]. Tübingen: Stauffenburg. 
Hildenbrandt, Eberhard (ed.) 1997. Sport als Kultursegment aus der Sicht der 
Semiotik. Hamburg: Czwalina. 
Kull, Kalevi 2001. Biosemiotics and the problem of intrinsic value of nature. Sign 
Systems Studies 29(1): 353-365. 
Lotman, Juri M. 1981. Kunst als Sprache: Untersuchungen zum Zeichencharakter 
von Literatur und Kunst. Leipzig: Reclam. 
— 1990. Universe of Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Martineiii, Dario 2002. How Musical is a Whale? Towards a Theory of Zoomusi-
cology. (= Approaches to Musical Semiotics 3.) Helsinki: International Semi­
otics Institute at Imatra. 
Nöth, Winfried 1990. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
— 2000. Handbuch der Semiotik. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
— 2001. Protosemiotics and physicosemiotics. Sign Systems Studies 29(1): 13-
26. 
Nöth, Winfried; Kull, Kalevi (eds.) 2001. The Semiotics of Nature. [= Sign Sys­
tems Studies 29(1).] Tartu: Tartu University Press & Kassel: Kassel Univer­
sity Press. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1931-1958. Collected Papers, vols. 1-6 (Hartshorne, С.; 
Weiss, P., eds.); vols. 7-8 (Burks, A. W., ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. [Cited as СР.] 
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1986 [1916]. Cours de linguistique générale. Bally, 
Charles; Sechehaye, Albert (eds.). Paris: Payot. 
Uexküll, Jakob von; Kriszat, Georg 1970 [1934]. Streifzüge durch die Umwelten 
von Tieren und Menschen. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. 
От окружающей среды до культуры: аспекты непрерывности 
Концептуализация жизненного мира любого вида содержит в себе 
преобразование материи его окружения в категории, составляющие 
характерный для этого вида умвельт. В статье утверждается, что 
свойственное человеку стремление концептуализовать умвельт ведет 
к трансформации "природы" в "культуру". Такая человеческая ак­
тивность имеет как минимум два последствия, которых мы не можем 
избежать и которые влияют не только на наше восприятие окру­
жающей среды, но и на наш способ теоретизировать о границе 
между природой и культурой или о так наз. семиотическом пороге. 
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Во-первых, любое восприятие окружающей среды сразу "перево­
дится" в терминах культуры. Во-вторых, какой бы ни была "при­
рода", включение ее в дискурс культуры отгораживает ее от наших 
непосредственных ощущений. 
Keskkonnast kultuurini: Pidevuse tahud 
Mistahes liigi eluilma kontseptualiseerimine sisaldab tema keskkonnas 
leiduva aine ümberkujundamise kategooriaiks, mis moodustavad ta liigi­
omase omailma. Käesolev artikkel väidab, et inimlik taotlus kontseptua-
liseerida omailm ühtlasi tingimata transformeerib nn. looduse nn. 
kultuuriks. See immlik aktiivsus omab möödapääsmatult kaht tagajärge, 
mida ei saa vältida, kuid mis omavad mõju mitte üksnes meie keskkonna­
tajule, vaid ka meie viisile teoretiseerida looduse ja kultuuri piiri ehk 
semiootilise läve üle. Esiteks, iga keskkonnataju saab otsemaid vaa­
deldavaks kultuurilistes terminites. Teiseks, milline iganes ka "loodus" 
pole, selle liitmine kultuundiskursusesse lahutab ta vahetust tunnetusest. 
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Abstract. This paper seeks to address the relation of materiality to structure 
and phenomena of signification or semiosis. It examines the logical conse­
quences of several major lines of argument concerning the status of semiosis 
with regards to the human or broadly "organic" life-world and to the "zero 
degree" of base materiality — from Peirce to Lotman and Sebeok — and 
questions the classificatory rationale that delimits semiosis to the exclusion of 
a general treatment of dynamic systems. Recent investigations into neuro-
semiotics have provided salient arguments for the need to treat semiosis as a 
characteristic of systems in general, and to establish a more transverse under­
standing of signifiability upon the basis of what makes dynamic structures, as 
such, possible. 
Introduction: Why is there structure rather than chaos? 
Such questions bring into view a certain habit of reason which has 
accustomed us to regard the world in terms of a conceptual division — 
between the inert and the animate, matter and mind, substance and 
form — indeed, to regard it as something like a Byzantine vista of 
categories, types, and classes, whose bifurcations and taxonomies ap­
pear, from moment to moment, as seemingly real and incontravertable 
as the "great chain of being" on the eve of the Lamarckian revolution, 
while any perceived ambivalence to rigid denomination has routinely 
been suppressed "for the sake of meaning". As various commentators 
have noted, "humans seem equipped by the structure of the brain to 
perceive patterns, and the trick has survival value, but this does not 
prove that all the patterns we perceive are really there" (Everdell 
1997: 346), nor does it prove that those inimical to particular modes of 
14 
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theorisation do not, therefore, exist. Categories, types and classes are 
themselves derived statistical descriptions of stochastic processes 
whose "emergent" regularities or patterns have too often been mis­
taken for an order of things or immutable schema. Their symmetry 
has, up until recent times, defined the limiting epistemological criteria 
both of philosophical and scientific discourse, whose character (dia­
lectic, dualistic, oppositional) can more properly be described as 
metaphorical or analogical. 
While a great deal has been written about dialectics, dualism and 
binary opposition, there still remains the task of accounting for the 
inaugurating metaphoricity that can be said to condition each of these 
modes of thought. By metaphoricity it is meant a certain "mechanism" 
of equivalence, vested in an otherwise arbitrary relation invoked be­
tween "unlike" and "uncommunicating" terms, and therefore formally 
paratactic or discontinuous. This mechanism may be said to be 
founded upon a predisposition of metaphor towards a delineation of its 
objects in terms of structural equivalence and inequivalence (and only 
consequently semantic equivalence). That is to say, along an axis of 
suppressed ambivalence. The ambivalent quality of this axis comes 
more clearly into view once we recognise its ostensibly arbitrary 
function in defining an "oppositional" relationship between paired 
terms, and a "homological" one between terms arranged on either side 
of it. Such ambivalence, in light of the metaphorical schema organised 
around it, acquires the appearance of something like a métonymie re­
cursion, in that it describes a certain asymmetrical relation across con­
tiguity. That is to say, the so-called oppositional terms are either mu­
tually determinate or partial — meaning that the one inclines to an 
"excluded" or "detached" characteristic of the other. 
It is precisely in the co-implied structures of metaphor and meton­
ymy — of implication and co-implication — that we encounter am­
bivalence as an engine of possibility, by means of which supposedly 
inert matter assumes the characteristic of a sign, such that — for ex­
ample — we may consider signification not as a process that is retro­
spectively projected upon the universe — i.e. as a rationalistic mirror-
fantasy — or "modelled" in our own image (vis-à-vis the symmetry or 
synonymy of likeness), but rather as a process that necessarily accom­
panies the most elementary material relations which, posed as "oppo­
sitional", "correlative", or "complementary", imply some aspect of 
formal communication. Such communication, however, must be dis-
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tinguished from the assumptions of "analogical" correspondence 
(similarity, likeness, resemblance), so that when we speak of possibil­
ity we mean something contingent upon ostensibly material and prob­
abilistic constraints, but which also exceeds and envelopes those con­
straints (metaphor, metonymy); indeed, which would in fact constitute 
their very condition. Consequently, our initial question may be refor­
mulated as: How is it, that even at the most basic level, matter appears 
to be bound up with the very nature of structure, of structurality and 
of structure's immanent possibility? 
This question, or series of questions, has given rise within the 
study of sign systems to analogous questions which, on the surface at 
least, approach the problem from the opposite side, in terms such as: 
"Can the essence of life — or, at least, our concept of life — be under­
stood in a semiotic framework?" (Luure 2002: 315). On the one hand, 
a base, inert materiality; while on the other, life-processes, dynamic 
systems, or mechanisms of reflection; posed against an axis of structu­
ration which, both nominally and yet in some sense equally "essen­
tially," is therefore also an axis of signification, or of what we might 
call "sign operations" or semiosis. This apparent opposition — 
sketched here in a merely provisional, though also conventional, out­
line — is itself a characteristic of a certain axial mode of thinking 
(symmetrical, asymmetrical) which, even if not in purely "value" 
terms, obtains its impetus by arranging its objects across a differential 
gradient — according to which certain tendencies are schematised in 
relational or transferential tenns (as a movement, for example, from 
materiality to systematicity) desribing what we might call a formal 
immanence. 
To tend, however, will have always implied a movement of conti­
nuity versus discontinuity; such as is implied in a system of arbitrarily 
defined difference, for example, or as represented in the paratactic 
structures of metaphor and metonymy, and which is effectively 
masked by the assumption — retrospectively supplied — of a latent 
similarity, synonymy or formal "symmetry". This quasi-progressivist 
notion, with its neo-Platonistic undertones of an "en te physei" (the 
immanence attributed to paradeigmata as the "future forms of things" 
latent within any process of structuration, including the naturalisation 
of forms into species in Aristotle's schema) — or equally of a trans­
mutation of base matter into something like a consciousness (however 
necessarily conjectural its character) — ought not, however, to be per­
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ceived as merely a doctrinal or ideological caprice. Insofar as we may 
say that "binary structures" obtain within material relations — that 
materiality tends to structurally — or that material relations are them­
selves fundamentally axial or "ambivalent," only presupposes an op­
position or value-relation on the basis of a "signifying" function (and 
not of a "representation" or "model-image" as such), and it would 
therefore seem that the overriding concern to which our initial ques­
tions refer is how we are to "locate" a signifying function within, or 
across, an "originary" binary relation, in advance of any semantic 
schématisation. That is to say, in advance of any assumption of 
meaning other than the fact of this relation itself. But is such a thing 
possible? 
1 
In Global Semiotics (2001), Thomas Sebeok attempts to frame this 
problem in terms of a globalised view of material structures that, to a 
limited extent, re-echoes Gregory Bateson's ecologies of mind and 
parallels Juri Lotman's theory of semiospheres, in attempting to "ex­
tend" semiotic concepts into the 'vitalistic' or biological realm. The 
logical implications of Sebeok's thesis, however, can be seen as 
countering Sebeok's own assumption that a discourse of biosemiotics 
can only be founded upon a metaphorical approximation of sign 
structures to living systems. The structural logic of biosemiotic sys­
tems nevertheless directly implies structural logics characteristic of 
non-organic "dynamic systems" (or what might equally be termed 
dissipative systems, according to which entropy would describe a 
common characteristic of both so-called life systems and non-organic 
dynamic systems) and thus points us towards a "literalised" under­
standing of semiotics in its global implications. One of these implica­
tions being that, founded upon a purely material basis, semiosis, or 
sign operations, ultimately presuppose what we call a phenomenon of 
consciousness, and hence of agency — and consequently that agency 
must be vested first and foremost in the very materiality of structure, 
and thus also be considered immanent to it, rather than representing a 
quality externally derived or somehow instantiated by way of external 
processes — i.e. applied to it — or derived from some autonomous 
model-image. Likewise, the concept of dynamic sign systems, organ­
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ised around an "axis of ambiguity" or structural recursion, cannot 
simply be reduced to an externally supplied impetus (vis-à-vis New­
ton's law). As with physical systems, the recursive mechanisms to 
which we assign the term agency remain ambiguous with regard to the 
distinction, for example, between "energy" and "matter" (energeïa 
and pràgmata), even if such mechanisms remain subject to the ten­
dency of all closed systems to dissipate. It remains that the "commu­
nication" of the energy-matter relation (or ratio) requires a prior 
structural possibility, such that we can speak of a system as such and 
not merely of an "isolated effect". 
Interpreting along similar but restricted lines, according to the lim­
ited case-model of biosemiotics, Sebeok postulates that "two cardinal 
and reciprocal axioms of semiotics" must therefore be: 
(la) The criterial mark of all life is semiosis; and (lb) Semiosis presupposes 
life [...]. Further semiosic unfoldings — such as the genesis of ordered oppo­
sitions like self/other, inside/outside, and so forth — derive from, or are cor­
ollaries of, the above pair of universal laws. (Sebeok 2001: 10-11) 
Drawing upon the biological theories of Jakob von Uexküll, the life-
world is described by Sebeok as a type of biotext, not simply in the 
sense that living systems are affective of signification, but rather that 
they devolve — as systems — upon a processual network of sign op­
erations. Sebeok argues: 
The aim of biosemiotics is to extend the notions of general semiotics to en­
compass the study of semiosis and modeling in all species. The premise which 
guides biosemiotics is, in fact, that the forms produced by a specific species 
are constrained by the modeling system(s) which has evolved from its ana­
tomical constitution. The aim of biosemiotics is to study not only the species 
belonging to one of the five kingdoms, Monera, Protocista, Animalia, Plan-
tae, and Fungi, but also their hierarchically developed component parts, be­
ginning with the cell, the minimal semiosic unit [...]. In a phrase, the target of 
biosemiotics is the semiosic behaviour of all living things. (Sebeok, Danesi 
2000: 15) 
Once again the concept of structural agency emerges here as an in­
strumental action in the tendency from "anatomical constraint" to 
"modelling system" to "semiosis". The question remains as to how it 
is possible to abstract semiosis from this evolutionary process? 
Equally, if semiosis is to be conditioned by an effect or phenomenon 
of agency, how is an assumption of agency to take place other than as 
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an evolution within and as this functional, constitutive anatomy — i.e. 
describing "emergent" regularities — such that its "constraints" re­
main immanent, rather than as an autonomous set of codes or 
paradeigmata upon which a semiotic condition may be modelled or 
according to which its "form" may be said to be determined. Distin­
guishing between latency and immanence, the complementarity of 
constraint and structurality ("anatomic constitution") are what define 
semiosis as the very condition and possibility of agency, and not vice 
versa as the organicist argument would suggest. 
2 
If we are to speak of agency as a non-linear, "causal circuit" of mate­
rial constraints upon which "cognitive action" devolves — vis-à-vis 
the trope of semiosis — and not the contrary, then it is a matter of re­
orientating Sebeok's biosemiotic model towards a properly global 
semiotics founded upon a concept of discursive materiality, in its lit­
eral and no longer "metaphorical" sense. This requires that we exam­
ine the implications of C. S. Peirce's contention that the universe as 
such is characterised (though not exclusively) by sign operations, and 
Margaret Mead's re-definition of semiotics in 1962 as "patterned 
communication in all its modalities". This would require that we 
firstly arrive at an understanding of what such concepts as "universal," 
"sign operation" and "communication" might require by way of refor­
mulation if we are to pose them in strictly material terms — that is to 
say, in terms independent of assumptions of human agency or of bio­
logical vitalism (zoösemiotics, anthroposemiotics and phytosemiot-
ics). And this would mean accounting for the operations of signs as 
such — an accounting which would necessarily draw into question 
Sebeok's insistence that Saussure's "linguistic paradigm" represents a 
distortion of natural signifying. 
John Deely paraphrases Sebeok's argument as being founded upon 
a distinction "between language, as having in itself nothing to do with 
communication but which, through exaption, gives rise to linguistic 
communication as species-specifically human, and communication, 
which is a universal phenomenon of nature" (Deely 2004). In this way 
Sebeok is seen to reject the notion that animal species other than hu­
mans may be possessed of language, or at least of "linguistic commu­
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nication". Yet insofar as communication presupposes something other 
than random, singular events of "transmission" — although this in 
itself would require elaborate definition — the question remains as to 
what "linguistic communication" could entail in distinction from 
communication in its universal sense, since any form of structuration 
or sign operation must be given to require, for example, some type of 
syntactic and broadly signifying "function," and that such functions 
must be generalisable (as a function of the possible) across an arbi­
trarily defined field of potential "signs". And if "universal" conditions 
are to obtain vis-à-vis communication, from where do such conditions 
arise if they are not also to be attributed to "linguistic communica­
tion," on the one hand, and to the material states of dynamic (non-life) 
systems on the other? 
Indeed, the opposition here between "communication, which is a 
universal phenomenon of nature" and "linguistic communication", 
reveals itself to be nothing other than a restatement of the nature-
artifice (physis-technë) dualism that has reasserted itself at different 
points in the history of Western thought, and which more recently has 
manifested itself in terms of natural and artificial languages, and natu­
ral and artificial intelligence. As a sub-class of communication, "lin­
guistic communication" is presented as a mere "species-specifically 
human" prosthesis. In other words, a supplementary mode or model of 
communication, vested in a formal definition of language as artefac-
tual (the specifically human techniques or technologies of speech and 
writing, for example, as opposed to a species-aspecific "semiosis"). 
The distinction is based in part upon the assumption of agency, such 
that "language" is defined as a particular use to which the phenome­
non of communication is put: that it is a utility, an addition or exten­
sion, and thus bears no relation to ("has nothing to do with") the un­
derwriting conditions of communication in its universal aspect. 
The question immediately arises as to how language, as a prosthe­
sis of communication, is possible if its operations are not somehow 
vested already in those of communication as such. By implication, this 
question extends also to the limiting claims of biosemiotics that com­
munication be viewed as "a universal phenomenon of nature" solely to 
the extent that it relates to the operations of life-systems. Simplifying, 
this question becomes: upon what are the operations of life-systems 
founded if not upon a general condition of materiality, upon which the 
possibility of sign operations must also devolve? In other words, are 
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not the assumptions about "nature" and natural communication in fact 
already presupposed in a generalised technë — what we might go so 
far as to characterise as the very technë of possibility itself — as a 
function not of derivation from "anatomical constraints" (or "model­
ling systems," which by definition already function semio-mime-
tically), but of an architectonics of constraint (material, probabilistic), 
which thereby is regarded as programming the general semiotic appa­
ratus? 
If so, the "basic unit" of semiotic systems cannot, contrary to Se­
beok's insistence, be meaningfully defined (analogically or otherwise) 
in terms of the biological "cell," which in itself — even as the ultimate 
element of organic structures — is already a complex of micro- and 
macro-scale molecular events. The "agency" (or bio-technics) of cell 
division or propagation is already prefigured in the "agency" of dy­
namic systems contained within it, and indeed sustaining and super­
seding it — whether these involve enzymic transcriptions or atomic 
states. If we assume a literal significance to Peirce's threefold condi­
tion of semiosis (that any sign operation presupposes a relation of two 
elements to a third element) (Peirce 1955: 99-100), then we may posit 
the "basic unit" of semiotics as any mediated binary relation — i.e. 
satisfying the minimal conditions for a dynamic system. Negatively 
defined, semiosis is thus a measure of entropy, insofar as it implies 
even the most rudimentary and minimal of system dynamics — as in 
Bateson's "difference that makes a difference" (Bateson 1973: 428). 
Hence, in place of the limiting sense of semiosis presupposing "life," 
it is necessary to posit a more general notion of semiosis — one prop­
erly consistent with the logic of a "communication, which is a univer­
sal phenomenon" — describing material, and fundamentally technical, 
processes of transmission, propagation and dissipation. 
3 
The dilation of materiality in the "figure" of communication, language 
or sign systems, brings into view a fundamental incongruity in the 
logic of biosemiotics in the assumption of a life-principle or biological 
agency as the determining condition of semiosis. Sebeok's two "car­
dinal and reciprocal axioms of semiotics" reflect the tendency of a 
closed semiotic system towards what we might call the vertigo of self-
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representation, according to which semiosis is "constrained" by its 
own "modelling system", thus succumbing to a reductio ad infinitum. 
Moreover, the arbitrary distinction between the sign-mechanics of 
organic systems and the signifying possibility of material relations per 
se, implies a logic of exceptions whereby biosemiotics merely re-
inscribes a certain analogical privilege — i.e. that the figure of agency 
must in all accounts remain distinguishable from the "condition" of 
base matter, as in fact the determining limit of that class of entity that 
culminates in man. 
The genesis of "ordered oppositions" underwriting Sebeok's claim 
to certain "universal laws" of semiotics is thus not universal at all but 
based upon a foundation of behavioural and bio-mimetic assumptions. 
By behavioural and bio-mimetic it is above all meant analogical, in 
the sense that the genesis of "ordered oppositions" is said to resemble 
the formal structurality innate to semiotic systems as such. Hence, that 
the discourse of semiotics is effectively modelled upon the organisa­
tion of its primary objects, thereby acquiring an aura of scientific va­
lidity. Such claims to validation, however, belie a particular asymme­
try in the relation between biosemiotics and its object, on the one 
hand, and the general discursiveness of sign structures on the other. 
An asymmetry, moreover, reflected in the very discourse of biosemi­
otics which both characterises the very impetus of semiosis defined 
within that discourse, but also — and of necessity — points beyond its 
limiting criteria towards a general condition of semiosis (implied by 
Lotman's semiosphere); one which is radically non-analogical, but 
which describes the prior possibility of analogical structures; one 
which is not representable within the discourse of biosemiotics, but 
which rather describes an horizon of representability. In this we may 
recognise a fundamental dependency upon a technë of metaphoric 
substitution and métonymie forethrow, or of what we call "equiva­
lence across contiguity". 
Re-echoing Claude Lévi-Strauss' studies in structural anthropol­
ogy, Lotman (like Sebeok) derives a logic of "ordered opposition" on 
an analogical rather than properly structural or material basis, founded 
upon culturally (or "ideologically") articulated assumptions about sig-
nifiability. This points to both an explicit and hidden anthropomor­
phism within the discourse of biosemiotics, which — despite its uni­
versalism — posits the "asymmetry" of semiotic systems (what we 
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might call their dynamic gradient) in species-specific — and hence 
analogical — terms. According to Lotman: 
The asymmetry of the human body is the anthropological basis for its semioti-
cisation: the semiotics of right and left are found just as universal in all human 
cultures as the opposition top and bottom. And the fundamental asymmetry of 
male and female, living and dead, are just as widespread. The living/dead op­
position involves the opposition of something moving, warm, breathing, to 
something immobile, cold, not breathing (the belief that cold and death are 
synonyms is supported by an enormous number of texts from different cul­
tures, and just as common is the identification of death with turning to stone 
[...] (Lotman 1990: 133) 
This preoccupation with the "orientational" logic of ordered opposi­
tion — or of oppositional pairs (or binaries) — founded here upon a 
process of textual induction with its appeals to cultural and empirical 
facticity, belies a systematic dependence upon an oppositional logic 
that is purely formal, normative, and metaphysically "grounded". It is 
in accordance with such a logic that we encounter the continuing dis­
tinction between such terms as animate-inanimate, nature-artifice, 
body-mind, sensible-intelligible, and so on, not to speak of the endless 
series of cognate oppositions between purely qualitative terms, defin­
ing a network of associated values from which the discourse of bio­
semiotics is in no way exempt. 
4 
Disagreement with this tendency to a limited, doctrinal approach to 
semiotic phenomena, has provoked a number of corrective hypothe­
ses. One such is represented by the emergent discourse of neurosemi-
otics, which focuses upon the material, neurological conditions of 
what we call communication, affected not on biologically causal 
grounds, but rather in terms of a general state of probabilistic interme­
diation. According to this view: 
If we understand semiosis to be an organising principle of all manner of sign-
exchange, then the operational processes enabling signification from receptor 
cell to interneuron to effector cell and the processes enabling signification 
across the meta-systems of biological organisation (cell, pathway, network, 
organ, system, body proper) and across levels of awareness (network signifi­
cation, body signification, mental signification) reveal themselves as systemic 
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parts in a lawful, interactive continuum — a view of mind and body that al­
lows us to transcend the intransigent dualism of contemporary neuroscience 
[...]. (Favareau 2002: 80) 
In contrast to the analogical "modelling systems" characteristic of Se­
beok's "global semiotics", the enquiry into semiosis as an "organising 
principle of all manner of sign-exchange" — but above all concerned 
with the "principles by which the emergence of mental representation 
from neuronal electro-chemical signal transduction is even possible" 
(Favareau 2002: 66) — points to the necessity of a fundamentally 
material understanding of the mechanisms of reflexivity, repre-
sentability, and mechanical agency as a basis for defining cognitive 
processes (or, equally, "organic" processes). 
The mediational aspect of all signifying structures — with its ana­
logies to mind, consciousness or thought — has tended to become 
obscured in the investigation of what might be called signifying mate­
riality and those processes by which, to reformulate Donald Fava­
reau's expression, the apparent "emergence" of sign structures from 
base matter is deemed possible. The problem here, however, is not to 
do with the "advent" of semiosis, but with its possibility in the first 
place. In other words, how it is that what we call "base matter" ap­
pears to be already inscribed within a field of signifying possibility — 
in which semiotic system-effects are determined probabilistically — 
according to a transverse relation between local events and global 
states, and vice-versa (where "system" implies a continuity effect un­
derwritten by networks of micro-macro dw-continuity)? Such trans­
verse relations or "non-linear circuits" (as between and across 
Favareau's "meta-systems") affect a refiguration of what we have al­
ready referred to as an axis of ambivalence: an axial relation that ob­
tains across all scales of (semio-technical) (inter)relation — micro-
medio-macro — and within the mediated structure of any binary (ter­
nary, quaternary, ...) relations whatsoever. And insofar as this trans­
verse relation assumes the function within any structure of an "organ­
ising principle," then it is to this relation that we must firstly attribute 
the mechanical, "reflexive" function of agency. 
As with Lévi-Strauss's "Totemic Operator" (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 
152-153) — which describes the underwriting mechanism of totemic 
classification in so-called primitive societies (a generalised network of 
transverse relations between subject-object, species-genera, concept 
and representation, etc.) — transversality implies a broadly cybernetic 
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conception of signifying structures, which posits the relativised or­
ganisation and interrelational event-states of "sign constellations" as a 
form of global agency. In other words, agency is thus situated not as 
an epiphenomenon of neuro-biological or other analogous processes, 
but a mechanism inherent to structuration that both "constitutes" and 
operates the relations in a network of potential signs, constellated 
around an axis of ambivalence that is also an "horizon" of signifying 
possibility. 
Such constellational functions have been referred to by Gerald 
Edelman and Giulio Tononi (2000) as "dynamic functional clusters", 
and have been described in terms of recursive or dynamic systems 
generally, including the dissipative electrochemical activity of inter­
communicating neurons in the human brain. Transversality has for a 
long time characterised investigations into some branches of neurosci­
ence and artificial intelligence, as well as information technology, 
systems theory and hypertext. As a "means" of describing cognitive 
event-states, the virtue of transversality lies in the necessity of ac­
counting for the materiality of any "phenomenon of consciousness" 
based upon a structural understanding of how the "signs" of the neu­
ronal semiosphere relate to each other as well as to signs "appre­
hended" in the otherwise external world; i.e. between so-called "men­
tal events" and "experienced events." The statistically overwhelming 
character of interactional possibilities represented by the transverse 
structures of neurological activity, with its assumed mind-orientated 
teleologies, suggests stochastically patterned "emergent" regularities 
which in turn point towards a generalised probability, affective of 
complex structural dynamics, and hence of the "anatomical con­
straints", upon which semiosis is said to be "modelled". In other 
words, it is precisely the "semiotic effect" of transversality upon 
which the assumed paradigmatic model-image of semiosis devolves: 
not as a first principle revealed through a process of derivation, but as 
the recursion of an ßrc/ze-technics or ambivalence at the "origin" of 
the phenomenon of consciousness. 
According to Favareau, the number of possible interactive connec­
tions between neurons in a human brain is estimated to exceed 10'9. 
"Of these interactional possibilities", he points out, "the ratio between the 
statistically average 1 million motor neurons, 10 million sensory neurons, 
and 100 billion interneurons is a mediation-heavy 1:100,000:10" (Fava­
reau 2002: 64). It is not a matter, however, of viewing this ratio as 
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marking an empirical limit to, for example, a reduction to an "object-
state" of the neural network (as though it were a cause in its own 
right), but rather of recognising that the ratio of interactional possi­
bilities is instead a characteristic of a generalisable event-state that 
necessarily remains in no way "ontologically 'fixed'" (Favareau 2002: 
81). For Floyd Merrell, the transverse relation multiplied across the 
constellation of neurological micro- and macro-events, may be "repre­
sented" in the ambivalent figure of a significatory vortex, as a meta­
phor of agency or "dynamic mediation" inscribing a probabilistic net­
work of sign operations whose structure may be broadly defined as 
semio-textual. "The 'vortex'," Merrell suggests, "is the composite of 
all unactualised signs. It is, so to speak, the 'emptiness', the sheer pos­
sibility of anything and everything" (Merrell 2001: 394). The univer­
sal characteristic of possibility alluded to here simultaneously in­
scribes itself as a "zero-dimensionality", whereby the "vortex" medi­
ates any relation whatsoever, as the figure of an archë-technics in ad­
vance of all signifying relations. But the dynamic interval represented 
by this "zero dimensionality" can also be regarded as a gradient of 
dissipation, or entropie spiral, in the sense that the vortex describes an 
engine of possibilities — i.e. it constitutes a mechanism of systemic 
ambivalence. This zero dimensionality "generalises" the axial relation 
outlined previously, with regard to the quasi-unicity of binary sign 
structures. As the locus of a differential interstice, it is taken to repre­
sent an "'emptiness' giving rise to the emergence of the sign, of all 
signs, of all that is becoming" (Merrell 2001: 395) — approximating 
one aspect of what, elsewhere, we have already termed vortext (as a 
generalised technë of semiosis). 
This complex of discursive relations — here between ambivalence, 
interstice, constellation, transversal, vortext — may be said to describe 
a generalised movement of "equivalence across contiguity" of the type 
S = P (subject, predicate), or S/s (according to the Saussurean algo­
rithm of the signifier/signified relation), whereby the advent of semio­
sis remains both topical and above all tropic (metaphor, meton­
ymy) — a movement of periodicity across a non-periodic interval. As 
Norbert Wiener notes, recursive phenomena are "characterised by an 
invariance with respect to a shift of origin in time" (Wiener 1961: 
viii-ix), and in this sense, any properly "binary relation" whatsoever 
may be said to be affective of "communication" (with-out correspon­
dence). Only in this way can the semiosphere "be regarded as a gen-
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erator of information" (Lotman 1990: 127) (rather than as a mere epi-
phenomenon, e.g. of semiotic "paradeigmata") — congruent on the 
macro-scale with the micro-scale operations of a sign generative of 
signs; Bateson's "difference that makes a difference" — wherein ma­
terial effects of transmission accede to systématisation on the basis of 
a generalised technë of possibility, or techno-genesis, rather than de­
scribing a mere formalism from which "consequences" and "predic­
tions" of various kinds might be deduced. Moreover, it is necessary to 
recognise that such mechanistic configurations and processes — in­
cluding all forms of transduction, mediation or "communication" (as a 
phenomenon of ambivalence) — are therefore conditional for any as­
sumption of semiotic possibility tending towards an event-state of 
semiosis. 
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Из материальности в систему 
В статье рассматривается соотношение материальности (предмет­
ности) со структурой и с явлениями обозначения (или с семиозисом). 
Исследуются как статус семиозиса по отношению к человеку (или — 
шире — "органическому умвельту") и к "нулевой степени" мате­
риальности, так и связанные с этой проблемой точки зрения и вы­
воды (на основе текстов Пирса, Лотмана и Себеока). Подвергается 
сомнению классификация, очерчивающая семиозис без учета дина­
мических систем. Исходя из постулатов нейросемиотики обосновы­
вается необходимость рассматривать семиозис как общую характе­
ристику систем и развивать понятие обозначения как основу, 
делающую возможными динамические структуры. 
Materiaalsusest süsteemiks 
Artikkel üritab käsitleda materiaalsuse suhet struktuuriga ja tähendus-
tumise (semioosi) nähtustega. Vaadeldakse semioosi staatust inimese (või 
laiemalt orgaanilise eluilma) ning ainelise "null-astme" suhtes, sellega 
seotud põhjenduskäike ja järeldusi (C. Peirce'i, J. Lotmani ja T. Sebeoki 
põhjal). Seatakse kahtluse alla klassifikatsioon, mis piiritleb semioosi, 
arvestamata seejuures dünaamilisi süsteeme. Neurosemiootikast lähtuvalt 
põhjendatakse vajadust käsitleda semioosi kui süsteemidele üldist oma­
dust ning arendada tähendustumise mõistet kui alust, mis teeb dünaami­
lised struktuurid kui sellised võimalikuks. 
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From semiosis to social policy: 
The less trodden path 
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Abstract. The argument moves through three stages. In the first, the case is 
made for accepting 'living is semiotic engagement' as 'a foundational state­
ment for a postfoundational age'. This requires a thoroughgoing rejection of 
mind-body substance dualism, and a problematisation of humanism. In the 
second, the hazardous endeavour of applying the above perspective to social 
policy begins with a consideration of the sine qua non(s) underpinning such 
an application. These are posited as unpredictability of outcomes and blurring 
of the human/non-human boundary. In the third stage, the case is developed 
for a policy orientation that is both liberal-pragmatic (with some caveats 
relating to 'liberal') and post-humanist, and the paper concludes with some 
speculation concerning the precise policy outcomes of such an orientation. 
1. A fully semiotic perspective 
Most work in cultural and social semiotics examines existing practices 
through a semiotic lens. It is a strategy less often attempted to start 
from a perspective of practice as 'semiotic' (or 'semiosic') and to 
extrapolate from this to real-world application. As a philosopher of 
education, I have attempted to do this in a series of recent publications 
(Stables 2006a; 2006b; Stables, Gough 2006). In this paper, I shall 
attempt to answer the question, 'What implications does a fully se­
miotic view of living have for the development of social policy?' 
However, I must begin by justifying the assertion that 'living is 
semiotic engagement', and attempt to clarify where such an assertion 
sits in relation to existing biosemiotic and pansemiotic perspectives. 
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The term 'semiotic' is a little problematic here, in two respects. 
Firstly, it relates both to semiosis (the act of responding to signs) and 
to 'semiotics' (implying, in some cases, but not others, meta-aware-
ness of sign use — as in the work of Maran, e.g. 2003). I intend the 
first of these uses, aware that the more rarely used term 'semiosic' has 
been adopted by some commentators for this purpose (e.g., Hoffmeyer 
1995b). 
Whatever meta-awareness actually is (for it has certain connota­
tions of 'mind' that I shall challenge below), I can neither prove nor 
disprove that it is a propensity common to anything beyond the human 
(cf. Nöth's distinction between homo semioticus and Organismus 
semioticus in Nöth 1998: 332). However, this issue becomes redun­
dant if the second problem is addressed satisfactorily. This (the second 
problem, though related to the first) is that the semeion — the sign — 
is traditionally reckoned to be something transmitted by a purposive 
meaning-maker; this despite extensive Twentieth Century debunking 
of the assumption that a 'text' is simply the product of an 'author' 
(e.g., Eagleton 1983, for an overview of the arguments, and Barthes 
1977). On this assumption of purposive meaning-making, the view 
that this paper develops of all living as semiotic engagement would be 
the kind of pansemiotic view suggested by Nöth (1998), in which all 
life is construed as a series of divinely inspired messages, but this is 
not the line I shall be taking as I do not accept this author-dependent 
view of the sign. (This is not to preclude the possibility that people 
will interpret all they perceive as messages from God, of course, or 
even that such an interpretation is necessarily invalid.) 
Rather, my use of 'semiotic' here is one that interprets the semeion 
as both 'sign' (intended or otherwise, and evidently value-laden), and 
as 'signal' (as morally, or evolutionarily neutral 'prompt').1 In other 
words, I do not distinguish between signs and signals on the basis of a 
commonly discredited Cartesian substance dualism that unjustifiably 
divides 'mind', conscious or otherwise, from 'matter', or that merely 
chooses one over the other: a solution that fails adequately to dissolve 
1 In Stables 2006a; 2006b; Stables, Gough 2006, I have employed the term 
'sign(al)' to this end. (For a biosemiotic perspective according to which DNA 
carries survival messages of evolutionary value, see Sharov 1998; Sharov's per­
spective is explicitly biosemiotic rather than pansemiotic, however: on Sharov's 
view, the DNA carries messages of survival value that distinguish the living from 
the non-living.) 
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the dualism since it continues to beg interpretation of each term in 
light of its opposite (i.e. matter as mindless; mind as supernatural). By 
implication, therefore, mine is a pansemiotic perspective in the 
broader sense suggested by commentators on Peirce (as contrasted 
with anthroposemiotic and biosemiotic perspectives by — for exam­
ple— Emmeche 1999) rather than in the narrower sense alluded to 
above: it is possible to see all activity semiotically/semiosically and 
impossible ever to be sure what, if anything, precedes the sign. It 
differs from a biosemiotic view such as Sharov's (1998) in begging 
the problematisation of the living vs. non-living divide as well as that 
between the human and the non-human; it makes no prior ontological 
assumptions. Maran (2006), for example, cites Hoffmeyer (1995a) 
stating 'that the simplest entity with full semiotic competence is a 
single cell'. On my account, while cells can indeed be construed as 
acting semiotically (see below), this may not be the end of the story. 
However, for the purposes of the present argument, with its focus on 
social policy implications, it is necessary merely to acknowledge that 
a 'fully semiotic' perspective deconstructs the boundaries of the 
human — a point that will be developed in a later section. 
In a recent article, I summarised my argument as follows: 
If there is body and soul — mind and matter — then the difference between 
'signs' and 'signals' [...] is a crucial one. Mental, spiritual, conscious human 
beings communicate via signs, as uniquely gifted symbol users; other animals, 
even cells and genes emit and respond to signals. 
We [...] live by emitting and responding to either signs or signals — and, 
as we cannot be sure about whether mind and matter are really separate, we 
cannot be sure of the validity of dividing signs from signals, hence my rather 
clumsy neologism, the sign(al) — and, if this makes sense, then the statement 
'living is semiotic engagement' is, potentially, a foundational statement for a 
post-foundational age. That is to say, we could usefully begin our studies of 
all sorts of things in the human sphere with a realization that messages — be 
they laws, political ideologies, teachers' explanations or even medicines or 
physical punishments — are received and acted upon differently by people 
and are always understood in the light of their previous experience. (Stables 
2006b: 374-375) 
All living, therefore, can be understood as semiotic engagement, 
provided: (1) we do not distinguish between signs and signals, (2) we 
do not regard all sign(al)s as consciously transmitted, and (3) we do 
not differentiate between a 'mind' that processes 'signs' and a body 
(in the broadest sense) that responds unthinkingly to 'signals'. These 
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criteria can be met if we do not distinguish between mind-substance 
and body-substance: in other words, if we reject Cartesian dualism. 
On this account, thought, feeling and action are all forms of human 
behaviour; perhaps non-human also. Reasoning is one of the things we 
do; sleeping is another. Human fulfilment entails enjoyment of each of 
these kinds of activity, and of many more beside. We do not need an 
unsustainable concept of dualism to work on this basis. 
Of course, 'semiotic engagement' is one of several possible 
descriptors for human life (putting aside the non-human issues for a 
moment). It is also possible to construe living as a Darwinian fight for 
survival, an essentially meaningless state for which we have to invent 
a meaning, after Nietzsche, Sartre and the existentialists, or as the 
working out of a divine plan. Each of these perspectives, too, can be 
used as a basis for social policy. However, as such a basis, all three 
demand that each citizen 'buy in' to the prevailing view to some 
extent. A construal of living as semiotic engagement has as its starting 
point that everybody will see the world to some extent differently; it 
can incorporate the other views, acknowledging, inter alia, both 
competition and co-operation as essential elements of our Umwelten 
(Uexküll 1982), accepting a notion of life as narrative without 
assuming that any narrative is simply the product of an author, and 
allowing for both religious and secular interpretations (provided one 
does not attempt to preclude the other). On this view, outcomes are 
uncertain, but they will certainly be arrived at through a process that 
can validly be described as semiotic, or semiosic, in the terms given 
above. 
2. Semiotic engagement as reading and writing: 
Implications for policy 
The question arises as to whether this 'foundational statement for a 
post-foundational age' is any more than a truism. To examine its 
implications for social policy broadly, it may be helpful to return to a 
context in which people are used and content to take a semiotic 
perspective: that of response to literature, film and works of art. 
Reading a book involves responding, half-consciously, to a 
complex, evolving series of signs, in terms both of their incontro­
vertible denotations and their endlessly varied connotations (though 
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note that the distinction between denotation and connotation is proble-
matised outside a realist epistemology, where no sign either simply 
'stands for' something nor does anything other than evoke something 
that it is not). Texts operate on a spectrum characterised by Barthes as 
from 'readerly' to 'writerly' according to how open they are to 
multiple interpretation. However, when the response to text is taken to 
include subsequent action, it becomes clear that no text, however 
simple and apparently ambiguous, is closed to interpretation; it is 
impossible to prescribe how people will respond to any text. (Consider 
the variety of responses to a speed restriction sign on a road, for 
example.) 
Insofar as living is both textual and intertextual, therefore — as a 
fully semiotic perspective takes it to be — human responses, on all 
fronts, are always somewhat unpredictable. Signs are received in 
context, and context always varies; thus response to signs and combi­
nations of signs always varies. Interpretation is inevitable, therefore, 
even without any conception of autonomous human 'mind'. This is 
the first major implication of a fully semiotic view of living for social 
policy: outcomes are unpredictable. By further implication, rational 
social planning is an inexact and potentially hazardous art, since the 
outcome of any social policy is also unpredictable.2 
The second, related implication is that all systems are open sys­
tems, just as all texts are intertextual. Any institution, for instance, 
understood fully semiotically, is a network of meanings, an 'imagined 
community' in 'discursive space' (Stables 2003a; 2003b), a complex 
and evolving text constantly countersigned (e.g., Derrida 1992) and 
modified by the behaviour of those relating to it. Thus there are no 
firm boundaries to any institution or other form of social system; even 
outsiders are effectively insiders since, by merely knowing about any 
institution (in any way at all), they affect it through their actions, 
words and attitudes. Thus what everybody thinks and does changes 
the world, albeit there are no grounds for claiming that each person's 
actions do so 'equally'. 
If there are no firm boundaries to anything, there are no firm 
boundaries to humanity: a fully semiotic perspective blurs the human-
nonhuman divide (and may also blur the life-nonlife divide, and thus 
Students never learn quite what teachers teach; no form of social provision 
ever quite delivers the goods it was intended to deliver; aims are expressions of 
wishes but are not precisely achievable. 
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the tensions between biosemiotic and pansemiotic perspectives, 
though that is not the direct concern of this paper). In relation to this, 
it can no longer remain tenable to define the human condition by a 
series of exclusive attributions, including those of 'language' and 
'feelings'. This is not tantamount to claiming that sheep speak English 
(as Sebeok, 1995, has pointed out, there is no evidence of anything 
beyond the human using syntactic structures, as we understand them), 
but amounts simply to a claim that the general kinds of behaviour, 
including mental operations relating to spatial awareness, recognition, 
tool use and memory, that classical humanists and many of a religious 
persuasion have been used to seeing as unique to the human species, 
can be found in other life forms. What it means to be human is thus 
problematised by a fully semiotic conception of living. 
The sine qua non(s) of social policy from a view of living as 
semiotic engagement would seem to be, therefore, that policy-makers 
have power to affect what happens, but not to predict it (so social 
policy should be limited and pragmatic in its aspirations), and that 
human interests cannot be firmly demarcated from non-human inte­
rests. These are bases for social policy that take a strongly relational 
view, and are therefore necessarily ecosemiotic (Kull 1998; Nöth 
1998), but that also discourage social engineering. For these two 
reasons, I refer to my political position as one of post-humanist liberal 
pragmatism.3 
My position is post-humanist insofar as it both builds on and 
moves beyond humanism, as postmodernism both builds on and 
moves beyond modernism. Indeed, as postmodernism rejects a simple 
historical view of history, but rather sees the postmodern as a 
recurrent voice within the discourse of modernity (Lyotard 1984; 
1988), so post-humanism can be understood as immanent critique of 
humanism, finding its voice in aspects of, for example, Romanticism 
and deep ecology. It relates to conceptions of narrowness in humanist 
conceptions of flourishing. 
I am aware of the irony of this in the context of the indebtedness of the 
development of semiotics to cultural Marxism, and even their mutual 
independence. I look forward to a Marxist critique of my argument. 
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3. Beyond both humanism and cyborg posthumanism 
Contemporary 'Western' culture is essentially humanistic. Both the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment were driven by a belief in human 
potential and the specialness (even the divinity) of the human condi­
tion. Human life has been endowed with a value (a preciousness, some 
might say) that justifies the subservience of the rest of nature to 
human needs. Thus human beings must be fed, clothed, housed, 
educated and supported at all costs, and human life must be preserved 
at all costs. This worldview is still critiqued more for its failure to 
achieve these objectives than for its treatment of non-human life in 
pursuing them. So deep-rooted is this belief system that we are all — 
myself included — loath to depart from it lest we open the door to 
indiscriminate cruelty, neglect and barbarism. Even 'sustainable 
development' is largely conceptualised as 'social development' 
despite its genesis in the ecological movement; humanism has largely 
triumphed over environmentalism, perhaps. 
Nevertheless, this pursuit of (short-term) human flourishing at any 
cost is clearly limiting. Increasing the wealth, warmth and health of a 
burgeoning human population entails — or has tended to entail — the 
depletion of natural resources, the reduction of biodiversity, the 
pollution of non-human places, and the possible destruction of the 
entire ecosystem as a result of increased and no-longer-controllable 
global warming caused by greenhouse gas (especially carbon dioxide) 
emissions. Already the tropical rain forest (that which remains of it) is 
becoming subject to fire and the ice caps are beginning to melt. I read 
in a newspaper recently that each square mile of ocean contains tens 
of thousands of items of human rubbish, and that chemicals in arctic 
waters are causing medical and genetic problems for a range of 
species. There are two possible responses to this: either to seek a non-
humanistic, anti-humanistic values base, with all the attendant dangers 
of deciding that human life is not (effectively) sacrosanct — which, 
after a century of ethnic cleansing, would be as sensible as jumping 
into a pond full of crocodiles — or to adapt humanistic values to a 
situation in which human wellbeing is never considered apart from 
non-human thriving, and the endless relations of the human to the 
non-human are never disregarded. This is the harder path to follow, 
but surely the only one that holds any real hope for the future. It is this 
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kind of posthumanism, entailing an extension, rather than a curtail­
ment of humanist values, that I propose. 
Ironically, however, much of the existing literature sometimes 
considered posthumanist pays little or no heed to the non-human per 
se, but rather focuses largely on problematising the human condition 
via the implications of (human) technology: considering, for example, 
the 'cyborg' nature of the human, dependent largely on the machine 
(Haraway 1991; Hughes 2004 — though Haraway also considers the 
human-animal interface), sometimes substituting 'transhuman' for 
'posthuman'. Such perspectives are of considerable interest to both 
philosophers and casual conversationalists (for instance, how much of 
yourself could be replaced by artificial organs before you stopped 
being human, or having human rights? Is your humanity enhanced by 
hearing aids or spectacles?) as they are of perennial fascination to 
writers of science fiction, but they are not primarily focused on the 
issue of human survival in the context of global survival, albeit they 
contain many relevant and important insights. The ecosystem is 
greater than the human system, however defined. 
Thus it is not enough to blur the boundaries of what it means to be 
human, if by doing so we are concerned merely with redefining what 
it means to be human, though this is part of what any useful post-
humanism must entail. The human relationship with the (utterly) non-
human is also very important. Implicit in any blurring is the issue of 
manifold relatedness, and implicit in issues of relatedness are issues of 
ethics. Ethical issues are certainly human issues, but they cannot be 
resolved by examining human issues in isolation. This is a lesson we 
are beginning to learn, but slowly. A fully semiotic view of living 
renders the necessary move a little easier by undermining some 
assumptions of qualitative difference between human and non-human. 
4. From theory to policy 
Detailed discussion of specific policy areas is not possible here 
(though see Stables 2003a; 2006a for examples relating to education). 
However, it may be instructive to consider one case of almost 
universal interest in which humanist assumptions could be both 
adopted and extended: that of the provision of housing. In countries 
such as England, there has been significant immigration in certain 
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areas, while other social factors such as family breakdown have also 
increased demands for housing. The South-East of England (the 
London area) now faces pressure for a huge increase in housing stock 
at the same time as increasing water shortages and other environ­
mental and infrastructural problems (e.g. traffic congestion). The 
traditional, humanist response has been to argue that more homes 
must be built, positing human need as the sole, rather than the greatest 
priority. A post-humanist response might be that people must be 
housed but only in the context of an improved (as opposed to 
depleted) natural environment. Development plans must therefore aim 
to reduce the 'carbon footprints' of communities, increase biodiversity 
and reduce the risks of either drought or flooding. This is a demanding 
aim but not an impossible one: over time, existing settlements could 
conceivably be replaced by those that were much more ecologically 
sensitive, just as transport can be made much more environmentally 
friendly than at present. There are, of course, costs, but they pale into 
insignificance against the potential costs of continuing the current, 
narrowly humanist agenda. 
Note that my argument is unusual among environmentalists — and 
perhaps among semioticians — in focusing on humanism rather than 
capitalism as the major cause of the environmental crisis. This is 
because humanist values underpin the principal economic systems we 
recognise: capitalism and socialism. Each exists to maximise human 
wealth; they differ only over matters of production and distribution. 
Any post-humanist settlement will be some sort of capitalist-socialist 
hybrid, but operating on an altered values base. Without that altered 
values base, both capitalism and socialism will continue to deplete 
natural resources in the pursuit of increased human wealth. It is not 
capitalism per se that is to blame for the ecological crisis, but rather 
human greed and narrow-mindedness. It would, for example, be 
conceivably possible to operate a capitalist system in which wealth 
was not taxed at all, but energy use was. Under such an arrangement 
wealth creation would be valorised but not at the cost of environ­
mental degradation. 
There exists the temptation of a relatively easy way to bring such 
changes about: by reducing individual freedom. Indeed, many 
environmentalists argue for severe restrictions on (or even reversal of) 
economic growth, the freedom to travel and live where one chooses, 
and so on. Luckily (for many environmentalists' ideal communities 
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would, I fear, be hells on earth), such prescriptions fall foul of the 
other tenet of the fully semiotic perspective developed here: outcomes 
are unpredictable. People will interpret laws and circumstances in 
different and unexpected ways whether policy-makers want them to or 
not. Strict social planning does not work. Rather, the more informed 
the populace is about the complexity of issues, the more chance there 
is of informed and sensitive private and public action. On this view, 
the traditional liberal freedoms of travel, assembly, association, belief 
and speech serve a post-humanist emphasis better than would their 
restriction (even if we no longer see individuals as autonomous 
rational agents in the Eighteenth Century manner), since they 
encourage problematisation, and the challenge for social development 
is to understand human issues from a more complex set of conside­
rations than hitherto. 
This may seem a tentative and highly risky basis on which to 
construct any policy — yet the management of risk is central to all 
human endeavour. If policy is to be constructed to further humanistic 
aspirations while also improving the condition of the biosphere, it will 
need to respect human life (including human freedom), respect non-
human life and generally allow for diversity. Thus it is important that 
policy-makers play their parts in both developing the debate at the 
highest level (as opposed to 'spinning' themselves away from 
controversy) and providing the conditions in which that debate can 
thrive, and actions that might further a posthumanist agenda can be 
expedited: fiscal conditions, for example, that encourage the develop­
ment of cleaner technologies and energy conservation, and planning 
regulations that take more account of general environmental, resource 
and biodiversity effects (for example, in the current UK context, 
changing gardens of existing properties from the status of 'brown 
field' [i.e. developed and easily developable, where applications to 
build are generally to be allowed] to 'green field' sites [where applica­
tions to build are more often to be rejected]). 
5. Concluding remarks 
Have I wandered too far from my starting point? Do the above con­
jectures and suggestions about policy really derive so self-evidently 
from a view of living as semiotic engagement? Certainly, many 
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semioticians regard themselves as neither liberal nor environmentalist. 
The line I have taken is entirely dependent on the acceptance that, as 
Maran and others have suggested, semiosis is a valid construct in 
relation to the non-human. I suggest that such an acceptance involves 
a thorough-going rejection of Cartesian dualism that goes further than 
most existing models. Often, materialist explanations view the uni­
verse as mechanical and 'mindless', while panpsychic and certain 
biosemiotic and pansemiotic explanations regard it as 'minded' in the 
sense of human, or at least humanly recognisable rational agency. 
Each of these perspectives is a reaction against mind-body substance 
dualism, but neither is a complete departure from it. The fully se­
miotic view I propose seeks to accept that 'what happens happens' 
without attempting to differentiate between the mental and the phy­
sical on a substantive basis. Rather, 'mental' and 'physical' are cate­
gories of the same qualitative status as 'oral' (or 'aural') and 'visual'. 
The path from such a fully semiotic perspective to the policy 
debate is one little followed as yet, as there has so far been little 
detailed application of (other) biosemiotic, ecosemiotic and pan­
semiotic approaches, and there may be a series of possible alternative 
routes. In this paper, I have attempted simply to explore the implica­
tions of a view of life in which everybody is constantly re-reading and 
re-writing the world, and in which the idea of semiotic engagement is 
not merely applicable to humans. This leads me to a set of policy-
related conclusions based on the two premises of (1) the inevitable 
unpredictability of outcomes, and (2) the continuous dependence of 
the human on the non-human. 
From his biosemiotic perspective, Sharov states: 
Biosemiotics brings a new understanding of hierarchies: it does not imply the 
superiority of a system over its subsystems [...] Human society was definitely 
evolving from strong systems (monarchies) to weak systems (democracies). 
(Sharov 19974) 
While the present argument is not explicitly biosemiotic in Sharov's 
terms, the view he appears to be expressing here tallies with my own 
in construing agents not merely as systems-driven, but rather viewing 
systems as identifiable abstractions: as relations of agents, who are 
4 Sharov, Alexei 1997. Towards the semiotic paradigm in biology. Retrieved 
from www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/biosem/txt/ tosemiot.html 05/07/2006. 
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themselves relational entities. Thus society does not precede the 
individual any more than the reverse; each is in flux, subject to 
multiple agency. This seems to me to ally strongly a semiotic/semiosic 
view of living with a political commitment away from state control 
and pre-specification and towards personal, interpersonal and other 
forms of interrelational empowerment, and a concomitant emphasis on 
procedural rather than either retributive or distributive justice, in terms 
of the reinforcement of those human rights associated with political 
(not outcome) equality, such as freedoms of conscience and associa­
tion: in other words, a commitment to political liberalism with a more-
than-humanist scope. 
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От семиозиса к социальной политике: 
непроторенный путь 
Аргументация трехступенчатая. На первой ступени обосновывается 
положение, согласно которому "жизнь является семиотической 
связностью" как "базовое утверждение в постбазовую эпоху". Для 
этого нужно полностью отвергнуть субстанциональный дуализм 
между телом и душой и поставить под сомнение гуманизм. Пред­
принятая на второй ступени рискованная попытка применить данное 
положение в области социальной политики начинается с подчерки­
вания необходимости укрепления основ такого применения. Такими 
основами будут непредсказуемость результатов и стирание грани 
между человеческим и нечеловеческим. На третьей ступени разви­
вается политическая ориентация, которая одновременно является 
либерально-прагматической (вместе с некоторыми предупрежденями 
по поводу либеральности) и постгуманистической. Статья заканчи­
вается размышлениями о реальных политических последствиях 
подобной ориентации. 
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Märgiprotsessist sotsiaalpoliitikani: vähetallatud rada 
Argumentatsioon on kolmeastmeline. Esimesel astmel arendatakse vaa­
det, mis tunnistaks, et 'elamine on semiootiline seostumus', kui 'alus-
väide alustejärgses ajastus'. Selleks on vaja läbinisti hüljata substantsiline 
dualism keha ja vaimu vahel, ning seada kahtluse alla humanism. Teisel 
astmel tehtav nskantne katse rakendada ülalmainitud vaadet sotsiaal­
poliitikale algab säärase rakenduse aluste tugevdamise vajaduse rõhuta­
misest. Neiks alusteks oleksid tulemuste ennustamatus ja piiri ähmastu-
mine inimeseliku ja mitteinimeseliku vahel. Kolmandal astmel arenda­
takse poliitilist orientatsiooni, mis on ühtaegu liberaal-pragmaatiline 
(koos mõningate hoiatustega liberaalsuse suhtes) ja posthumanistlik. 
Artikkel lõpeb mõtisklustega säärase orientatsiooni tegelike poliitiliste 
väljundite üle. 
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The meaning of meaning in biology and 
cognitive science: A semiotic reconstruction 
Göran Sonesson 
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Abstract. The present essay aims at integrating different concepts of meaning 
developed in semiotics, biology, and cognitive science, in a way that permits 
the formulation of issues involving evolution and development. The concept 
of sign in semiotics, just like the notion of representation in cognitive science, 
have either been used too broadly, or outright rejected. My earlier work on the 
notions of iconicity and pictoriality has forced me to spell out the taken-for-
granted meaning of the sign concept, both in the Saussurean and the Peircean 
tradition. My work with the evolution and development of semiotic resources 
such as language, gesture, and pictures has proved the need of having recourse 
to a more specified concept of sign. To define the sign, I take as point of de­
parture the notion of semiotic function (by Piaget), and the notion of appre-
sentation (by Husserl). In the first part of this essay, I compare cognitive sci­
ence and semiotics, in particular as far as the parallel concepts of representa­
tion and sign are concerned. The second part is concerned with what is proba­
bly the most important attempt to integrate cognitive science and semiotics 
that has been presented so far, The Symbolic Species, by Terrence Deacon. I 
criticize Deacon's use of notions such as iconicity, indexicality, and sym-
bolicity. I choose to separate the sign concept from the notions of iconicity, 
indexicality, and symbolicity, which only in combination with the sign give 
rise to icons, indices, and symbols, but which, beyond that, have other, more 
elemental, uses in the world of perception. In the third part, I discuss some 
ideas about meaning in biosemiotics, which I show not to involve signs in the 
sense characterised earlier in the essay. Instead, they use meaning in the gen­
eral sense of selection and organisation, which is a more elementary sense of 
meaning. Although I admit that there is a possible interpretation of Peirce, 
which could be taken to correspond to Uexkiill's idea of functional circle, and 
to meaning as function described by Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, I claim that 
this is a different sense of meaning than the one embodied in the sign concept. 
Finally, I suggest that more thresholds of meaning than proposed, for instance 
by Kull, are necessary to accommodate the differences between meaning (in 
the broad sense) and sign (as specified in the Piaget-Husserl tradition). 
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Often conceived as interdisciplinary perspectives that have in some 
places gained the position of independent disciplines, cognitive science 
and semiotics seem to cover more or less the same domain of knowl­
edge. This in itself is controversial, since semiotics and cognitive sci­
ence offer very different characterisations of their domain. In some 
sense, however, both are concerned with the way in which the world 
described by the natural sciences appears to humans beings and perhaps 
also to other animals and some robots. Cognitive science puts the em­
phasis on the place of the appearance of this world, the mental domain,1 
and its characteristic operation, cognition; and semiotics insists on the 
transformations that the physical world suffers by being endowed with 
meaning. 
The disciplinary history of these approaches has been very different. 
Cognitive science is often described as the result of joining together the 
knowledge base of rather disparate empirical disciplines such as lin­
guistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy, biology, and computer sci­
ence. Semiotics has, in a more classical way, developed out of the 
amorphous mass of philosophy, and still has some problems encoun­
tering its empirical basis. This difference in background partly may ex­
plain why semiotics and cognitive science rarely are on speaking terms 
with each other. 
In this essay, I will start out by investigating a case that in some re­
spects go counter to these generalisations. Terrence Deacon (1997) is a 
researcher in neuroscience whose work has been particularly acclaimed 
within cognitive science. Y et he has chosen to express some of his main 
arguments in a terminology taken over from Charles Sanders Peirce, 
who is perhaps the principal cultural hero of semiotics. Without trying 
in any way to diminish Deacon's contribution — in fact, I find him very 
convincing whenever he is not having recourse to semiotic terminol­
ogy —, I would like to express certain misgivings about his way of us­
ing Peircean terms. I do not do so in order to defend Peircean orthodoxy 
(which is a task very far from my mind), but because I think a rigorous 
use of these terms can throw more light on the issues at stake, and may 
thus contribute to a more relevant confluence of the two sciences in­
volved. Indeed, I can generally accept the idea, expressed by Bouissac 
1 A better description of what is involved would be "the field of conscious­
ness", a term used in phenomenology (cf. Gurwitsch 1957), but many representa­
tives of cognitive science would of course not want to use any term referring to 
consciousness. 
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(2000: 326), that even if Deacon's usage is not accurate from a Peircean 
point of view, there is no good reason for rejecting his terms considered 
as "conceptual facilitators in order to formulate his own evolutionary 
semiotic theory"; but I think, like Lumsden (2002) that, in this particular 
case, the Peircean paraphernalia serve to obscure Deacon's own theory, 
and, unlike Lumsden, I think it is worthwhile to integrate Deacon's 
problematics with a revised Peircean theory, instead of simple putting it 
to aside. Rather than taking Deacon to task for not following Peirce 
strictly, I would like to offer a framework in which both Deacon's 
problem and that of Peirce may be discussed. 
In so doing, I will propose two different interpretations of Peirce, 
one which I have found necessary in my own work in order to redeem 
the concept of iconic sign (part 2), and another one which would seem 
to be common in, among others places, biosemiotics (part 3). However, 
I will suggest that Deacon's theory is not congruent with any of these 
interpretations. At the same time, I will try to show that both these con­
cepts of meaning serve to specify Deacon's proposal and place it into a 
more comprehensive framework. 
1. Introduction: Beyond "representation" 
in cognitive science 
Before proceeding to our discussion of Deacon's central thesis con­
cerning the nature of symbolism, I would like to delineate the general 
context within which this discussion will take place. If, as has been sug­
gested above, semiotics and cognitive science have a lot in common, it 
would be interesting to find out what keeps them apart, and if there is 
some worth-while manner of overcoming this separation. As a first ap­
proximation, it might be suggested that the basic concept of semiotics is 
the sign, whereas that of cognitive science is representation. From the 
point of view of methods, semiotics is generally speaking stuck between 
the analysis of single "texts" and theory construction, whereas cognitive 
science is closer to relying on experimental methods (including, of 
course, computer simulation). 
In a sense, semiotics keeps making overtures to cognitive science. 
Even since the demise of the linguistic model, according to which all 
semiotic systems are constructed more or less in the same way as verbal 
18 
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language" (in particular as the latter was conceived in the tradition of 
structuralism, inspired by Saussure), semioticians have repeatedly stated 
their ambition of going cognitive. On the whole, it seems to me, there 
has been little substance to such expressions of intent. Within visual 
semiotics, my own work aiming to refute the conventionalist theories of 
pictorial signification developed by, among others, Eco and Goodman 
(cf. Sonesson 1989a), has relied heavily on findings and concepts taken 
over from cognitive psychology, notably the work of Rosch (1975a; 
1975b; 1975c) and Tversky (1977; Tversky, Gati 1978), but it is, I am 
afraid, rather unique is this respect. While this work absorbs certain 
concepts from cognitive science, it also gives more prominence than 
earlier to the concept of sign. It is more empirical, only in the sense of 
trying to supply the theory needed to explain experimental findings 
(which is of course also often true of cognitive science). In a recent an­
thology bearing the title "cognitive semiotics", Bundgârd (et al. 2003), 
as he notes in the introduction, actually only provides a collection of 
texts written within the framework of cognitive science which he judges 
to be relevant to semiotics, which includes the work of cognitive lin­
guists such as Langacker and Fauconnier, and of "catastrophe theorists" 
such as Thorn and Petitot. The latter tradition, which may really qualify 
as being some kind of hybrid of semiotics and cognitive science, is dif­
ficult to situate within both paradigms. In any case, it is not clear that at 
any given point it has become more cognitive and less semiotical.3 
On the other hand, there have recently been some encouraging de­
velopments within cognitive science which, no doubt with some exag­
geration, may be qualified as a "semiotic turn": an interest in meaning 
as such, in particular as it has developed, ontogenetically and, in par­
ticular, phylogenetically, in the human species and, to some extent, in 
other animals and animal-like machines. Not only Deacon, both other 
scholars interested in the specificity of human nature now put their em­
phasis on the concept of sign (which they normally term "symbol", us­
ing this word is a sense in which we will not employ it here). This is 
As used here and in the following, the term "verbal language" includes ges­
ture systems and the like, which are formally equivalent to spoken and written 
language. In a semiotic context, the label "verbal" is necessary in order to exclude 
more metaphoric uses of the term "language". 
Catastrophe theory has certainly become less involved with Gremasian semi­
otics, but the latter cannot be identified with semiotics tout court, as Bundgaard 
seems to think. 
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true, in a very general sense, of Donald's (1991) stages of episodic, mi­
metic, mythic and theoretical culture. It seems to apply even more to 
Tomasello (1999), less, in the end, because of his epigraphs taken from 
classical semioticians such as Peirce and Mead as well as Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky, than because of the general thrust of his analysis, which con­
sists in separating true instances of interpreting actions as intentional 
from those which may merely appear to be such. Building on the 
aforementioned works, Jordan Zlatev (2002; 2003) is explicitly con­
cerned with the conditions for the emergence of higher levels of mean­
ing involving "mimesis" and language, from more basic ones, charac­
teristic of all biological systems (life forms), such as "cues" and "asso­
ciations".4 Although he has not proposed any complete scheme for de­
velopmental semiotics, Tom Ziemke (Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Lind-
blom, Ziemke 2003) no doubt must be said to participate in the sug­
gested "semiotic turn" already because he has had recourse to the con­
cepts of Uexkiill and Vygotsky in order to separate living beings from 
robots. 
The distinction between cognitive science and semiotics involves 
much more than the concepts of representation and sign, as was sug­
gested above. Indeed, much of recent cognitive science has taken the 
fonn of a rejection of the very notion of representation (notably the in­
fluential work of Lakoff and Johnson; cf. Lakoff, Johnson 1999; John­
son 2005), just as some traditions in semiotics, from Eco to Greimas, 
early on rejected the notion of sign. In both cases, as we shall see, the 
problem is how one can reject a notion which is not even defined, but 
simply taken for granted. However, in this article, the relationship be­
tween the two disciplines will be discussed exclusively in these terms. 
To a representative of cognitive science, it may seem that "sign" and 
"representation" stand for the same thing. If so, it is difficult to see in 
which way the work of Deacon, Donald, Tomasello, Ziemke, and Zlatev 
constitutes a kind of "semiotic turn". 
In cognitive science, terms like "representation", "symbol", and 
even "sign", are used in a vastly more comprehensive sense than the one 
favoured here. The contents of consciousness are said to be "symbols", 
and so on, of things in the "real" world (see Johnson-Laird 1988). Even 
4 Zlatev (2003) now distinguishes "signs", as the general term, from "symbols", 
which are truly conventional, systematic and possibly arbitrary signs. His termi­
nological usage is thus intermediate between that of Deacon and that of Peirce 
(employed here). 
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in a recent textbook (Eysenck, Keane 1995: 203ff), representations are 
only distinguished into those that are external, such as pictures and lan­
guage, and those that are internal, such as propositions and mental mod­
els. Interestingly, this is an employment of the terms "sign" and "repre­
sentation" found also in John Locke, one of the first explicit semioti-
cians, at the beginning of the 18th century. Indeed, Locke's (1965 
[1706]: 309) definition of semiotics may actually sound more like a 
characterisation of cognitive science: it is, together with physics and 
ethics, a third part of all human knowledge, the business of which is "to 
consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the understand­
ing of things, or conveying its knowledge to others." 
Even before that, however, Pedro Fonseca, in his treatise on signs 
from 1564, distinguished two types of signs: "formal signs", by means 
of which we know the outside world, and "instrumental signs", which 
lead to the cognition of something else, like the tracks of an animal, 
smoke, a statue, and the like (cf. Deely 1982; 1994; 2001). This distinc­
tion could perhaps be taken to correspond to that between "internal" and 
"external representations". However, it seems more akin to a distinction 
between "direct" and "indirect perception", as suggested by the psy­
chologist of perception James Gibson, in his discussion of the differ­
ences between the environment and those kinds of surfaces that we call 
pictures. As recognised in the ecological psychology of Gibson, and 
before that in the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, we 
do not ordinarily perceive signs of the world, but the world itself; and 
thus, if indeed meaning is involved, this must be is some wider sense of 
the term. Both Husserl and Gibson point out that we do not perceive 
"this flurry collection of surfaces seen from above right", but a dog, 
even if the former expression may better describe the collection of light 
rays which hit the eye.5 More generally, Peirce and Vygotsky alike in­
troduced the term "mediation" to describe the way in which reality is 
imbued with meaning. At least, as we shall see, this is one possible in­
terpretation of what their intentions were.6 
? Although Gibson (1966; 1982) never quotes Husserl, the similarity between 
the two thinkers extends onto their very formulations. Apparently, he was less 
taciturn about his sources during his lectures, as suggested by the fact that his 
students point to Husserl's influence (cf. Lombarde 1987; Reed 1988: 45). 
In spite of the suggestion made by several authors in Mertz, Parmentier (eds. 
1985), mediation did not mean the same thing to Vygotsky and to Peirce. In par­
ticular, it may appear from certain passages in Peirce's work that there is nothing 
that is not mediated, that is, nothing that is opposed to mediation. However, this 
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What is interesting about Deacon, Donald, and Tomasello from a 
semiotic point of view is that they do appear to talk about signs (or 
"symbols") in the sense of mediation. But this concept is not spelled 
out, nor clearly distinguished from other concepts of meaning. This is 
the task I have set myself in the present essay. 
Just as cognitive science has absorbed the themes of embodiment 
and situatedness from phenomenological philosophy (notably in Varela 
et al. 1991), it needs to take over the concept of semiotic function, 
which, as I have reconstructed it in my own work, stems in part from 
phenomenology, and in part from the cognitive psychology of Jean 
Piaget. Indeed, as we shall see, much of semiotics, too, is content to use 
the concept of sign or mediation, without asking itself what criteria 
serve to define it. Be that as it may, it will be suggested in the following 
that, in important respects, the "semiotic turn" to which the work of 
Deacon and others testify does not go far enough. 
2. In defence of the sign: A critical reading 
of Deacon's use of Peircean terminology 
Although I intend to show, in the following, that Deacon's use of 
Peirce's concepts is not consistent with a natural interpretation of 
Peirce, and therefore is seriously misleading, I am not out to defend 
Peircean orthodoxy as such. It is important to point this out, since there 
certainly are semioticians who look upon Peirce's writings the way 
many Christians conceive of the Bible, as Divine revelation. In contrast, 
in my view it is not interesting to find out "what Peirce really thought", 
except perhaps as a kind of preparation for our own analysis. Peirce was 
no doubt an exceptional thinker, who, moreover, consecrated most of 
his life to reflecting on the nature of meaning. There is therefore every 
interpretation fails to account for the notion of iconicity, to which we will turn 
below. To Vygotsky (1962; 1978), however, mediation basically seems to involve 
language, in the strict sense of the term (although there are references to other 
semiotic resources which are not properly taken into account). 
7  Zlatev certainly focuses on different concepts of meaning, and, in his latest 
paper (Zlatev 2003), even distinguishes signs and symbols, but not quite in the 
way it is done here, although I pride myself of being at least one of the causes for 
the introduction of this distinction. I cannot further discuss this terminology here. 
As for Ziemke's use of the term "sign", which derives from Uexküll, I will touch 
on it in the third part of this essay. 
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reason to take his opinions into account, even if, in the end, we decide 
to revise them. 
2.1. How to make Deacon's (and Peirce's) ideas clear 
Peirce famously pinpointed the importance of having a correct termi­
nology for making our ideas clear. It can be observed with some justifi­
cation that, in this task, Peirce himself failed miserably. Few things have 
turned out be more open to misapprehension that Peirce's own termi­
nology. Yet I think the injunction as such should be taken seriously. 
There are at least three reasons for pointing to the discrepancy between 
Deacon's and Peirce's employment of the same terms. First, using terms 
already having a more or less established signification within Peirce 
scholarship in other meanings breeds confusion. Second, it tends to ob­
scure the basic issues of Peirce's theory. Third, it renders Deacon's own 
problem difficult to grasp. Indeed, I will argue that Deacon has no use 
whatsoever for Peircean terms, since he is concerned with different is­
sues. And yet both Deacon's and Peirce's problems are important. And, 
within a more comprehensive theory, they should be connected.8 
There are different possible formulations for what we have so far 
called Deacon's problem: how it is possible for the child to learn a lan­
guage, without having a Chomskyan Language Acquisition Device; 
how human intelligence can be so special if, within the brain, only a 
quantitative difference to other species can be found; how the difference 
can be so important, if the human brain is not even the biggest of any 
species, whether in absolute terms, or in relation to body mass; and so 
on. But there is yet another formulation, which will serve as my point of 
departure here: why there are no "simple languages", that is, nothing 
which is similar to (verbal) language, but containing fewer signs and/or 
less complex rules (Deacon 1997: 39ff). Or, as Deacon himself puts it: 
Imagine a greatly simplified language, not a child's language that is a frag­
ment of a more complicated adult language, but a language that is logically 
complete in itself, but with a very limited vocabulary and syntax, perhaps suf­
ficient for only a very narrow range of activities. [...] Even under these loos­
I will be mostly concerned here with chapter 3 of Deacon's book, to which 
will be added some earlier and later passages. This essay thus covers a very small 
part of Deacon's theory, but one that is essential for preparing an encounter be­
tween cognitive science and semiotics. 
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ened criteria, there are no simple languages used among other species, though 
there are many other equally or more complicated modes of communication. 
(Deacon 1997: 40f) 9  
Deacon here presupposes a certain concept of language, which is 
spelled out a little later: it is "a mode of communication based upon 
symbolic reference (the way words refer to things) and involving 
combinatorial rules that comprise a system for representing synthetic 
logical relationships among these symbols" (Deacon 1997: 41). He 
goes on to say that this concept extends beyond verbal language to 
include such things as "manual signing, mathematics, computer 'lan­
guages', musical compositions, religious ceremonies, systems of eti­
quette, and many rule-governed games" (Deacon 1997: 41). Even so, 
he contends, language is not found in other species. To refute this ar­
gument, it should be sufficient to discover language-like systems 
having reduced complexity and/or a smaller quantity of units, compa­
rable to what we find in children. According to Deacon, however, 
nothing like this can be found, not even in the case of animals that, 
with extraordinary efforts, have been explicitly taught to use some 
units derived from language. The animals fail to use these units as part 
of a language system. This is true also of animals that are able to learn 
other complex behaviour patters and to remember extensive sets of 
associations. Thus, their inability to learn language does not derive 
from a general incapacity to handle complexity as such or to sustain 
an important memory load. 
It is misleading, Deacon (1997: 52ff) goes on to say, to use language 
(which he here identifies with "vocal communication") as a model for 
analysing other forms of communication, such as those found in ani-
9 Although Deacon initially appears to claim that what he calls "simple lan­
guages" do not exist, what he really wants to say is that they only exist in human 
beings (as mentioned in the very quotation to which this note refers: "no simple 
languages used among other species" (my italics). As noted already in the passage 
quoted, children's language really is a case in point. This becomes even clearer in 
chapter four (in particular 122ff), where Deacon suggests language learning is 
possible because the child starts out ignoring the more complex aspects of lan­
guage. Even if we take into account the restriction to "a language which is logi­
cally complete in itself', simple languages will not disappear from the world, 
because they reappear in human evolution, if Deacon (1997: 340) is right in pos­
iting a mutual development of language and the brain. As mentioned below in the 
text, Deacon's exclusion of "simple languages" in animals only applies "in the 
wild", as testified by laboratory cases such as Kanzi and others. 
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mais. Language is exceptional, and has been around for a much shorter 
time than other kinds of communication. When we teach a dog to obey 
a command in verbal language, we understand what it means, but the 
dog learns it "by rote". What for us depends on language, involves an­
other kind of communication system for the dog. 
In spite of the attempt at a definition, it cannot be said that Deacon's 
concept of language becomes particularly clear. Sometimes, it seems to 
involve only "vocal communication", but at other occasions it appears 
to be very extensive indeed. When Deacon mentions "religious ceremo­
nies, systems of etiquette, and many rule-governed games", it is difficult 
not to see this as an echo of Saussure's very tentative characterisation of 
the subject matter of "semiology", which includes at least the first two, 
and perhaps also the third, instantiated by the game of chess. Other 
semioticians, even a close follower of Saussure such as Hjelmslev, 
would have excluded these cases from the domain of true signs, be­
cause, in his view, they lack "double articulation".10 Today we also 
have a speciality that is called semiotics of music, but not all semioti­
cians are sure whether there can be such a domain of study. Indeed, one 
may wonder whether Deacon himself (no doubt in very good company) 
does not himself extend the language metaphor excessively. 
In contrast with this pansemioticism, and no doubt much to the cha­
grin of biosemioticians, Deacon denies any kind of semiotic character to 
the kind of communication processes occurring in the world of ani­
mals." He would deny that the relationships between cells is a process 
of interpretation (a Peircean semiosis) as Hoffmeyer would have it; nor 
would he discover any "symbolic reference" in the genetic code, con­
trary to what was famously suggested by Roman Jakobson. In fact, he 
does not even discuss what, in Sebeok's parlance, is called "endosemi-
otic" processes (sign processes occurring within the body). What is at 
stake is the domain of zoosemiotics as originally characterised by Se-
beok, that is, those overt stretches of behaviour which serve to convey 
meaning, in some sense or other, from one animal to another, e.g. the 
10 That is, once they have been separated into signs with expression and content, 
there is no point continuing to analyse expression and content separately, into 
smaller units that do not coincide on the two levels. See my discussion of the se­
miotic function below. 
1 ! I here suppose that, if Deacon had used the term, he would define semiotics as 
the domain of "symbolic reference". It is of course possible that Deacon would 
instead oppose symbolic semiosis to other kinds of semiosis, such as that found in 
animal communication systems. 
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cry of the wolf, the calls of vervet monkeys, the dance of the bees, and 
so on. 
As will be seen later, I think Deacon is quite right in excluding such 
phenomena as these, if not from the domain of semiosis generally, at 
least from that characterised by the concept of sign. The trouble is that 
these distinctions appear to be quite arbitrary, as long at the notion of 
"symbol" (that is, in my terminology, the sign) is not defined. To char­
acterise it as "the way words refer to things" begs the question, to say 
the least. This is also true of the opposition between "this unique human 
mode of reference" and "forms of nonsymbolic reference that are found 
in all nonhuman communication (and in many other forms of human 
communication as well)" (Deacon 1997: 43). 
However, in the same context, Deacon points out that the problem 
for the animals is "the simple problem of figuring out how combinations 
of words refer to things", and he goes on to argue that grammatical rules 
and categories are only physical regularities if they are considered inde­
pendently of symbolic operations. This is an important factor, as we 
shall see later, which has to do with the systematicity of verbal language 
and some other semiotic systems, but it is not in any direct way con­
nected with symbolicity, in Peirce's sense of the term. 
It is difficult to see how etiquette rules, games (such as chess) and 
music would have "symbolic reference", in a way in which animal 
communication systems fail to have it. In fact, if we suppose "symbolic 
reference" to convey the general idea of something being "about" 
something else, or, equivalently, to stand for something else, then it 
makes much more sense attributing it to at least some instances of ani­
mal communication than to such things as etiquette, games, and mu­
sic.1" Etiquette rules and the rules defining games are not "about" any­
thing at all: they impose restrictions on the behaviour allowed. As Dea­
con (1997: 61) claims about laughter, it is certainly odd to say that eti­
quette has a meaning, at least in the sense of reference. Indeed it might 
be argued (and we will return to this later) that to the extent that there is 
something semiotical about these phenomena, it is found at a level 
comparable to endosemiotics. 
'* As becomes clear at least in the discussion of the Williams syndrome, Deacon 
(1997: 270) would associate such "aboutness" with indexicality, not symbolicity. 
This is a serious error, because it amounts to confusion between indices and in­
dexicality. As we will see later, it is not an accident that Deacon has recourse to 
the same examples as Saussure. 
19 
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What is even more curious is that, when Deacon (1997: 59ff) later 
returns to "the reference problem", he opposes "the way words refer to 
things" to "a vervet monkey alarm call, a laugh, or a portrait". No mat­
ter what features we attend to, the portrait, just as any other picture, un­
doubtedly refers in a way much more similar to words, than does either 
a laugh or a rule of etiquette. Indeed, Deacon would seem to agree with 
this. Later on in the text, Deacon (1997: 365f) talks about "external 
symbolization in the form of paintings, carvings, or just highly conven­
tional doodlings" which are "the first concrete evidence of the storage 
of such symbolic information outside of the human brain" (Deacon 
(1997: 374, my italics). We will return to this issue when discussing the 
concept of semiotic function.'" 
Deacon does not give any further justification for classifying games, 
etiquette, and music with language, while excluding pictures, but it 
might be argued that, although games and etiquette rules (and perhaps 
even music) are not prototypical signs, such as verbal language and 
pictures, they are still "about" something in some more general sense. " 
To shake hands (in a given context) means that you greet somebody; to 
move a particular chessman means that the queen takes up a new posi­
tion causing perhaps a checkmate. As I understand the term "etiquette 
rules" (but Deacon gives us no clue) is does not involve something like 
shaking hands. I would describe this as an interactive gesture carrying a 
meaning just as any other sign. Etiquette rules, however, are those that 
tell us under which circumstances it is appropriate to shake hands, and 
when it is not. In this sense, they impose restrictions on the behaviour 
allowed.15 
The case of chess, however, is more difficult to deal with. What 
makes some pieces of wood or other material and a board into a game 
of chess are the restrictions imposed on the permitted movements of the 
chessmen and the consequences of certain chessmen taking up particu­
lar positions. Saussure would seem to use the example of chess as an 
The passage quoted introduces a section that is concerned to show that there is 
more to the purported difference than conventionality. So perhaps Deacon would 
say that etiquette, just as language, is part of a system, whereas neither laughs nor 
pictures are. But this only shows that his terms and his criteria are unclear. 
I owe these objections, as well as the examples quoted in the sequel, to Jordan 
Zlatev. 
This is equivalent to the "display rules \ which, according to Ekman and Frie­
sen ( 1969), are applied differently in different cultures to the universal facial ex­
pressions for emotions. 
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analogue to phonology rather than semantics: anything is a queen, as 
long as it is permitted to move it in the ways a queen moves, just as 
anything (with some exaggeration, no doubt) may be an /а/, as long as it 
functions as an /а/ in the vowel system. Hjelmslev, however, claims that 
chess is a "symbol system", in the sense of permitting no distinction 
between expression and content, itself a result of both having the same 
structure (i.e. of not being doubly articulated).16 As we will see below 
(in 2.2), this is not, in my view, a valid argument for abandoning the 
difference between expression and content. In fact, as Searle has ob­
served, the rules of chess are not like traffic regulations, applying to 
movements on a board which were hitherto unregulated: the restrictions 
on movement create chess, but traffic regulations do not create traffic.17 
Clearly, it could be argued that the queen means "able to move in any 
straight direction as far as desired", in a sense in which /а/ does not 
mean "low, frontal, sonorous". However, it does not seem that each 
movement of the queen could be a kind of "chess act", comparable to a 
speech act, in case of which chess would be a highly repetitive type of 
discourse. It might be admitted, therefore, that chess is in some way 
intermediate. But this does not change the fact that pictures are much 
more similar to language, in this respect, than chess is. 
Apart from having language, human beings retain some elements of 
a communication system comparable to that found in animals. It is 
wrong, Deacon (1997: 53f) thinks, to see these systems as partial lan­
guages, or precursors to language, because they are in fact self-
sufficient and independent of language, even in man. Language, on the 
other hand, needs the support of these systems, because "we make ex­
tensive use of prosody, pointing, gesturing, and interactions with objects 
and other people to disambiguate our spoken messages". It would be 
absurd, in Deacon's opinion, to see smiles, grimaces, laughs, sobs, hugs, 
kisses, and the like, as "words without syntax". Without bothering to do 
the latter, I still find Deacon's idea of a "special kind of reference" dif­
ficult to grasp. Most instances of pointing and many instances of ges­
turing and interactions with objects seems to me to have something akin 
to "symbolic reference" (cf. Kendon 2004; Kita 2003), whereas one 
would be hard pressed to find something of the kind in sobs, hugs and 
16 This is of course a sense of symbol that has nothing to do with the use of the 
term neither in Peirce, Saussure, or Deacon. 
! In the Pufendorf lectures, given at Lund University, May 30 to June 2, 2006. 
This is an example of his old distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. 
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kisses — none if which serves to suggest that the latter are not meaning­
ful. 
However, the example of the vervet monkey alarm calls may con­
tribute to a clarification of the issue. Sevfarth, Cheney et al. (as reported 
in Deacon 1997: 54ff; also cf. Hauser 1997) tell us that these monkeys 
produce different calls to warn troop members of the presence of either 
eagles, leopards, or snakes. The calls have the effect of making the 
troop members race out of threes, climb into the trees, or just rise up to 
peer into the bushes around them. These calls therefore do not simply 
refer to states of mind (fear in all cases) but to different predators.1% Ac­
cording to the authors, the calls are analogous to names, or to the way 
we use the exclamation "Fire!", and thus they make up a simple lan­
guage. However, they also point out that the calls are different from 
language in being contagious. At the same time as they behave in the 
adequate way, the monkeys repeat the calls. This is more similar to our 
way of laughing, as Deacon points out. To laugh at something is quite 
different from saying "I just heard a great joke". There is a sense, Dea­
con (1997: 57) admits, in which a laugh may be said to refer to "a defi­
nite class of experiences which are deemed funny". Analogously, the 
vervet monkey calls refer to classes of predators. But this is not the 
same sense in which words refer.19 
Later on, when opposing "sense" and "reference" in the Fregean 
sense, Deacon (1997: 62) seems to say that laughs and vervet monkey 
alarm calls, contrary to words, do not need any "sense" to determine the 
"reference". Yet he already appears to have admitted the opposite when 
claiming that there is a sense in which laughs refer to a class of laughable 
objects. This would seem to be analogous to the way in which words 
which change their meaning (or reference) each time they are used 
(Husserl's "okkasionelle BedeutungenJespersen's and Jakobson's 
"shifters", etc.) are said to signify "the class of all persons referring to 
themselves", "the class of all present moments", etc. In both cases, only 
In fact, they could also be said to refer to different behaviour patterns, that is, 
as Peirce would have said, to different energetic interprétants. 
Another criterion quoted here by Deacon (1997: 58f) is the hierarchy of inten­
tions according to Grice. I will ignore it here, because it certainly does not put 
pictures or any kinds of gesture in a different class from verbal language. Cf. Son­
esson 1999. 2001 a, 2002. In fact, I suspect most instances of kissing, embracing 
and even prosody must be deemed to be hierarchically intentional. 
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one of those objects is picked up in the moment of realisation."0 It is true, 
however, that Deacon says laughing and alarm calls fail to have any "con­
scious concept of meaning" (my italics). Perhaps this should be under­
stood in the sense in which Deacon (1997: 63) goes on to say that the dif­
ference between a dog's and a human being's way to get to the reference 
is "something additional that is produced in the head". But, again, this is a 
claim in need of further elucidation. 
Deacon then introduces the Peircean concept of interprétant to take 
care of this mental residue. This is rather unfortunate, for, if anything, 
the interprétant is not characterised as being mental. The different be­
haviour sequences provoked in the troop by the various vervet alarm 
calls would be ideal cases of Peircean interprétants. It is true that Dea­
con later notes that there are different kinds of interprétants in Peirce's 
theory. But he then goes on to talk as if only words had interprétants. 
However, Peirce's original point was quite the opposite one: that 
meaning is not necessarily "in the head". It is no accident that Morris 
could reinterpret Peirce using the tenets of behaviourist psychology. It is 
not even true that the chain of interprétants, where one instance leads on 
to another, and so on (for instance one word to another), is characteristic 
of language, as Deacon seems to think. In Peirce's view, it would apply 
to all signs (including "non-symbolic communication"). Nor is Peirce 
interested in distinguishing interprétants in a way that would be useful 
to Deacon. His taxonomy obeys different criteria that do not pertain to 
the distinction between language and other communication forms, nor 
to the difference between mental phenomena and others. As Peirce 
never tires of explaining, the mind is simply a possible instance among 
others of an interprétant. 
According to Deacon (1997: 63), "an interprétant is whatever en­
ables one to infer the reference from some sign or signs and their con­
text". This is perhaps not wrong, but it is misleading. Rather, the inter­
prétant is any consequence the sign may have for somebody doing the 
interpreting. The distinction between interprétant and object has nothing 
to do with the Fregean opposition between sense and reference, contrary 
to the impression one may get form reading Deacon (and of course from 
the classical model of Ogden and Richards). If anything, Frege's terms 
20 I am of course not claiming any further analogy, but it would seem that Dea­
con would have to do so. Both cases are indexical to him, as we will see later, 
whereas I would insist on the difference between a mere indexical relation (an 
indexicality) and an indexical sign (an index). 
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would rather correspond to the distinction between the immediate object 
(that which is directly presented through the sign) and the dynamical 
object (that which we may learn by other means about the thing pre­
sented by the sign). Everything really tends to suggest that, to Peirce, 
the object is that which incites someone to create a sign; and the inter­
prétant is something which the sign gives rise to in the one being pre­
sented with the sign. We will see this more in detail in a later section of 
this essay. 
For the moment, however, I think we need to introduce a clear con­
cept of what a sign (in some respects equivalent to Deacon's "symbol") 
is. Then we shall see that the sign, rather than being identified with one 
of Peirce's categories, must be cross-classified with iconicity, indexi­
cality and symbolicity. And finally we shall see that even symbols in 
our sense, which combine the semiotic function with symbolicity, are 
not confined to verbal language. Something else must be added, which 
Deacon fails to distinguish clearly. 
I will start out from a definition of the semiotic function that I found 
necessary to introduce, in order to salvage the notion of iconicity from 
the conventionalist critique of Eco and Goodman (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 
etc.). 
2.2. Stone for candy and feathers for a chicken. 
On the concept of semiotic function 
Even though semiotics is not exclusively concerned with signs, but is 
also required to attend to meanings of other kinds, the concept of sign 
remains crucial, and semiotic inquiry still has to start out from a distinc­
tion between signs and other meanings (cf. Sonesson 1989a; 1992a; 
1992b; 1998a). Indeed, many semiotic studies (those of Lévi-Strauss, 
Barthes, the Greimas school, and, most notably perhaps, those forming 
part of biosemiotics), will recover their validity, once it is realised that 
they are concerned with meanings, in a much wider sense than that of 
the sign, better paraphrased perhaps in terms of wholes, connections, or 
schemes. Building their models of the sign, both Peirce and Saussure 
made a set of fundamental conceptual distinctions, which are in part 
complementary, yet both of them took if for granted that we would all 
understand the import of such terms as "signifier" and "signified", or 
the equivalent. A basic understanding of the sign function may however 
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be gained from an interpretation of Piaget's important attempt to define 
the semiotic function (which, in the early writings, was less adequately 
termed the symbolic function), and from Husserl's definition of the no­
tion of appresentation. 
According to Piaget, the semiotic function is a capacity acquired by 
the child at an age of around 18 to 24 months, which enables him or her 
to imitate something or somebody outside the direct presence of the 
model, to use language, make drawings, play "symbolically", and have 
access to mental imagery and memory. The common factor underlying 
all these phenomena, according to Piaget, is the ability to represent real­
ity by means of a signifier that is distinct from the signified.21 Indeed, 
Piaget argues that the child's experience of meaning antedates the semi­
otic function, but that at this stage it does not suppose a differentiation 
of signifier and signified in the sign (see Piaget 1945; 1967; 1970)/" 
Even from a cursory interpretation of these terms, it seems clear that 
pictures as well as linguistic signs, some kinds of play (but not games 
such as chess) and certainly some gestures depend on the semiotic 
function; but etiquette rules and most instances of music do not. 
In several of the passages in which he makes use of this notion of 
semiotic function, Piaget goes on to point out that "indices" and "sig­
nals" are possible long before the age of 18 months, but only because 
they do not suppose any differentiation between expression and content. 
The signifier of the index is, Piaget (1967: 134; my translation, G. S.) 
says, "an objective aspect of the signified"; thus, for instance, the visible 
extremity of an object which is almost entirely hidden from view is the 
signifier of the entire object for the baby, just as the tracks in the snow 
stand for the prey to the hunter. But when the child uses a pebble to sig­
nify candy, he is well aware of the difference between them, which im­
plies, as Piaget (1967: 134ff) tells us, "a differentiation, from the sub­
ject's own point of view, between the signifier and the signified". 
21 It should be noted that at least memory and mental pictures are internal repre­
sentations, in the sense of cognitive science, but that they are still differentiated, 
according to Piaget's conception. 
Not all of Piaget's examples of the semiotic function may really be of that 
kind, even applying his own criteria. For some critical observations, see Bentele 
1984; Trevarthen, Logotheti 1989; Sonesson 1992b. Just as it remains doubtful 
that there is a unitary semiotic function from the point of view of ontogeny, as 
Gardner and Wolf (1983) observe, one may doubt its phylogenetic justification 
(cf. Foley 1991). However, this does not necessarily put into doubt the structural 
unity of the function. 
152 Gör an Sonesson 
Piaget is quite right in distinguishing the manifestation of the semi­
otic function from other ways of "connecting significations", to employ 
his own terms. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, while the signi­
fier of the index is said to be an objective aspect of the signified, we are 
told that in the "sign" and the "symbol" (i.e. in Piaget's terminology, the 
conventional and the motivated variant of the semiotic function, respec­
tively23) expression and content are differentiated from the point of view 
of the subject. We can, however, imagine this same child that in Piaget's 
example uses a pebble to stand for a piece of candy having recourse 
instead to a feather in order to represent a bird, or employ a pebble to 
stand for a rock, without therefore confusing the part and the whole: 
then the child would be employing a feature, which is objectively a part 
of the bird, or the rock, while differentiating the former from the latter 
from his point of view. Only then would he be using an index, in the 
sense in which this term is employed (or should be employed) in semi­
otics (cf. Sonesson 1992a; 1992b; 1995b).24 
Just as obviously the hunter, who identifies the animal by means of 
the tracks, and then employs them to find out which direction the animal 
has taken, and who does this in order to catch the animal, does not, in 
his construal of the sign, confuse the tracks with the animal itself, in 
which case he would be satisfied with the former. Both the child in our 
example and the hunter are using indices, or indexical signs. On the 
other hand, the child and the adult will fail to differentiate the perceptual 
adumbration in which he has access to the object from the object itself; 
indeed, they will identify them, at least until they change their perspec­
tive by approaching the object from another vantage point. And at least 
the adult will consider a branch jutting out behind a wall as something 
-3 Piaget thus uses the term "sign" to stand for, among other things, an entity con­
sisting of an expression and a content that are connected to each other arbitrarily, 
and "symbol ' for an entity having a non-arbitrary connection, exactly as Saussure 
does. To Peirce, as we shall see, "sign" is a generic term, and "symbol" applies, 
roughly speaking, to an entity based on an arbitrary connection (or, perhaps more 
generally, a "law-like' connection). Deacon does not distinguish between "sign" and 
'symbol in their Peircean senses. In this essay, I follow Peirce's usage, though I try 
to give a more precise meaning to the concept of sign. 
In fact, the child may even try to objectify his subjective point of view in the 
sign, by reworking the pebble to resemble a rock, or by transforming (less plausi­
bly) the feather into the likeness of a bird. This is the kind of discovery made by 
the prehistoric artist, although the rock itself may not really have been a possible 
subject matter to him. 
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that is non-differentiated from the tree, to use Piaget's example, in the 
rather different sense of being a proper part of it. This is so because, 
from the point of view of phenomenology, defended by Gibson as well 
as Husserl, the part is no sign of the whole, but is identified with it in 
perception.25 In the Peircean sense an index is a sign, the relata of which 
are connected, independently of the sign function, by contiguity or by 
that kind of relation that obtains between a part and the whole (hence­
forth termed factorality). But of course contiguity and factorality are 
present everywhere in the perceptual world without as yet forming 
signs: we will say, in that case, that they are mere indexicalities. Per­
ception (to pick a Peircean term) is profused with indexicality (cf. Son­
esson 1989a; 1992a; 1992b; 1995b). 
Each time two objects are perceived together in space, there is conti­
guity, and each time something is seen to be a part of something else, or 
to be a whole made up of many parts, there is factorality. According to 
Husserl, two or more items may enter into different kinds of "pairings", 
from the "paired association" of two co-present items (which we will 
call perceptual context), over the "appresentative pairing" in which one 
item is present and the other indirectly given through the first, to the real 
sign relation, where again one item is directly present and the other only 
indirectly so, but where the indirectly presented member of the pair is 
the theme, i.e. the centre of attention for consciousness. This property 
serves to distinguish the sign from the abductive context, which is the 
way in which the unseen side of the dice at which we are looking at this 
moment is present to consciousness: in the abductive context the atten­
tion is focused on the directly presented part or spans the whole context. 
However, there seems to be many intermediate cases between a perfect 
sign and an abductive context (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.2). 
Piaget's notion of differentiation is vague, and in fact multiply am­
biguous, but, on the basis of his examples, two interpretations can be 
introduced (cf. Sonesson 1992a; 1992b; 1995b): first, it might corre­
spond to the sign user's idea of the items pertaining to different basic 
categories of the common sense Lifeworld; and, in the second place, it 
could refer to the impossibility of one of the items going over into the 
other, following the flow of time or an extension in space. Indeed, it is 
sufficient to catch a glimpse of the wood-cutter lifting his axe over his 
shoulder and head to know what has gone before and what is to come: 
"5 About proper parts, perceptual perspectives, and attributes as different ways of 
dividing an object and thus different indexicalities, cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.2. 
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that he has just raised his tool from some base level, and that at the next 
moment, he is going to hit the trunk of the tree. Here the flow of indexi­
calities is only momentarily halted. Whereas the items forming the sign 
are conceived to be clearly differentiated entities, and indeed as per­
taining to different "realms" of reality, the "mental" and the "physical" 
in terms of naïve consciousness, the items of the perceptual context 
continuously flow into each other, and are not felt to be different in na-
, 26 ture. 
The concept of semiotic function, which has here been developed 
from a reading of Piaget, is not the same as the one found in the work of 
Hjelmslev, who uses it to distinguish signs from what he calls "symbol 
systems": the former, but not the latter, require a different analysis into 
minimal units on the levels of expression and content, that is, they have 
"double articulation" (cf. Sonesson 1992a; 1992b). In Hjelmslev's view, 
not only chess and other games as well as mathematical symbols but 
also pictures and onomatopoeias form symbol systems.27 There are 
many reasons to doubt this analysis: other criteria than the linguistic 
ones may be found which will allow for a distinct articulation of expres­
sion and content (as I have suggested above), and the content and ex­
pression of onomatopoeias are certainly different also according to lin­
guistic criteria. But in any case, both onomatopoeias and pictures are 
differentiated according to our criteria, because expression and content 
are clearly experienced as being of different nature and having separate 
spatial and/or temporal location. 
Differentiation is also different from "displacement", which, in 
Hockett's (1977) classical formulation, is one of the "design features" 
of human language: the capacity for being used to refer to things remote 
in time and space. No doubt this is an important property of some signs, 
and it has even been suggested that the necessity of remembering the 
past and of planning for the future (displacement in time) is at the origin 
of human language (Sjölander 2002; Deacon 1997: 397ff). If so, this 
property is also realised by pictures as well as by some gestures. Inter­
In fact, both content and expression of the sign are actually "mental" or, per­
haps better, "intersubjective", as structural linguists would insist; but we are inter­
ested in the respect in which the sign user conceives them to be different. 
Actually, Hjelmslev may not be talking about pictures as such, because he 
literally claims that "The Christ of Thowaldsen as a symbol of compassion" is a 
symbol. But even this could be disputed applying our criteria. It will be noted that 
the distinction between sign and symbol in Hjelmslev's work is quite different 
both from the Peircean and the Saussurean tradition. 
The meaning of meaning in biology and cognitive science 155 
estingly, however, other gestures (such as, most notably, pointing), 
which, on our criteria, are clearly signs, do only function as they do in 
the presence of the object to which they refer (cf. Sonesson 1995b). A 
large portion of verbal signs, and not only what has variously been 
called (with only partly overlapping terms) "deictics", "egocentric par­
ticulars", "shifters", etc., accomplish their peculiar function in the pres­
ence of their referent. Indeed, even some pictures require the presence 
of the referent. In the zoo, for instance, both the verbal label and the 
picture of the animal will only function as they are meant to function — 
helping us applying the right name to the animal — in presence of the 
animal referred to (cf. Sonesson 2003; 2004). So while the capacity of 
language and pictures for functioning in the absence of their referents is 
important, it may be equally important that they have usages in the 
presence of their referents. 
In fact, the sign, and therefore differentiation, may be necessary for a 
much wider purpose: to single out different portions of the perceptual 
world for attention. Within semiotics, Prieto (1966; 1975a; 1975b) has 
long insisted on the importance of this function of signs. Interestingly, 
also Tomasello (1999: 13Iff) has recently arrived at the same conclu­
sion: the basic function of "symbolic representation" is "attention ma­
nipulation", which, beyond "displacement", "undermines the whole 
concept of a perceptual situation by layering on top of it the multitudi­
nous perspectives that are communicatively possible for those of us who 
share the symbol".28 As we shall see (in the second part), this actually 
points to a more elementary sense of meaning, which, in different tradi­
tions, is called such things as "relevance", "pertinence", or "form". It is 
at the origin of the Peircean concept of "ground". 
Deacon (1997: 397), however, suggests that "almost any objects or 
events or even particular qualities of objects or events can be signified 
without symbolic reference, using iconic or indexical means". It is diffi­
cult not to be reminded of Swift's scholars who communicated using 
objects, which they carried with them. The difficulty with this solution 
is not only that one cannot carry all conceivable objects on one's back 
"s It is not clear to me whether the perspective mentioned here should be viewed 
in relation to similar ideas of Bakhtin's, for Tomasello's quotes from the latter 
concern other issues. Interestingly, however, Bakhtin allows for such perspectives 
being incorporated into drawings, as well as into linguistic signs, but denies their 
presence in photographs, for reasons that I have shown to be erroneous. Cf. Son­
esson 1999; 2001a. 
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(which would be equivalent to the displacement argument), but also that 
the properties and relationships between these objects cannot be ma­
nipulated freely (which is the argument from relevance). In some re­
spects, this is similar to Deacon's own claim, that "nonsymbolic refer­
ence" cannot point to "abstract or otherwise intangible objects of refer­
ence" (ibid.), but the latter may be too general a formulation because it 
does not mention the possibility of changing the principles of relevance. 
The latter, in any case, is a capacity of pictures and some gestures as 
well as verbal language. 
It cannot be denied, however, that in some respects my interpretation 
of Piaget goes against his own self-understanding. I have made much 
out of a distinction between the "objective" and the "subjective point of 
view" (which is precisely a kind of "attention manipulation"), which 
Piaget introduces only later to forget all about it himself. Indeed, if we 
look at Piaget's examples, it seems that he attributes the semiotic func­
tion only to those expressions and contents which are not only subjec­
tively, but objectively different: the pebble in relation to the candy, but 
not the feather in relation to the bird Л9 In other terms, he seems to con­
fuse differentiation, in the end, with symbolicity, that is, the arbitrari­
ness that accounts for the connection between the expression and the 
content. 
Interestingly, this is, at least by implication, the same confusion we 
discover in Deacon's work: to him that "special kind of reference" we 
find in symbols, and notably in verbal language, seems to involve a lack 
of motivation, opposed to the motivated relationships appearing in icons 
and indices; but it is, at the same time, as his examples show, differen­
tiation as opposed to non-differentiation. The evaluation of Deacon's 
claim is certainly complicated, as we shall see, by his rather curious 
interpretations of iconicity and indexicality, and by his attribution of a 
system character to all instances of symbolicity (which perhaps, in the 
end, rather than arbitrariness, is that which defines symbols to Deacon). 
But clearly, when it comes to the attribution of sign status to the vervet 
monkey alarm calls, the question at issue is not whether the monkeys 
perceive contiguities and/or similarities between the calls and the 
A passage from Deacon (1997: 413f) which seems to go in the direction of my 
distinction, is when he opposes the "indexical" interpretation of the chimpanzees 
which are unable to choose the small heap of candies, although they have ob­
served that as a result they are given the big heap, to the "symbolic" interpretation 
of children who are able to leam the adequate reaction. 
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predators, but whether they see the former as being anything else than a 
part of the situation which also contains the latter. 
There can be no doubt that the identification of differentiation with 
symbolicity is a serious confusion, at least because it makes it impossi­
ble to formulate some relevant questions for research. And one of the 
questions which our terminology permit us to formulate actually may 
explain why both Piaget and Deacon have been led down this alley: it is 
conceivable that, phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically, differen­
tiation can first only be experienced on the basis of symbolicity, and is 
then later generalised to iconic and indexical relationships. At this stage, 
obviously, this can only be a speculative proposition. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the notion of differentiation, as 
it is used here to define the concept of sign, itself needs interpretation. 
Tomasello's (1997) claims that the sociocultural contexts in which hu­
mans are reared allow them, contrary to other animals, to develop "joint 
attention", which permits them to discover the goals and motives behind 
the actions of others. This idea is intriguing, particularly in view of the 
parallelism which Tomasello, along with Vygotsky (and, unknowingly 
to him, Prieto), postulates between tools and signs. Both tools and signs 
point beyond themselves, Tomasello notes, to the problems they are set 
to resolve, and to the situation they describe, respectively. Prieto would 
say that a set of expressions is connected to a set of contents, just as a 
set of tools relates to a set of usages.30 Just as Tomasello talks about 
taking different perspectives, Prieto insists on the set of alternatives 
(known in classical structuralist semiotics as "paradigm"). In both tools 
and signs, it seems necessary to intercalate an intention between the two 
sets, in order to explain the possibilities of choice. To Prieto, who looks 
at the issue from a more theoretical point of view, intentionality is an 
additional message, which is superimposed on the original sign. To 
Tomasello, on the other hand, intentionality is at the origin of all signs, 
because causality is a later reinterpretation of what was originally a 
magically misunderstood intentionality, attributing goals to the things of 
the natural world.31 
30 Elsewhere, I have introduced the term allofunctionality to characterise objects 
that are defined by reference to the properties of other objects, such as tools and 
signs (cf. Sonesson 1989a). 
31 The case of autism is very interesting, because Tomasello inteiprets it in the 
sense of a failure to see others as conscious beings, and thus to entertain joint 
attentions with them. We know however, from other sources (see Winner 1982: 
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Seen in this way, the semiotic function seems to have something to 
do with mediation, not only in the very general sense of Peirce and Vy-
gotsky, but in the more special sense of second generation behaviourist 
theories: an intercalated variable between stimulus and response. Here 
again, we are of course at the level of mere speculation. 
2.3. The picture as a sign. 
On not seeing the depiction owing to all the paper 
The picture is a sign, in the sense of it having a signifier which is doubly 
differentiated from its signified, and which is non-thematic and directly 
given, while the signified is thematic and only indirectly present. This 
also applies to rock paintings and rock carvings: the rock itself is made 
of quite another material than the arms, the elks, the boats, and the hu­
man beings depicted; indeed, even those stone implements which are 
represented are not rendered in the same material, since the expressions 
of these contents are not really the rock itself, but the carved hollows, 
and the pigment lines, made in, or on, the rock. Nor is there any conti­
nuity in space and time between the motifs and their rendering. The 
rock and its carvings, as well as the pigments deposited upon it, are di­
rectly given to our perception; that which is thematic, however, are the 
animals, men, arms, and tools suggested by these means. 
The perception of surfaces is important for the possibilities of sur­
vival of all animals; it is only by means of determining their mutual re­
lations that the animals are capable of orienting themselves in the world 
of experience. However, according to James Gibson (1980), it is only to 
human beings that the marks made on surfaces attract attention. Such 
marks may be of different types, for example, colour spots, lines or 
projected shadows; and they can be produced in different ways: by the 
fingers, with a pencil, a brush, some engraving instrument, with a rule, a 
181 ff) that some autistic children a better than normal children at some specific 
tasks, which include such things as "photographic memory", the ability to sing an 
entire opera after hearing it once, and an extraordinary capacity for drawing. Just 
as in the other cases mentioned, however, the drawing ability is of the kind per­
mitting a very close reproduction in the expression of the content as given, with­
out any apparent awareness of alternatives. In this sense, expression and content 
here appear to be imperfectly differentiated. It is intriguing however, that this is 
exactly the opposite of the kind of drawing chimpanzees have been known to 
accomplish. 
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compass, or with a more complex instrument such as a printing-press, a 
camera or a projector. The marks on the surface can be disorderly and 
may even be dirt spots. If they are symmetrical or regular in some way, 
they make up some kind of ornament; but if the marks have a form that 
can be interpreted as referring to a possible perceptual scene, we have to 
do with a picture. 
If we follow Gibson, the capacity to interpret pictures is as unique a 
human capacity as that of using verbal signs. This contention may ap­
pear to be contradicted by numerous experiments which show that some 
animals react to pictures of their keeper in the same way as to the keeper 
himself; this notably appears to be true of pigeons (cf. Cabe 1980; Fagot 
2000). However, these experiments do not show to what extent the ani­
mals perceive the pictures are something different from a new instance 
of the human being in person. In this sense, the iconicity of pictures, to 
human beings at least, is very different from Deacon's (1997: 76) de­
scription of "seeing just more of the same (bark, bark, bark...)." Julian 
Hochberg showed that a child 19 months old who had never seen a 
picture could readily interpret it if he/she were familiar with the objects 
depicted (Hochberg, Brooks 1962). But Hochberg did not investigate 
whether the child saw the picture as a picture or as an instance of the 
category of the depicted object — a picture of a bird as a bird, etc. For 
the picture to be a sign, both similarity and difference have to be in­
volved. 
Recent experiments have shown that even children 5 months old 
look longer at a doll than at its picture (DeLoache, Burns 1994). How­
ever, it does not follow that the children see the picture as a picture. 
Indeed, 9th month olds, but not 18th month olds, try to grasp the object 
depicted as if it were a real object (DeLoache 2004); whatever the dif­
ference they perceive, then, it does not seem to involve signs as opposed 
to objects. Just as in the case of the doves, this may simply show that 
the picture and its object are seen as different, but not necessarily as 
being a sign-vehicle and its referent. The real doll is perhaps seen as a 
more prototypical instance of the category; or, alternatively, the real 
object may be more interesting because of having more perceptual 
predicates. 
Once we know that something is a sign, and, specifically, a pictorial 
sign, the particular "similarities" will take care of themselves. If we are 
not told that some particular thing is a sign, and iconic at that, then we 
may perhaps be aware of it because of general facts derived from our 
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experience of the common sense world. Members of the Me tribe, we 
are told, smell the pictures, taste them, bend them, and so on, in short 
behave like a Piagetian child exploring his world. According to Dere-
gowski (1973: 167; 1976: 20) not only pictures, but materials like paper 
are unknown to the Me'; therefore, when Deregowski had pictures 
printed on coarse cloth, animals well-known to the tribe could be identi­
fied, although the recognition was still not immediate. It appears the 
Me' were so busy trying to discover the fundamental properties of the 
paper as an object in itself, that the iconic properties, those making it a 
pictorial sign of something else, were not noted; other attributes became 
dominant in their experience of it. It therefore seems (as I suggested in 
Sonesson 1989a) that for something to be a pictorial sign of something 
else, it must occupy some relatively low position in the particular Life-
world hierarchy of "things". 
If we suppose the Hochbergian child to understand, not only that 
given pigment patterns on paper have something to do with the shoe, the 
doll, and the Volkswagen of the real world, but also that the former are 
signs for the latter, and not the reverse, then it will not be enough for the 
child to have learnt from his experience with objects of the world that 
the edges of objects have properties which are shared by contours drawn 
on paper, or to be innately predisposed to react to these common prop­
erties (cf. Hochberg 1978: 136; cf. 1972). He must also have acquired, 
probably from experience in his particular Occidental Lifeworld, some 
notion of the relative low ranking on the scale of prototypical Lifeworld 
things of a material like paper, which directs his attention, not to what 
the pigment patterns on the paper are as "selves", but to what they stand 
for. And perhaps he must also possess some idea of a meaningful or­
ganisation, which relieves him of the task of finding a meaning in ink­
blots, in the dirt on the road, in the stains he makes with his dinner on 
the tablecloth and in the clouds. 
Familiarity with paper and familiarity with cloth are facts of par­
ticular cultures. Paper, which is too prominent to the Me' to serve as a 
sign-vehicle, traditionally cames this function in Western culture. But 
there would probably also be universals of prominence: thus, for in­
stance, two-dimensional objects are felt to be less prominent than three-
dimensional ones and may thus more readily serve as expressions. In 
this sense, it is not true that the object is its own best icon, as is ordinar­
ily claimed — at least if iconic means iconic sign. Indeed, iconicity 
stands in the way of the sign function. The objects of the common sense 
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world are three-dimensional: much less is required for a two-
dimensional object than for another three-dimensional object to repre­
sent one of these objects. This is precisely what is suggested by DeLo­
ache's more recent experiments with children: not only is the picture 
understood later than language in these experiments, around 2 1/2 years 
(DeLoache, Burns 1994; etc.), but scale models are understood even 
later, at 3 years of age, half a year after pictures (DeLoache 2000). As 
noted also by DeLoache, this contradicts what is expected by common 
sense. But it is reasonable, if the issue is separating the sign and its ref­
erent. 
DeLoache (2004) employs the term "double representation" to de­
scribe the necessity for the child to attend both to the picture and the 
object depicted. This is a misleading term, for there is only one repre­
sentation, that is, one sign function.3" Rather, in Gibson's more enlight­
ening terms, there are invariants for both the surface and the referent in 
the object, and the task is to tell them apart, and decide which is most 
prominent. In fact, the problem only arises because there is at the same 
time sign function and iconicity. This means that the term "double rep­
resentation" is not only misleading: if fails to explain why pictures are 
easier to interpret than scale models. 
In all DeLoache's experiments, the task is, in one way or other, to 
find a hidden object by using information contained in a picture or a 
scale model. According to the standard procedure, the experimenter and 
the child are outside the room in which the child is to search for the toy. 
The child cannot see the picture/scale model and the room at the same 
time. The experimenter tells the child that she will hide the toy in the 
room and then come back and ask the child to search for it. She returns 
to the child and points out the appropriate location in the picture/scale 
model telling him "This is where Snoopy is hiding in his room, can you 
find him?". If the subject fails in the first search it is once more shown 
the picture and given more explicit prompts. 24 month old do not pass 
the retrieval test, but 30 month old do; there is no difference in perform­
ance using photographs or line drawings. However, when the whole 
procedure is conducted verbally, children pass the test already before 24 
months old; and when a scale model is used, only 36 months old pass it. 
Perhaps DeLoache talks about "representation" in the sense in which the term 
is often used in cognitive science, but then this is precisely the problem, as we 
have suggested above. 
21 
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This way of investigating the picture function may be criticised from 
two diametrically opposed points of view. First, it could be argued that 
the task involves much more than the recognition of the picture as pic­
ture — it requires an action, which is no doubt difficult in itself, namely, 
to search for the hidden object. It remains, however, that even this task 
is differently accomplished if the instructions are given in entirely ver­
bal form, or if they involve pictures or scale models. On the other hand, 
even when the instructions for the task feature pictures or scale models, 
at lot of verbal and indexical scaffolding also takes place, without this 
being taken into account in the interpretation. It has been argued by 
Callaghan and Rankin (2002) that pictures would be interpreted even 
later if such verbal scaffolding had not taken place. More fundamental, 
however, may very well be the indexical scaffolding: not only are the 
objects pointed out by the experimenter in the picture or the scale 
model, but the latter are even placed on the real objects, creating an arti­
ficial neighbourhood relation. 
Another one of DeLoache's experiment seems to indicate that the 
sign function is at least part of the problem. When the experimenter, 
instead of talking about a model and a real room, tells the children that 
the search has to take place in the same room, which has shrunken since 
it was last seen, the task is accomplished much more easily (DeLoache 
et al. 1997). The difference, clearly, is that the two instances are here 
connected by a narrative chain rather than by a sign relationship. In an­
other experiment, DeLoache (2000) places the scale model behind a 
window-pane, in order to make it more similar to a picture, with the 
expected results. In fact, however, two things happen here which would 
have to be separated: the object becomes less prominent, because it has 
less the appearance of three-dimensionality; and it is put into a frame, 
which creates a centre of attention. 
DeLoache's work experimentally investigates the central issues 
broached in Sonesson (1989a).33 As always, the investigation engenders 
new problems. However, if understanding pictures is as difficult for 
children as DeLoache and, even more, Callaghan, suggest, then we 
should not expect animals to be able to do so. We have already pro­
posed some alternative explanations for the behaviour of Cave's pi­
geons. On the other hand, primatologists, as mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, tend to take for granted that the apes to which they are 
trying to teach language already understand pictures. There are only a 
33 Clearly without knowing Sonesson 1989a. 
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few regular investigations of apes looking at pictures and scale models. 
Itakura (1994) reports that enculturated chimpanzees can interpret line 
drawings; Kuhlmeier etal. (1999; Kuhlmeier, Boysen 2001; 2002) have 
even shown their chimpanzees to understand scale models. It is difficult 
to know what to make of these results, already because these apes are all 
enculturated, which is to say that they are trained in many of the semi-
otic resources that in ordinary circumstances are peculiar to the human 
Lifeworld. Moreover, it should be noted that, while the children were 
introduced to a model of a room that they had never seen before the 
training-phase, the apes were confronted with a model of their own fa­
miliar environment. In addition, a lot of facts about the subjects and the 
experimental procedure are not clear from the articles. At present, it 
would therefore be premature to draw any conclusions about the abili­
ties of the great apes in this domain. 
It is clear, however, that, in order to understand the peculiarity of the 
picture, we need a concept of sign which can account for the difference 
and similarity between perception and pictures, on the one hand, and of 
pictures and scale models on the other. 
2.4. Beyond the "fleeting instant". 
From iconicity to the iconical sign 
Deacon's way of using the Peircean notions of iconicity and indexi-
cality is curious, not only in relation to the naïve interpretation, found in 
many textbooks, but also, I am afraid, with reference to a deeper read­
ing, which takes into account the underlying armature of Peircean phi­
losophy. As I have repeatedly pointed out, I am not particularly inter­
ested in opposing an orthodox interpretation of Peirce to the one real­
ised by Deacon. What does interest me is to find a more enlightening 
way of talking about the complexities of semiosis. 
Deacon (1997: 70f) starts out rather cautiously, pointing out that terms 
like icon, index and symbol have been used in other senses by scholars 
before and after Peirce. In his view, however, Peirce was involved in in­
vestigating "the nature of the formal relationship between the characteris­
tics of the sign token and those of the physical object represented", where 
icons depend on similarity, indices on "some physical or temporal con­
nection", and symbols on "some formal or merely agreed-upon link". He 
also relates Peirce's three sign types to the classical repertory of associa-
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tions types, which he lists as: "a) similarity, b) contiguity or correlation; c) 
law, causality, or convention". This seems compatible with many pas­
sages in Peirce's work, with the exception that causality would be in the 
second category. Deacon no doubt is aware of this, because already on the 
following page he talks about indices being "causally linked to something 
else". 
Deacon (1997: 7If) also quite correctly observes that nothing is an 
icon in itself, and that similarity is not "caused" by iconicity. "What we 
usually mean is that they were designed to be interpreted that way, or 
are highly likely to be interpreted in that way."34 However, we need the 
Peircean notion of ground to account for this fact. As we shall see, an 
object is actually iconic in itself, but it is only an iconic ground in rela­
tion to something else, and an iconic sign in relation to a further rela­
tion. Deacon rightly notes that something, such as (a sign of) American 
Sign Language (ASL), may well partake of different sign types, such as 
iconicity and symbolicity, at the same time. He is wrong, however, in 
identifying iconicity with depiction, that is perceptual resemblance. 
More importantly, perhaps, he fails to note that this shows that the Peir­
cean sign categories are not types of signs at all, but types of relation­
ships between the parts of a sign." " 
So far, this is a somewhat more subtle reading of the "received ver­
sion" of Peirce's theory. Where Deacon's (1997: 74ff) interpretations 
become strange, however, in when he suggests that iconicity is the fact of 
there being no distinction: the perception of the same "stuff' over and 
over again. It is, he maintains, like camouflage: the moth's wings being 
seen by the bird as "just more tree". Deacon (1997: 77ff) goes on to sug­
This hardly seems compatible with Figure 2.2. in Deacon's book, in which 
symbols are said to have an "opaque" relationship to their object, and icons a 
"transparent" one, which is glossed as "that they require no additional knowledge 
to 'see' the one through experience of the other" (Deacon 1997: 60). 
Deacon (1997: 72ff) goes on to discuss Peirce's idea according to which an 
index always contains an icon, and a symbol an index, which he interprets in the 
sense that the capacity to interpret icons must precede the ability to understand 
indices, and the ability to make sense of indices must come before that of making 
use of symbols. This is probably not what Peirce meant. In any case, it is certain 
that the child first is able to interpret the marks on a paper as indices (traces of its 
own movements), then as icons or symbols (depictions or letters). In another 
sense, it can be shown that some indices contain icons, such as the footprint, 
which is an imprint of a foot, but also resembles it, but that others fail to do that, 
such as the pointing finger, which has no similarity with what it indicates. Cf. 
Sonesson 1989b; 1999; 2001b; 2001c. 
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gest that iconicity is recognition, that is, the identification of a category, 
and even "stimulus generalisation". Interestingly, he is quite right, from a 
Peircean point of view, in searching for a "basic sense" of iconicity be­
yond "the way we typically use the term", but he is looking in the wrong 
place: what he comes up with is both too much and too little, as we shall 
see when we attend to the notion of Firstness. Deacon (1997: 76f) then 
claims that "typical cases" such as pictures are essentially of the same 
kind: what makes pictures into icons is "the facet or stage that is the same 
for a sketch and the face it portrays". Curiously, he then refers to Peirce's 
saying that, upon closer inspection, an icon can convey further informa­
tion about its object, and quotes "the simplification in a diagram or the 
exaggeration in a cartoon" as instances of this. Although Peirce may 
really have meant something rather akin to Deacon's claim, the latter ex­
amples clearly point in the opposite direction: they show that a difference 
between the sign and its referent is needed to convey new information. 
In Peircean parlance, to put it simply (but we will later see that this 
is all too simple a manner of putting it), an icon is a sign in which the 
"thing" serving as expression in one respect or another is similar to, or 
shares properties with, another "thing", which serves as its content. In 
fact, according to Peirce, there are two further requirements: not only 
should the relation connecting the two "things" exist independently of 
the sign relation, just as in the case of the index, but, in addition, the 
properties of the two "things" should inhere in them independently.36 
"b We are of course not concerned with pictorial representations of persons or 
events derived from the sacred history of Christianity, often used as an aid to de­
votion. Icons in the religious sense are not particularly good instances of icons in 
the semiotical sense, for they are, as Uspenskij (1976) has shown, subject to sev­
eral conventions determining the kind of perspective which may be employed, and 
the kind of things and persons which may be represented in different parts of the 
picture. It may be less clear that the term is not to be used to refer to all things 
visible, or to everything whose elements are graphically disposed, as in the jargon 
of computer programming, or in cognitive psychology (e.g. Kolers 1977). Con­
trary to the latter usage, iconic signs may occur in all sense modalities, e.g. in the 
auditive modality, notably in verbal language (not only onomatopoetic words, but 
also in the form of such regularities and symmetries which Jakobson 1965a, b 
terms "the poetry of grammar") and music (cf. Osmond-Smith 1972), and not all 
visual signs are iconic in the semiotic sense; indeed, many icons found in com­
puter programs are actually aniconic visual signs. Curiously, many semioticians 
also tend to confuse these two quite different senses attributed to the term "ico­
nicity": thus still in Eco 1999: 100, in spite of admitting his error in Eco 1998: 10; 
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Contrary to what is suggested by Groupe ji's (1992) quotation from 
Dubois' dictionary, iconicity, in the Peircean sense, is thus not limited 
to a resemblance with the external world ("avec la réalité extérieure'). 
When conceiving iconicity as engendering a "referential illusion" and as 
forming a stage in the generation of "figurative" meaning out of the 
abstract base structure, Greimas and Courtés (1979: 148, 177) similarly 
identify iconicity with perceptual appearance. In fact, however, not only 
is iconicity not particularly concerned with "optical illusion" or "realis­
tic rendering", but it does not necessarily involve perceptual predicates: 
many of Peirce's examples have to do with mathematical formulae, and 
even the fact of being American, as in the Franklin and Rumford exam­
ple, is not really perceptual, even though some of its manifestations may 
be (cf. Sonesson 1989a: 204ff; 1996; 1998a; 2000a; 2001b; 2001c). It is 
also common to confound iconicity and picturehood, when in actual 
fact, if we rely on Peirce's definition, pictures constitute only one vari­
ety of iconicity and are not even supposed to form the best instances of 
it. Something additional in necessary to account for the pictorality of 
pictures, as I have shown elsewhere (cf. Sonesson 1989a; 1989b; 2001c; 
2003; 2004; in press a, b, c). Contrary to what Deacon (1997: 72) seems 
to imply, the signs of ASL, just like those of Blissymbolics and some 
kinds of gesture, which I have discussed in another context (cf. Sones­
son 2001b), may well rely in part on an abstract type of iconicity which 
is distinct from depiction. 
During the second half of the last century, the claim that there can be 
no iconic signs came from two rather different quarters. Philosophers 
like Bierman (1963) and Goodman (1968; 1970), only the first of whom 
explicitly refers to Peirce, started out from logical considerations, to­
gether with a set of proto-ethnological anecdotes, according to which 
so-called primitive tribes were incapable of interpreting pictures; out­
right semioticians such as Eco and Lindekens, on the other hand, 
wanted to show that pictures conformed to the ideal of the perfect sign, 
as announced by Saussure, by being as arbitrary or conventional as the 
sign studied by the "most advanced" of the semiotic sciences, general 
linguistics. Since then, the question has largely gone out of fashion, but 
the results of those disquisitions have, rather undeservedly, been taken 
for granted by later researchers. In my own work on iconicity, which 
dates from the period of low tide in the debate (Sonesson 1989a; 1992a; 
1999: 340. For further details of this analysis of iconicitv, see, notably, Sonesson 
1989a; 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1996; 1998a; 2000a; 2001b; 2001c. 
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1992b; 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1996; 1998a; 2000a). I have quoted evi­
dence from psychology and ethnology that tends to show that that con­
clusion is unfeasible. More importantly, however, I have also suggested 
that the arguments against iconicity were mistaken, mainly because they 
construed language and pictures, as well as the world of our experience, 
i.e. the Lifeworld, in a fashion which is incompatible with our empirical 
knowledge, i.e. with that which we have good reasons to believe to be 
true about the world. 
If iconicity is part of a (ternary) structure, then it cannot be discussed 
outside the framework of Peirce's division of signs into icons, indices, 
and symbols.37 Within philosophy, many divisions of signs have pre­
ceded the one proposed by Peirce, ending up with two, or four, or more 
categories. In some ways, these divisions may be more justified than the 
Peircean one. However, quite apart form Deacon's reference to Peirce, 
there are two reasons for taking our point of departure in the Peircean 
canon: first, it is within these frames that most of the discussion has 
been conducted; and secondly, when we look beyond those elements 
which have usually been addressed in the discussion within semiotics, 
we will find that Peirce's theory offers some help for developing a more 
subtle approach to iconicity. Even though we may not find the Peircean 
categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness particularly useful 
for the understanding of the Lifeworld, they are important for grasping the 
differences between his sign types. Indeed, one should never forget that 
icons manifest Firstness, indices Secondness, and symbols Thirdness. 
Many semioticians, in particular those who deny the existence of 
iconic signs, apparently believe pictures to be typical instances of this 
category. There are several reasons to think that this was not Peirce's 
view. Pure icons, he states (1.157), only appear in thinking, if ever. Ac­
cording to Peirce's conception, a painting is in fact largely conventional, 
or "symbolic". Indeed, it is only for a fleeting instant, "when we lose con­
sciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy", 
that a painting may appear to be a pure icon (3.362; cf. Sonesson 1989a, 
III-1). It will be noted, then, that a pure icon is thus not a sign, in the sense 
The Peircean use of the term "symbol" is of course problematic, since it con­
trasts with another sense, more common in the European tradition, and which is 
found for instance in the work of Saussure, where it is a particular kind of icon. 
However, it appears that "conventional sign" is not an adequate term for what 
Peirce means by "symbol", which may involve "law-like" relationships of other 
kinds (perhaps those which are observed to obtain). 
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of the semiotic function discussed above (although Peirce will sometimes 
state the contrary). At first, it may seem that although the icon is not a 
socially instituted sign, i.e. not something which is accepted by a commu­
nity of sign uses, it could at least, for a short time span, become a sign to a 
single observer. But even this is contrary to the very conditions described 
by Peirce: he specifically refers to the case in which the sign loses its sign 
character, when it is not seen as a sign but is confused with reality itself 
(which could actually happen when looking at a picture through a key 
hole with a single eye, producing what Husserl dismisses as a "Jahr-
makteffekte"), when, as Piaget would have said, there is no differentiation 
between expression and content (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.2.5; 1992b). 
Indeed, it would seem that, at least sometimes, the pure icon is taken 
to be something even less substantial: an impression of reality, which 
does not necessarily correspond to anything in the real world, for "it af­
fords no assurance that there is any such thing in nature" (4.447). Thus, it 
seems to be very close to the "phaneron", the unit of Peircean phenome­
nology (itself close to the Husserlean "noema"), which is anything ap­
pearing to the mind, irrespective of its reality status (cf. Johansen 1993: 
94ff). In this sense, the Peircean icon is somewhat similar to that of cog­
nitive psychology, for it involves "sensible objects" (4.447), not signs in 
any precise sense: however, it comprises all sense modalities. 
Now it may seem that iconicity, characterised in this way, corre­
sponds rather well to Deacon's (1997: 74ff) description of not making a 
distinction, of "just more tree", "bark, bark, bark..." or "stuff, stuff, 
stuff...". The most obvious objection to this is that there does not ap­
pear to be any difficulty in thinking any of these things (even if the bird 
may not think it, in our sense of thinking), as Peirce suggests should be 
the case with a pure icon. More importantly, however, these are all rela­
tional statements, and whatever else Firstness means, it certainly con­
veys up a world (or, more exactly, a view of the world) deprived of all 
relations. The contradiction becomes even more patent, when Deacon 
(1997: 77ff, 300f) identifies iconicity with recognition and category 
membership, both of which suppose relations, as much no doubt as 
"compound iconic analysis" (my italics). This is the sense in which 
Deacon's interpretation of iconicity allows too much. But it is also too 
little: the iconic sign is a bundle of relations. 
To go from the concept of iconicity to the iconic sign, we have to 
ponder the meaning of a notion, sporadically, but often significantly, 
used by Peirce, i.e. the notion of ground. As applied to signs, I will here 
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suppose, iconicity is one of the three relationships in which a represen-
tamen (expression) may stand to its object (content or referent) and 
which can be taken as the "ground" for their forming a sign : more 
precisely, it is the first kind of these relationships, termed Firstness, "the 
idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything else" (5.66), as 
it applies to the relation in question. In one of his well-known defini­
tions of the sign, a term which he here, as so often, uses to mean the 
sign-vehicle, Peirce (2.228) describes it as something which "stands for 
that object not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I 
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen" (Fig. 1). 
According to one of Peirce commentators, Greenlee (1973: 64), the 
ground is that aspect of the referent, which is referred to by the expres­
sion, for instance, the direction of the wind, which is the only property 
of the referential object "the wind" of which the weathercock informs 
us. On the other hand, Savan (1976: 10) considers the ground to consist 
of the features picked out from the thing serving as expression, which, 
to extend Greenlee's example, would include those properties of the 
weathercock permitting it to react to the wind, but not, for instance, its 
having the characteristic shape of a cock made out of iron and placed on 
a church steeple. It seems to me that, in order to make sense of Peirce 
theory, we must admit that both Greenlee and Savan are right: the 
ground involves both expression and content. Rather than being simply 
a "potential sign-vehicle" (Bruss 1978: 87), the ground would then be a 
potential sign. Such an interpretation seems to be born out by Peirce's 
claim that the concept of "ground" is indispensable, "because we cannot 
comprehend an agreement of two things, except as an agreement in 
some respect" (CP 1.551). 
It should be noted that I will be avoiding peculiarly Peircean terms in the fol­
lowing, as long as no harm is done by that procedure: I will use "expression" for 
what Peirce calls "representamen" and "content" for his "object": more precisely, 
I will roughly identify "immediate object" with "content" and "dynamical object" 
with "referent", though it might have been better to say that the "immediate ob­
ject" is what is picked out of the "dynamical object" by the ground. For the pur­
pose of this article, I will dwell as little as possible on the "interprétant", which is 
clearly also a part of meaning, though not in the simple way suggested by Ogden's 
and Richard's all too familiar triangle. In many of my earlier works, I have argued 
for a relationship between the ground and the interprétant, and Johansen (1993: 
90ff) even claims the latter was historically substituted for the former, but I now 
think the relationship cannot be that straightforward, for reasons which will par­
tially appear below. 
22 
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Thing considered as the 
expression 
Thing considered as the 
content 
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X X ground / / 
\ '/• V / у ч z / 
V v / 
V 
Semiotical or sign function 
Fig. 1. The sign as a mapping between different spaces, based on different 
principles of relevance, iconical and/or indexical ground and the sign 
function. The points are properties of the two things thus put into relation. 
The arrows are mappings between such properties. 
In another passage, Peirce himself identifies "ground" with "abstrac­
tion" exemplifying it with the blackness of two black things (CP 1.293). 
It therefore seems that the term ground must stand for those properties 
of the two things entering into the sign function by means of which they 
get connected, i.e. both some properties of the thing serving as expres­
sion and some properties of the thing serving as content. In case of the 
weathercock, for instance, which serves to indicate the direction of the 
wind, the content ground merely consists of this direction, to the exclu­
sion of all other properties of the wind, and its expression ground is only 
those properties which makes it turn in the direction of the wind, not, 
for instance, the fact of its being made of iron and resembling a cock 
(the latter is a property by means of which it enters an iconic ground, 
different from the indexical ground making it signify the wind). If so, 
the ground is really a principle of relevance, or, as a Saussurean would 
say, the "form" connecting expression and content: that which must 
necessarily be present in the expression for it to be related to a particular 
content rather than another, and vice-versa (cf. Sonesson 1989a, III. 1). 
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If the ground is a form of abstraction, as Peirce explicitly says, then 
it is a procedure for engendering types, at least in the general sense of 
ignoring some properties of things and emphasising others, for the pur­
pose of placing them into the same class of things. 9 And if it serves to 
relate two things ("two black things" for example, or "the agreement of 
two things" in general), it is a relation, and it is thus of the order of Sec­
ondness, i.e. "the conception of being relative to, the conception of re­
action with, something else" (CP 6.32). All this serves to underline the 
parallel with the principle of relevance, or pertinence, which is at the 
basis of structural linguistics, and the semiotics inspired by it (Hjelm-
slev and Prieto, notably). But we could take this idea further, adding to 
the notion of ground a more explicitly constructive aspect. To many 
structuralists (the Prague school notably), relevance is a double move­
ment, which both serves to downplay non-essential elements and to add 
others which were anticipated but not perceived: thus, it depends on the 
twin principles of "abstractive relevance" and "apperceptive supple­
mentation" embodied in Bühler's Organon model (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 
II.4.2), as well as in the Piagetean dialectic between accommodation 
and assimilation (cf. Sonesson 1988,1.3.1). Perhaps Peirce himself later 
abandoned the notion of ground because of its rather static-sounding 
character.40 Interestingly, above I was led to describe what was going 
on, as "a procedure for engendering types", as a "double movement" 
from abstractive relevance to apperceptive supplementation", and as a 
"Piagetean dialectic between accommodation and assimilation". So in 
spite of the name, it seems we are concerned with a constructive device. 
Unfortunately, Peirce never gave another name to this phenomenon. 
Perhaps we should call in "grounding" (if we had not already have had 
to pay it extra for all the tasks we have given it, as Humpty Dumpty 
would have said). 
Given these preliminaries, it might be said that an indexical ground, 
or an indexicality, involves two "things" that are apt to enter, in the 
In this sense, the model presented here (and already in Sonesson 1989a), is 
similar to that independently proposed by Groupe ц (1992: 124—156; 1995); since 
both are based on the notion of types mediating between similar predicates, except 
for the fact that Groupe ц postulates a type only on the side of content. Although 
Peirce does not specify his terms here, it seems that we are concerned with ab­
straction in both those senses which Peirce later takes great care to distinguish, the 
selection of properties ("creating predicates"), and the process of nominalisation 
("creating subjects"; cf. Stjernfelt 2001). 
40 As was suggested to me by John Michael Krois. 
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parts of expression and content ("representamen" and "object" in Peir­
cean parlance), into a semiotic relation forming an indexical sign, due to 
a set of properties which are intrinsic to the relationship between them, 
such as is the case independently of the sign relation.41 Indexicality, 
which is a ground, and therefore a relation, is thus basically different 
from iconicity, which consists of a set of two classes of properties as­
cribed to two different "things", which are taken to possess the proper­
ties in question independently, not only of the sign relation, but of each 
other, although, when considered from a particular point of view, these 
two sets of properties will appear to be identical or similar to each other. 
This is the sense in which indexicality is Secondness, and iconicity 
Firstness. As for the Peircean symbol, or generic sign, it is literally 
groundless, at least until it becomes a sign: there is nothing in the thing 
serving as expression, nor the thing serving as content which explains 
the sign relation. The principle of relevance obtaining between the two 
parts of the sign is produced merely by the sign relation, which is why it 





symbolic sign (symbol) Indexii 
Fig. 2. The relationship between principles, grounds, and signs, from the 
point of view of Peirce, as revised in the text. 
41 For the discussion of indexicality here and in the next section, see more details 
in Sonesson (1989a; 1989b; 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1995b; 1996; 1998a; 1999; 
2000a; 2001a; 2001c; 2003; in press a, b, c). 
42 I have always taken Peirce to be committed to the view that, just as indexicality 
is co-extensive with the indexical ground, using the present terminology, so sym­
bolicity is co-extensive with the symbolic ground as well as with the symbolic sign 
function. For my part, I rather tend to think that symbolicity also must be able to 
exist independently of the sign function, if it simply means something like "law-like 
relations". If Peirce thinks otherwise, this is no doubt because his sign concept is 
much broader than mine (for which see the third part of this essay). As he later rec­
ognised, it is better termed "mediation". Fig. 2 takes this difference into account, 
using a different background for the ground based on habituation and/or rules. 
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If iconicity is Firstness, but the ground is a relation, which is Second­
ness, then the only solution, it seems to me, is to admit that, contrary to 
indexicality, iconicity is not in itself a ground: it is only something 
which may be used to construct a ground. Perhaps, to use some of 
Peirce's own examples, the blackness of a blackbird, or the fact of 
Franklin being American, can be considered iconicities; when we com­
pare two black things or Franklin and Rumford from the point of view 
of their being Americans, we establish an iconic ground; but only when 
one of the black things is taken to stand for the other, or when Rumford 
is made to represent Franklin, do they become iconic signs (or hypo-
icons). Just as indexicality is conceivable, but is not a sign, until it en­
ters the sign relation, iconicity has some kind of being, but does not 
form a ground until a comparison takes place. In this sense, if indexi­
cality is a potential sign, iconicity is only a potential ground. 
Stimulus generalisation and category membership may thus very 
well be examples of iconic grounds. They are certainly not iconicities, 
nor iconic signs. And they do not exhaust the domain of iconic 
grounds.43 
As is well-known (though Deacon does not attend to it), Peirce al­
ways cross-classifies Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in the sense 
of iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity, with the manifestation of 
these same general categories as Sinsign, Qualisign, and Legisign, as 
well as their manifestation as Rheme, Dicent, and Argument. In this 
way, Peirce manages to make more subtle distinctions, but none of them 
concern the issues that involve us here. Curiously, as Fig. 2 suggests, 
the distinctions that do interest us may also be expressed as a cross-
classification of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness with itself, no 
doubt because Peirce's first trichotomy is really two different ones. 
However, this difference is hinted at in the work of Peirce, I believe, in 
oblique ways, with terms such as "genuine" or "pure" as opposed to 
"degenerate" instances of the three principles. If so, the present recon­
struction will at least contribute to make our ideas clear. 
43 After discussing indexicality, I will return to iconicity in section 1.5, where I 
will suggest that Deacon may not be so far from Peirce in his interpretation of 
iconicity after all. 
174 Göran Sonesson 
2.5. The Chinese Room mystery: 
From the indexical ground to the indexical sign 
On the face of it, Deacon's (1997: 77ff) notion of indexicality is less 
curious than the one he has about iconicity, but it is also very limited. 
He identifies indexicality with the conditioned reflex. It is a "repeated 
correlation" between two icons (in the idiosyncratic sense of catego­
ries): the smell of smoke repeated over and over again together with 
flames (index) presupposes the repetition of the phenomenon catego­
rised as smoke as well as the phenomena categorised as flames (icons). 
This is Deacon's way of absorbing Peirce's contention that all indices 
contain icons.44 Expressed in more ordinary terms, the conditioned re­
flex depends on a double stimulus generalisation. The advantage of de­
scribing perception and learning in terms of iconicity and indexicality, 
respectively, is, in Deacon's view, to present them as processes of infer­
ence and prediction. This is indeed a very Peircean way of looking at 
our experience of the ordinary world. Indexicality is very intimately 
connected with abduction, the process by means of which we conclude 
from one single instance to another. 
Numerous definitions of the index, which seem difficult to reconcile, 
are to be found in Peirce's work; and yet other interpretations are sug­
gested by the examples given by Peirce himself, and even more so, if 
we also attend to those proposed by latter-day semioticians. According 
to the paraphrase formulated above, which seems sufficiently broad to 
account for most of the examples and a fair amount of the definitions, 
an index, is a sign in which the "thing" which serves as the expression 
is, in one or other way, connected with another "thing", which serves 
as its content. Although the two objects partaking of this relation of in­
dexicality become a sign only by participating in a sign relation, the 
index relation must exist independently of the former.45 
In the second place, since there are many conceivable types of con­
nection between two things and, in particular, many ways in which they 
44 Cf. note 36. 
45 Normally, this would imply that the indexical relationship precedes the in­
dexical sign function in real time, but there are exceptions to this: some signs 
create the very contiguity, which make them indexical (for instance arrows and 
pointing index fingers). In this case, it cannot be true that indexicality is com­
pletely independent of the sign function, as Peirce claims. (Cf. discussion about 
performative indices below and in Sonesson 1989a, 1.2.5.) 
The meaning of meaning in biology and cognitive science 175 
may be entered into, it is convenient to distinguish various kinds of in­
dices (indexical signs) and indexicalities. This is not the place to enter 
into any details on the subject of indexicality, but a few varieties must 
be noted in the following (cf. also Sonesson 1989a, 1.2.5; 1989b; 1992a; 
1995b; 1999; 2001a). All indexical relations may involve either conti­
guity or factorality, that is, the relationship obtaining between the parts 
and the corresponding whole. Those indexicalities which are not as yet 
signs, being based on items which are not situated on different levels of 
directness or thematisation, or which are not clearly differentiated, may 
be described as contexts (or "pairings", in Husserl's sense). Any experi­
ence of two elements being related by proximity, conceived as a pri­
mordial perceptual fact, can be considered an actual perceptual context 
involving contiguity. An actual perceptual context involving factorality 
is any experience of something as being a part of a whole, or as being a 
whole having parts. 
When only one of the items is directly given, and the other precedes 
it in time, or follows it, we may speak of an abductive context (preten­
tion and retention, respectively). The term abduction is employed here 
in Peirce's sense, to signify a general rule or regularity that is taken for 
granted and which links one singular fact to another. All experience 
taking place in time is of this kind, for instance our expectancy, when 
seeing the wood-cutter with the axe raised over his head, that in the 
following moment, he is going to strike the piece of wood (contiguity 
pretention), and in the moment just preceding, he lifted the axe to its 
present position (contiguity retention). A case in point would also be the 
linguistic syntagm before it is completed, the foaming beer and feelings 
of refreshment, etc. Abductive contexts involving factorality would be, 
using in part some Peircean examples, the gait of the sailor, the symp­
tom as part of the disease, part and whole in a picture, a partly destroyed 
Minoan fresco, a jig-saw puzzle, a piece of torn paper (the last three 
examples combine factorality and contiguity).46 
When an indexicality has been stabilised, and objectified, into a real 
sign, it may become an abductive index, which can involve contiguity, 
as in the case of footprints, fingerprints, the cross as a sign of the cruci­
"h Although Deacon (1997: 399) at one point seems to deny the capacity of indi­
ces for representing future events (or is it only prescription?), he later (Deacon 
1997: 465f) actually appears to identify such anticipation with indexicality, as 
when the animal expects some particular behaviour on the part of another animal, 
as distinct from deducing them from a "theory of mind". 
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fied, the weather-cock (contiguity to the direction of the wind); or facto­
rality, when an anchor is used to stand for navigation, the clock to des­
ignate the watch-maker's (as part of the sum total of clocks), or a 
painting to indicate the painter's workshop. Some of Peirce's examples, 
and many of those suggested later, are however of another kind, for, 
instead of presupposing a regularity known to obtain between the 
"thing" which serves as expression of the sign, and another "thing" 
which is taken to be its content, they transform something which is con­
tiguous, or in a relation of factorality, to the expression, into the content 
of the latter. These signs may therefore be termed performative indices. 
With contiguity, they give rise to such phenomena as the pronoun 
"you", the finger pointing to an object, the weathercock (as marking the 
here-and-now of the wind), the clock of the watch-maker's (as marking 
the location of the shop); and with factorality, they may produce the 
pronouns "I", "here", "now", the finger pointing out a direction, etc.47 
If we use the term indicator to describe signs which are employed to 
single out an object or a portion of space for our particular attention, all 
indices in Peirce's sense are certainly not indicators, and those which 
are cannot sufficiently be characterised by being so classified (cf. Son­
esson 1989b: 50ff, 60f; 1995b; Goudge 1965: 65ff).48 Not all parts have 
as their primary function to point to the whole of which they are a part. 
On the other hand, real indicators, such as fingers and arrows, are 
equally contiguous to a number of objects which they do not indicate, 
for instance to the things which are at the opposite side of the arrow­
head, in the direction to which it does not point (Sonesson 1989a: 47; 
1995b). Therefore, something beyond mere indexicality is required, in 
the case of the arrow, for instance, the forward thrust of the arrow-head 
as imagined in water, or the sentiment of its slipping from our hands, as 
Thorn (1973) has suggested. 
To term certain signs "indicators" is, obviously, to make a categori­
sation of signs on the basis of their functions, as seen in relationship to 
47 It is also possible to identify secondary indexical signs, including rhetorical 
figures known as synecdoches and metonymies. Cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.2.5 and 
1999. 
48 As pointed out in Sonesson (1995b), there is even a vague sense of "indicator" 
in which the latter does not have to be an index. As Deacon (1997: 362) observes, 
pointing is more or less the only universal gesture remaining in human beings, so 
perhaps it is the ancestor of indicators as well as indices — nota bene of indices, 
not of indexicality, because it is clearly a sign — and this applies to both "im­
perative" and "declarative pointing" in the sense of Bates (cf. Brinck 2004). 
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the over-all scenes in which signs are produced. We should not expect 
this categorisation to coincide with the one stemming from Peirce s 
classification, which depends on the nature of the relationship between 
the expression and the referent or content of the sign. Of course, from 
this point of view, the term "index" is a misnomer, for although the fin­
ger so termed may function as an index, its specific function goes be­
yond that. 
If indexical signs are as complex as this, it is obvious that they can­
not be identified with conditioned reflexes, as Deacon suggests. But 
even the indexical ground goes well beyond the conditioned reflex. In 
fact, there is no necessity for the perceptual context to be repeated over 
and over again for us to interpret it indexically. One instance of a per­
ceived contiguity or factorality may be sufficient to establish the corre­
sponding indexical relation. And a long series of cases in which the ex­
pected contiguity or factorality does not obtain, does not necessarily 
lead to "extinction", contrary to Deacon's (1997: 82) claim. In fact our 
anticipation of rain when seeing dark clouds, or, to pick Deacon's own 
example, of fire when we perceive smoke, is so entrenched a semantical 
relation that it will not be abolished simply because it cannot always be 
realised in the world of our experience. 
On the other hand, not only is the conditioned reflex an instance of 
the indexical ground, but so is the unconditioned reflex, whether it is 
innate or not. In fact, the unconditioned reflex is a pattern of behaviour, 
which is released, in the temporal and/or spatial contiguity of a particu­
lar feature of the experimental world (that is, the Umwelt). Thus, an in­
dexical ground is formed not only between the sound sequence "food", 
and the edible substances that a rat may be conditioned to associate with 
it in the Skinner box, but also between these same substances, and the 
smell, colour, or other properties which the animal would use in real 
world circumstances as an identifying clue of the food. It could even be 
said that, while the unconditioned reflex depend on an abductive context 
(known regularity), the conditioned reflex is the result of a performative 
4' As Stjernfelt (2001) points out, the conditioned reflex is already symbolic in 
Peirce's sense, no doubt because it supposes a regularity. But this only makes 
sense if Peirce is taken to be talking about mediation, not signs, according to the 
way these terms are interpreted here. See III below. 
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context (posited regularity).50 However, from the point of view of the 
animal, this apparently amounts to the same. 
However, it does not follow that "the association between the word 
and what it represents is not essentially distinguished from the kind of 
association that is made by an animal in a Skinner box" (Deacon 1997: 
80). In particular, words like "there", "Aha!" and "George Washing­
ton", to quote Deacon's examples, and "shifters" in general, function 
very differently from conditioned reflexes. Indeed, just like the tracks 
interpreted by the hunter, which we opposed to the branch of the tree, 
when discussing the semiotic function, words which "derive reference 
by being uniquely linked to individual contexts", can only function as 
such if, at the same time as they are indexically connected to their con­
text, they are clearly differentiated from it. If not, we would have no use 
for the real George Washington, once we knew his name. Indeed, Dea­
con's (1997: 82) reference to the fable of the Boy Who Cried Wolf is 
misleading: if we knew for other reasons that the boy was a confirmed 
liar, or that he was obsessed with wolves, we would not even from the 
beginning have expected a contiguity between his use of the word 
"wolf' and real-world wolves. However, if the conviction is sufficiently 
strong, no reality will ever be able to produce "extinction", as we have 
recently seen in the case of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction expected 
by the American leadership. 
An excellent example of the difference between indices and indexi­
calities is the employment of warlike behaviour as a part of the Yano-
mamö peace ritual quoted by Deacon (1997: 403ff): if the participants 
had not made any difference between indexical signs and indexicalities 
(notably conditioned reflexes), the result would have been war, not 
peace. Perhaps this is also what Deacon wants to suggest, but he does so 
with a stereotypical, meaningless, formula, when he explains ritual from 
the fact of symbols having "a higher meaning" (Deacon 1997: 40If). 
Of course, Deacon (1997: 83; cf. 301) knows that there is a differ­
ence: he suggests that "indexical power is distributed, so to speak, in the 
relationship between words". This is reminiscent of the binary 
reanalysis of the Peircean trichotomy, suggested by Jakobson (1979: 16) 
long ago, which, much to the displeasure of orthodox Peirceans, com­
bines contiguity and similarity with actual and imputed connection. Ac­
50 In the case of an innate releasing mechanism, there is no prior experience of 
contiguity, but only a contiguity in the situation of release, so the term abductive 
context seems inappropriate. 
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cording to this analysis, icons rely on actual similarity, indices on actual 
contiguity, and symbols on imputed contiguity. There remains a fourth 
category, based on imputed similarity, which in Jakobson's view, corre­
sponds to the poetic function. In other contexts, I have pointed out sev­
eral problematic features of this analysis (cf. Sonesson 1989a: 213f). 
Here, I will only note one of these: it is not clear where the imputed 
contiguity of symbols is to be located. If Jakobson wanted to refer to the 
contiguity of expression and content in the mind (which seems the only 
reasonable interpretation), then of course the same contiguity must also 
obtain for icons and indices. Contrary to Jakobson, Deacon would ap­
parently accept such a consequence. It also appears more reasonable 
within the framework of Deacon's theory: the contiguity that he talks 
about is a contiguity of learning the signs. In our terms, this means that 
icons, indices and symbols, as opposed to the corresponding grounds, 
must be learnt in relation to other signs, not in relation to the non-
semiotic world. At least, this is how Deacon would have seen it, had he 
used our terminology. This will be clarified when we turn to the sys­
temic nature of symbolic signification. 
Before going on to discuss system character, however, I would like 
to point to a passage in which Deacon's vague and/or ambiguous con­
cept of indexicality breaks down. It is in his discussion of the Williams 
syndrome, which he interprets as an incapacity to use index relations, 
coupled with a hypertrophy of symbolicity, resulting from a reduction 
of the posterior cerebral cortex and an exaggeration of the cerebellar 
size (cf. Deacon 1997: 268ff). Victims of this syndrome are verbally 
highly fluent, and adept at storytelling and the recital of verbal informa­
tion, but have major cognitive deficits. It is, according to Deacon, as if 
they had ready access to lexical entries, that is, to the relationships be­
tween signs, as found in a thesaurus, but lacked all contact with reality, 
that is, the objects in the real world, to which the words refer. Thus, they 
get lost in symbolicity. 
Here, Deacon really seems to identify indexicality with the link be­
tween the sign and the object in the real world, whereas symbolicity 
apparently characterises the internal structure of language, where words 
only point to other signs (an authentically Saussurean vision, as we shall 
see). This is, as we have already seen, a very reductionist view of in­
dexicality, but it also seems to be in contradiction with what Deacon has 
said about the same notion earlier, on several levels. First, as an expres­
sion having reference (an indicator, notably), an index is certainly a 
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sign, in which expression and content are differentiated (as in the verbal 
examples discussed above). It cannot be identified with "conditioned 
reflexes".51 Therefore, the patient may well have lost something more 
than mere indexicality. In the second place, if indexicality as such is 
unavailable, it seems that this must give rise to deficiencies on even 
more elementary levels. Third, it should produce problems also for the 
symbolic capacity, since the latter is described as a transposition of in­
dexicality to the relations between signs, rather than between sign and 
reality (cf. Deacon 1997: 301). It is true that Deacon (1997: 302) talks 
about a "symbolic recoding", but the latter appears to consist precisely 
in the displacement of indexicality into the internal domain of language. 
This brings us, in conclusion, to Deacon's (1997: 444ff) interpreta­
tion of Searle's exemplum of the Chinese Room: the man inside the 
room who, when he is given a message with a number of Chinese char­
acters, responds by handing back another set of Chinese characters, 
which he takes out of a book where they are arranged as pairs, thus 
giving the false impression of understanding Chinese. According to 
Deacon, this highlights the difference between indexical and symbolic 
interpretation. The Chinese Room may certainly remind us of the Skin­
ner box. Both, no doubt, are instances of the Black Box: we have no 
information of what is going on inside. That is, the exemplum supposes 
us not to have any information about what is going on in the room, but 
of course Searle has given it all away. As such, the Chinese Room does 
not only obliterate the difference between "symbols" and "indices", but 
equally that between the latter and mere indexicalities. If the man is 
really following Searle's instructions, then he is manipulating indexical 
signs: he is exchanging one token for another, because they are contigu­
ous in the manual, as stated in the rules. But just as would a real Chi­
nese, the Searlean man is producing the same facts on the ground as 
could a simple computer and perhaps some variety of the Skinnerean 
rat. From the outside of the Chinese room, we would not only be unable 
to tell the symbol from and index, but also to distinguish an index from 
a mere indexicality. 
So far, I have tried to show that the nature of the link between two 
objects that may serve as the expression and content, respectively, of a 
sign, must be distinguished from the existence of a semiotic function 
relating these objects. Iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity only de­
51 Nor does this seem to me to be a plausible interpretation of the purported in­
dexicality of function words and the like (cf. Deacon 1997: 299). 
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scribe that which connects the two objects; it does not tell us whether 
the result is a sign or not.52 The advantage of this analysis is not only 
theoretical clarity. It also allows us to formulate a series of questions, 
which could not have been conceived previously. It allows us to sepa­
rate the study of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic emergence of iconic-
ity, indexicality and symbolicity from that of the corresponding signs. 
However, we will now go on to suggest that the emergence of symbolic 
signs cannot itself be confounded with that of symbol systems. 
2.6. From "tone" to "type". A note on iconicity 
as generality and configuration 
It may seem that iconicity as such is not really needed in semiotic the­
ory. If so, this could be the reason why Peirce points out that it is more 
or less impossible to grasp. But it is certainly indirectly needed. Even if 
iconicity only gains any real existence as an iconic ground, and thus as a 
relation, the ways in which iconicity and indexicality inhere in relations 
are different (cf. Fig. 2). Whereas both iconic and indexical grounds 
require a relation to function, the indexical ground is "about" this rela­
tion (its contiguity, its factorality, etc.), but the iconic ground is "about" 
the object at the other end of the relation. This is no doubt what Peirce 
wants to say when he claims that the items forming the icon are inde­
pendent of each other, not only of the sign relation, as is the case of the 
index. If you think of the portrait painter trying to create the closest pos­
sible likeness to his model a literal interpretation of independence im­
mediately becomes absurd — for, in this sense, the portrait can never be 
independent of its model (cf. Sonesson 2000a). 
However, it is possible that "pure iconicity" has a more direct part to 
play, if not in Peirce's conception, then at least in Deacon's theory. An­
other of the manifestations of the Peircean trichotomy is the distinction 
between "qualisign", "signsign", and "legisign", sometimes also de­
scribed with the terms "tone", "token", and "type". The opposition be­
tween token and type is straightforward (e.g. the letter "t" which as a 
Of course, Peirce would have said that symbolicity does predict the sign char­
acter. I find this problematic, because if symbolicity describes the "general law" 
which is motivated by neither similarity nor contiguity, then it clearly exists inde­
pendently of the sign function. There are many rules that are not sign functions. 
This is true, for instance, of etiquette and the rules of chess. 
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type only manifests itself once in the sentence "The opposition between 
token and type is straightforward", although there are 7 corresponding 
tokens in the sentence), but it is more difficult to make sense of the no­
tion of "tone".53 Contrary to the token, which is an individual instance, 
the tone seems to share some kind of generality with the type. But it is a 
kind of immediate impression of generality, not the organised, system­
atic kind found in the type. It is blackness, but not the category of 
blackness. It is certainly not recognition. It may be "black again", with­
out "again" being part of the thought. 
At least Deacon seems to be on to something like this, although this 
is really only borne out by his admission, in the section of suggested 
readings, that he has been influenced by "the classic text on Symbol 
Formation by Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan (1963)" (cf. Deacon 
1997: 486). Now this is a text of Gestalt psychology, or, more properly 
speaking, Ganzheitspsychologie, but it is not, as far as I understand, 
much indebted to the well-known Berlin school (with such names as 
Köhler, Wertheimer, Koffka, Arnheim, etc.), but rather to the Leipzig 
school, represented, notably, by Krueger, Sander and Volkelt (cf. Son­
esson 1989a, 1.3.4.). This latter school insisted on the fact that there are 
wholes present in our experience which are not properly speaking 
Gestalten, that is, not typical configurations standing out from a back­
ground which are internally articulated (i.e. which have parts which 
may in due course be separated). Such non-configurational holistic 
properties are externally and internally diffuse (i.e. neither their parts 
nor their limits to other wholes is easy to distinguish), but they may yet 
be transposed from one context to another. Some properties of this kind 
are "closure" and "angularity". Another case in point is the child being 
unable to count who still has the experience of something being "a lot" 
or "a little". In none of these cases does the experience of sameness re­
quire the perception of category identity. 
Elsewhere, I have suggested a double distinction between the 
meanings of meaning (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.3.4 and 1.4.2.): on the one 
hand, structure is opposed to configuration (including non-configura-
tional wholes), and on the other hand, there is a distinction between 
categories and signs. While structural wholes result from the mutual 
It is of course no accident that Peirce talks about "qualisigns", which is a term 
remiscent of the contemporary discussion of "qualia" (e.g. in Edelman, Tonini 
2000). No doubt the philosophical antecedents are the same. However, Peirce is 
nowhere really preoccupied about how it feels to be conscious. 
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relations between their components, including negative ones, a holistic 
whole is primarily a delimitation created in the field of perception, a 
setting up of borders, from which an inner differentiation may later en­
sue. Structures give rise to categories. But to reach the sign, we need the 
interrelation of two categories on different levels. 
Human language is clearly both categorical and structural. That is 
also what Deacon thinks. But without pausing to consider, he attributes 
these properties to symbols in general. 
2.7. The house that Saussure built. 
From symbols to symbol systems 
There is a double irony to Deacon's (1997: 69ff) plea for Peircean 
semiotics, as opposed to Saussurean "semiology". Not only does he 
impute to Saussure the very conception of language the Swiss linguist 
was out to criticise, but he ascribes to Peirce a conception of the symbol 
which, in a strict sense, is found nowhere is his work and which, in a 
loose sense, would really apply to all signs. Contrary to Deacon's self-
understanding, his semiotics is really Saussurean at heart. 
As anybody who has ever read a single paragraph of Saussure 
knows, his bête noire was — in the very terms that Deacons turns 
against him — the theory that words could be seen "as labels for ob­
jects, or mental images, or concepts" (ibid.). Saussure uses the same 
term ("etiquette") as Deacon to criticise this theory. He would heartily 
agree with Deacon that word meaning cannot "be modelled by an ele­
ment-by-element mapping between two 'planes' of objects." Yet this is 
exactly the reproach that Deacon addresses to Saussure. In fact, Saus­
sure (or the students who put together his Cours posthumously) may be 
responsible for the simple drawing of a circle divided into two halves, 
the signifier and the signified, but he also observed that such a concep­
tion was a gross oversimplification, because what really creates mean­
ing in language is what he called "values", that is, the relations between 
signs, within an edifice where no tenns are positive, and everything de­
pends on everything else. Indeed, Deacon (1997: 70) sounds properly 
Saussurean when he says that "the correspondence between words and 
objects is a secondary relationship, subordinate to a web of associative 
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relationships of a quite different sort, which even allows us reference to 
impossible things".54 
In contrast, Peirce claimed no such thing. When Deacon (1997: 96ff) 
says that symbols do not form "one-to-one associations" but "many-to-
one-associations" and "one-to-many-associations", Saussure would 
certainly agree. This is the very meaning of "structuralism", the linguis­
tic tradition that Saussure is supposed to have initiated. Peirce, however, 
never discusses this issue. It is true that Peirce maintains that the three 
parts of the sign may themselves be made up of signs, that is, that the 
representamen, the object, and the interprétant can be dissolved into 
new signs, which themselves are made up of signs, and so on indefi­
nitely. But nowhere does he tell us that such chains of signs are not 
linked by "one-to-one-associations". More crucially, he does not main­
tain that this model applies only to symbols, let alone linguistic signs. 
As far as can be gathered from the Peircean canon, the model applies 
equally well to icons and indices.55 Indeed, it is the Saussurean tradition, 
rather than the Peircean one, which has permitted Eco to oppose the 
thesaurus model of meaning to the dictionary model. But even in Eco's 
version, the model applies to all kinds of signs. 
In the light of this close correspondence between Saussure's and 
Deacon's conception of language, it is not surprising that when defining 
a concept of language which goes beyond the linguistic system, they 
independently come up with the same examples, such as games, norms 
of etiquette, and ceremonies. In these cases, the system character of the 
signs seems to be fundamental to their meaning. But it is not true that 
this system character translates to all signs, nor to all symbols in the 
Peircean sense. Indeed, this has always been a problem for Saussurean 
"semiology", as practised by such French structuralists as Barthes. 
The description of system character of language is later rephrased by 
Deacon (1997: 83ff) as "possibilities of combination". Commenting on 
the Rumbaugh experiments with chimpanzees, Deacon points to the 
difficulty of teaching somebody the impossibility of certain combina­
tions. Language has a great number of combinatorial possibilities, but 
how is a poor ape to learn that "banana juice give" is not one of them? It 
is impossible to train what is not to be done. Therefore, in order to be 
54 The latter is a point also made by Bouissac (2000) and Stjernfelt (2000). 
3" Perhaps there is some justification for Deacon's view, for after all there is a 
famous quotation from Peirce, according to which '"symbols grow". But this con­
ception is nowhere elaborated. 
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able to use a system, one must at some point recode indexical relations 
as symbolic ones. There is what Deacon (1997: 92, 95) calls "a sym­
bolic threshold", where the individual gains an insight permitting the 
reorganisation of the whole system. 
Deacon's combinatorial possibilities are reminiscent of the two as­
pects of the language system, described by Saussure, and later termed 
the syntagm and the paradigm by Hjelmslev. The syntagm is the set of 
signs appearing after each other in a combination of signs. The para­
digm is the set of signs that may be substituted for each other at the 
same place in the syntagm. It is possible to generalise these terms, so 
that the syntagm is any set of signs appearing together, regardless of 
temporal and spatial relationships, whereas the paradigm consists of all 
signs that can be substituted for each other. Thus, the syntagm is made 
up of conjunctions, and the paradigm of disjunctions. Such a model ap­
plies very well to language and to games such as chess, as well as to 
restaurant menus and clothing, as Barthes has shown. However, as I 
have demonstrated elsewhere (cf. Sonesson 1992a, b), pictures as such 
do not have any paradigms and syntagms, although depicted objects 
(such as clothing) may be organised in that way, as may pictorial styles 
(the variety of colours permitted, different kinds of perspectives in dif­
ferent parts of the painting, as in Russian icons, cf. Uspenskij 1976; 
etc.). There are, however, other kinds of visual signs, which are not 
properly speaking pictures, which could be said to contain paradigms 
and syntagms, or at least the former: naval flag codes, graphic signs for 
washing instructions (such as those current in Sweden), traffic signs, 
etc. On the other hand, while complete gesture systems such as ASL 
certainly have syntagms and paradigms (which is why contemporary 
linguists insist on calling them "languages"), that is hardly true about 
many other kinds of gestures, for instance, emblems such a the V-sign. 
It might be supposed that all sign systems have syntagms and para­
digms. We have seen that some kinds of semiotic resources, in which 
iconic relationships are dominant, such as pictures, do not have system 
character in this sense. However, it does not follow that, as Deacon 
(1997: 100) maintains, "there can be no symbolisation without system­
atic relationships". If symbolicity is to be defined, as in Peirce concep­
tion, by the lack of both iconic and indexical motivation, then this does 
In fact, perhaps only paradigms are required. At least on the level of complete 
units, traffic signs do not allow for any (or only a few) combinations, although 
they certainly offer a series of choices (cf. Posner 1989 and Sonesson 1998b) 
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not imply anything about the system character of the signs. It is of 
course conceivable that there is some kind of "universal" which says 
that all signs that are constituted by means of symbolic relations are also 
organised into systems. It may even seem reasonable to argue this point: 
if signs are not held together either by iconicity or by indexicality, they 
may need to form part of a system in order not to loose their meaning. 
Or the other way round: if they are held together by a system, they do 
not need iconicity or indexicality. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to show that this is not the case: if I decide 
with a friend that each time I have a particular shirt on, I want him to 
drive me home after the seminar, then this is a clear instance of a Peir­
cean symbol. And yet, if we have not decided that not having this par­
ticular shirt on means the opposite, then there will not even be a mini­
mal system. A lot of real world symbols are like that. If my example 
seems contrived, then this is not the case with the white walking stick 
used by blind people in some countries. Somebody not using a white 
walking stick does not convey the message "I am not blind", so there is 
not even a minimal system. On the other hand, the absence of a flag on 
the admiral ship does signify that the admiral in not onboard (cf. Prieto 
1966: 43ff). The latter thus constitutes a minimal system, but its very 
minimality puts it on a level rather far from what Deacon is thinking 
about. 
It should be clear by now that Deacon does not, in fact, have any use 
at all for Peirce's terminology. The system character of language, 
around which everything turns in the end, is not anything that is relevant 
to Peirce. The real criteria that define iconicity, indexicality and sym­
bolicity are not interesting to Deacon. 
On the other hand, I think that it is interesting for us to bring to­
gether the topics taken up by Deacon and the issues considered by 
Peirce. If symbolicity and systematicity are independent variables, then 
there is a series of empirical questions that may be formulated about 
them. If all symbols do not form part of sign systems, then is it at least 
true that all sign systems are made up of symbols? Perhaps semiotic 
resources of the kind in which iconic and/or indexical grounds dominate 
do not form sign systems. Then there is the historical issue: do we per­
haps need to learn symbols first in the context of sign systems, before 
we can use them independently, unlike what happens with icons and 
indices? These are all empirical questions, which should be possible to 
investigate. 
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Perhaps a new meaning could be given to the idea often expressed 
by the Tartu school, which has maintained that verbal language is pri­
mary in relation to the "secondary modelling systems", if the latter do­
main, since it involves systems, is restricted to symbols. In that case, 
language learning would really be a "semiotic threshold", which is im­
portant not only as such, but also for the new possibilities it opens up. 
3. The case for relevance. Beyond the Peircean Umwelt 
The following section has multiple goals. In the first place, I want to 
consider the "semiotic turn" in a part of biology that is not associated 
with cognitive science: biosemiotics, as first introduced by Hoffmeyer 
and Emmeche. In the second place, I will take into account a second 
interpretation of Peirce, which figures prominently in biosemiotics (but 
not only there), and which contrasts with my own interpretation in using 
the term "sign" in a very broad way. I will show that this interpretation 
leads to quite another conception of meaning, different from the sign, 
which is best paraphrased by such terms as relevance, filtering, and or­
ganisation. However, I will not abandon Deacon: on the contrary, at the 
end of the section, we will return to him with a vengeance. For it will be 
suggested that such concepts of meaning as are neglected or conflated 
with the sign in Deacon's work, and which we have introduced as ico­
nicity (as opposed to the icon) and indexicality (as opposed to the index) 
are foreshadowed in this broader notion of meaning. 
3.1. Reading Peirce hermeneutically: 
the process of interpretation 
In all the earlier discussion, my point of departure has been an interpre­
tation of Peirce, which I have found necessary to develop in order to 
defend the possibility of there being iconic signs, against such critics as 
Bierman and Goodman, who oppose to it the so-called arguments of 
symmetry and regression. The former argument says that, since similar­
ity is symmetrical, it cannot explain the sign relation, which is asym­
metrical; and the latter says that since all things in the world are similar 
to others in some respects (notably in relation to general categories such 
as "animate being", etc.), everything in the world could be a sign of 
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everything else. Basically, those arguments can be countered by arguing 
that, apart from being iconic, an iconic sign must also manifest the se­
miotic function. 
I still believe that this conception must correspond to something that 
Peirce was sometimes thinking about. There is, as we have seen, ample 
justification for some parts of this interpretation in the Peircean canon. 
In any case, this interpretation is needed in order to defend the theory 
against some arguments that have been formulated against it. And yet I 
think there is another theory in Peirce's work, which is not incompatible 
with the former, but which is considerably more general. It is concerned 
with interpretation in a more generic sense. Perhaps this is what Peirce 
was thinking about when, at a later stage, he discovered that his notions 
were too narrow, and that, instead of referring to signs, he should be 
talking about mediation or "branching". 
In a sense, this theory is about the situation of communication, but it 
is more akin to what we now would describe as a hermeneutical model 
than to the model known from the theory of information. In this sense, 
"a sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an 
utterer of it and interpreter of it, both being repositories of thought, or 
quasi-minds, by conveying a meaning from the former to the latter" 
(MS 318).5' In some passages, the object is not described a that which 
the sign is about, that is, to which it refers, in the sense in which this 
term is used in linguistic philosophy: instead, it is that which incites 
somebody to produce a sign (which may or may not coincide with the 
referent). It is in this sense that the object is Secondness: it concerns the 
relation between the reality perceived and the expression produced. 
Similarly, the interprétant must be seen as the result of the receiver tak­
ing in the whole event of the utterer creating an expression starting out 
from some feature of his experience. Because it refers to the relation 
between the utterer and that which he reacts to, it is more than an ele­
mentary relation, it is Thirdness. Indeed, this idea is very well illustrated 
by the notion of "branching" which Peirce used to characterise his later 
concept of mediation (cf. Fig. 3). 
57 Quoted in Jappy, Tony (2000). Iconicity, Hypoiconicity. In: Quiroz, Joäo; 
Gudwin, Ricardo (eds.), The Digital Encyclopaedia of Charles S. Peirce. 
(http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/jappy/hypjap.htm). 
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Fig. 3. A reconstruction of the hermeneutical interpretation of Peirce. 
In this model, it is easier to understand that the parts of the signs are 
always also signs. On the other hand, it becomes much more compli­
cated to make sense of the notions of iconicity, indexicality and sym­
bolicity. In particular, it is not easy to see how they can be applied to the 
relation between the object and the representamen, if the latter is not, in 
some sense, the referent. Perhaps they should be understood in the sense 
of the principles, rather than the corresponding grounds, in the sense in 
which we discussed this in earlier chapters (cf. also Fig. 2.). Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness, after all, are categories of human under­
standing, meant to function in the same way as the Kantian categories, 
that is, as schemes, or, to put it more simply, as filters determining our 
experience of the real world. 
This model does nothing to justify Deacon's usage of the Peircean 
terminology, because it is too general to have anything to say about the 
issues that interest him. However, it is useful for the purpose of under­
standing the ground zero of meaning, semiosis, which may explain why 
it has been employed within biosemiotics to explicate von Uexkûll's 
notion of meaning. 
3.2. The breed that Uexküll bred. Biosemiotics and 
the Kantian heritage 
Although the concept of sign is not clearly defined in Deacon's work, it 
certainly is a notion central to his concerns. There is, however, a domain 
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of semiotics within which meaning is addressed in a much more general 
sense: biosemiotics. In the work of Hoffmeyer, for instance, even the 
cells are said to be involved in a process of interpretation. When expo­
nents of biosemiotics such as Hoffmeyer (1997a; 1997b; 1997c; 1998) 
make use of Peircean concepts, they apparently do so in accordance 
with what we have called the second, hermeneutical reading. However, 
in order to understand what this is all about, it is more helpful to turn to 
the principal cultural hero of biosemiotics, Jakob von Uexküll. 
Uexküll's (1956; 1973) notion of meaning centres on the environ­
ment, the Umwelt, which is differently defined for each organism (Fig. 
4). As opposed to an objectively described ambient world, the Umwelt 
is characterised with respect to a given subject, in terms of the features 
which it perceives {Merkwelt) and the features which are impressed 
upon it ( Wirkwelt), which together form a functional circle {Funk­
tionskreis). According to a by now classical example, the tick hangs 
motionless on a branch of a bush until it perceives the smell of butyric 
acid emitted by the skin glands of a mammal {Merkzeichen), which 
sends a message to its legs to let go {Wirkzeichen), so that it drops onto 
the mammal's body. This starts a new cycle, because the tactile cue of 
hitting the mammal's hair incites the tick to move around in order to 
find its host's skin. Finally, a third circle is initiated when the heat of the 
mammal's skin triggers the boring response in order for the tick to drink 
the blood of its host. Together, these different circles consisting of per­
ceptual and operational cue bearers make up the interdependent wholes 
of the subject, corresponding to the organism, and the Umwelt, which is 
the world as it is defined for the subject in question. 
Fig. 4. The model of the Umwelt [functional cycle] according to Jakob 
von Uexküll (1973 [1928]: 158). 
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Quoting Thure von Uexküll, Ziemke and Sharkey maintain that this 
model 
contains all the elements which are part of a sign process, and whose interac­
tion forms the unity of a semiosis: an organism is the subject (or interpreter), 
certain environmental signals play the role of signs (or interpretanda), and the 
organism's biological condition determines the behavioural disposition (or 
interprétant). The object (interpretatum), on the other hand, can be harder to 
identify using common sign-theoretical concepts, since for the organism, e.g. 
the tick, it does not necessarily exist as an abstract entity, e.g. 'a mammal', but 
might only have temporary existence as different semiotic objects and the 
bearer of varying meanings, e.g. three different ones in the tick's case. 
(Ziemke, Sharkey 2001: 709) 
As is clear from the terminology, this conception of the "sign process" 
has little to do with Peirce, but owes a lot to Morris' behaviourist rein-
terpretation of the former. Even Peirce often uses the word "sign" in the 
sense of expression ("representamen"), but he certainly does not talk 
about the interprétant as a set of "behavioural dispositions"; however, it 
is perhaps not all too unreasonable to see the functional (or operational) 
cue bearers ( Wirkzeichen) as being some variety of interprétants. 
In any case, Ziemke and Sharkey's remark about the object is cer­
tainly judicious: that the object is, strictly speaking, nowhere to be 
found. In fact, they go on to quote an early text by von Uexküll, in 
which he says that "in the nervous system the stimulus itself does not 
really appear but its place is taken by an entirely different process" (my 
italics). Uexküll calls this a "sign", but it should be clear that is does not 
in any way fulfil the requirements of the semiotic function. Indeed, ex­
pression and content are not differentiated, already because they do not 
appear to the same consciousness. The butyric acid is there to the tick; 
the mammal is present only to us. 
If we return to our earlier reconstruction of the Peircean sign process 
as a hermeneutic act (Fig. 3), we will discover that what is lacking is 
real Thirdness: the reaction to the primary reaction, that is, the reaction 
which does not respond to a simple fact (Firstness), but to something 
which is already a reaction, and thus a relation (Secondness). Without 
having to enter into the earlier discussion of differentiation, we see that, 
from a strictly Peircean point of view, there is no Thirdness for the tick: 
As we shall see, the object is there, in a way, both as "immediate object" (the 
cues) and as "dynamical object" (the mammal). 
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it does not respond to any relationship, since it is not aware (even in the 
most liberal sense of the term) of any second item (the mammal) to 
which the first item (the butyric acid) stands in a relation. 
In fact, things are even more complicated. In a true sign relation, the 
mammal is not really the object, in the Peircean sense, for which the 
butyric acid is the representamen. Or, to be more precise, it is not the 
"dynamical object". At the very most, it is the "immediate object". It 
will be remembered that while the "immediate object" is that which 
directly induces the sign process, the "dynamical object" is something 
much more comprehensive, which includes all those things which may 
be known about the same object, although most of them are not present 
in the act of inducing. Indeed, the dynamical object is that which corre­
sponds to the potentially infinite series of different interprétants result­
ing from the same original immediate object (cf. Fig. 5). It should be 
clear that, for the tick and similar beings, there can be no distinction 
between direct and dynamical object, because there is no room for any 
further development of the chain of interprétants. In this sense, Dea­
con's idiosyncratic reading of Peirce, according to which only signs 
such as those found in human language (his "symbols") give rise to 
chains of interprétants seem to have some justification — in reality, if 
not in Peircean theory. 
We here enter a quite different, obviously Kantian domain: the 
mammal has become, to the tick, das Ding an sich, of which it can have 
no real knowledge. In a way, however, we are on familiar ground. It 
will be remembered that the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness were designed by Peirce to occupy the position of the Kantian 
categories, that is the forms in which the world is given to us. More 
relevant, in the present context, however, is the presence of a concept of 
meaning within the Peircean sign concept that is similar to that of von 
Uexküll: the notion of ground. As I have pointed out elsewhere (and as 
Soren Brier 2001 has independently noted) the ground accounts for the 
difference, among other things, between the immediate and the dynami­
cal objects. The butyric acid, the hairiness, and the warmth form the 
immediate objects of the tick, and we would expect the mammal as such 
to be the dynamical object. The difference, however, is that there is no 
way that the tick, unlike human beings, may learn more about the dy­
namical object than that which is given in the immediate one. Therefore, 
there is strictly speaking no difference between immediate and dynami­
cal object to the tick. 
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Fig. 5. A more complete reconstruction of the hermeneutical interpretation 
of Peirce's theory. New aspects are parts of the dynamical object (just as the 
immediate object) and are the support of new interpretations, which form a 
series. 
Meaning here appears as a kind of "filter": it lets through certain aspects 
of the "real world" which, in is entirety, in unknowable, though less so 
for human beings than for ticks. Yet, as even Uexküll insists, it would 
be wrong to see the tick's world of experience as just a series of features 
extracted from reality. They are also organised into a whole. Indeed, this 
can best be expressed in terms of another Kantian philosopher, Karl 
Bühler, who talked about the principles of "abstractive relevance" and 
"apperceptive supplementation", where the first principle accounts for 
the neglect of such physical properties as are not endowed with mean­
ing, while the second one explains the projection to the meaningful ex­
perience of properties not physically present in perception (Fig. 6). In 
fact, Bühler tried to explain the same linguistic phenomena as Saussure 
and Hjelmslev described in terms of "form" as opposed to "substance": 
the fact that certain properties of a physical sound may vary a lot with­
out the units of meaning (the phoneme, the word, etc.) being changed; 
and that other properties which are not physically present may yet be 
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perceived, because they are expected in the context. It can now be seen 
that Bühler's principles of abstractive relevance and apperceptive sup­
plementation go much further than the sign. They have been found in 
the studies of the systems of cooking and clothing realised by Lévi-
Strauss, Barthes, and others (cf. Sonesson 1989a). 
Fig. 6. Bühler's Organon model (with (a) 'abstractive relevance' and (b) 
'abstractive supplementation'), from Bühler 1978 [1934]: 28. 
The same general idea is found in the work of the cognitive psycholo­
gist Fredrick Bartlett (1932: 32, 44), who introduced the concept of 
scheme to account for our "effort after meaning. Bartlett used the no­
tion of scheme in his studies of memory, in order to explain the succes­
sive modifications which a story stemming from an alien culture was 
subjected to, as the experimental subjects were asked to recount it from 
increasing temporal distances; but also in order to explain how one and 
the same drawing was transformed in later reproductions from memory, 
in different ways according as it had been labelled the first time as a pair 
of glasses or as a dumbbell. The scheme is to Bartlett "the setting which 
makes perceiving possible", and, more precisely, it is "an active organi­
sation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be 
supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organism's response", 
with the result that responses do not occur in isolation, but "as a unitary 
mass" (Bartlett 1932: 201). The last definition (in spite of introducing a 
V 
things or stales 
"representation' 
sender receiver 
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socio-historical dimension) is reminiscent of Uexküll's notion of Um­
welt. 
This notion of schemes was used before Bartlett by Janet and 
Halbwachs, and it has been taken up later by Piaget, as well as by the 
phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1932; 1967). It has of course also be­
come a fundamental concept in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and 
artificial intelligence, but perhaps sometimes with a lower intentional 
depth. Elsewhere, I have summarised the results of these studies in the 
following way (Sonesson 1988): a scheme is an overarching structure 
endowed with meaning, which, with the aid of a relation of order, in the 
form of syntagms and/or paradigms, joins together a set of in other re­
spects independent units of meaning. Among its further properties, two, 
in particular, are to be noted here: (a) schemes contain principles of 
relevance which extricate from each ineffable object such features as are 
of importance relative to a particular point of view (this is Piaget's as­
similation, and the principle of abstractive relevancy, according to 
Bühler 1978 [1934]); (b) schemes also supply properties missing from 
the ineffable objects, or modify the objects so as to adapt them to the 
expectancies embodied in the schemes (this is another aspect of Piaget's 
notion of assimilation, and what Bühler terms apperceptive supplemen­
tation; also, it is involved in what Halbwachs (1925; 1950) and Bartlett 
(1932) call reconstruction).59 
Returning to modern-day biosemiotics, it can be easily shown that 
what these authors are involved in has nothing to do with meaning as 
sign function, but very much with meaning as relevance, organisation, 
configuration and/or filtering. In their early joint paper, Emmeche and 
Hoffmeyer (1991: 4), point out, in criticising the concept of information 
in information theory, that they are interested in "a difference that 
makes a difference to somebody". They go on to say that living beings 
''respond to selected differences in their surroundings" (their italics in 
both cases). This formulation clearly invokes relevance, and even some 
kind of filtering device. Later on in the paper, however, when the Peir­
cean sign concept is introduced, the DNA-sequence of the gene is said 
to be the representamen, the protein its object, and the interprétant the 
cellular-biochemical network. It is difficult to detect any sign function 
Some schemes incorporate (some of) the results of their own use on ineffable 
objects, and are themselves changed in the process, which is what Piaget calls 
accommodation, and perhaps what Lotman calls "internal recoding". Cf. Sonesson 
1988, II. 1.3.3. 
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here, in the sense in which we have defined it. According to our authors, 
the contribution of Peircean semiotics is to show us that "the field of 
genetic structures, or a single gene, cannot be seen in isolation from the 
larger system interpreted" (Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991: 34). This cer­
tainly suggests meaning as a whole or a configuration. In a later paper, 
Emmeche (2002) sets out to show that in the living being function and 
meaning are the same. This can also be demonstrated, simply because 
Emmeche understands meaning in the sense of function: the relation of 
the part to the whole. But even in this article, there are traces of the fil­
tering concept of meaning: we learn that "the whole operates as a con­
straint". Indeed, 
Saying that cytochrome с means something to the cell is the same as saying 
that it has a function. It is not just any molecule. We could well synthesise 
small proteins and artificially introduce them into the cell. They would be 
without importance or they would be dysfunctional or, with certain fortuitous 
strokes of luck, they would actually fulfil some function in the cell. (Emmeche 
2002: 19) 
This implies that the meaning of the enzyme "is structural" in the sense 
that "the cell's molecules form a system of dissimilarities (like the ele­
ments of language in Saussure" (Emmeche 2002: 20). This is of course 
true to the extent that there are relevancies in cells, in particular if these 
relevancies result from a system of oppositions, like those of Saussurean 
language. From this point of view, everything that is in the cells is also in 
language. But the opposite cannot be true. There is, of course, no semiotic 
function as we have defined it. Indeed, the semiotic function may be a 
function: but it is an external relationship between an expression and a 
content that are differentiated from each other. 
It may be useful to distinguish two elements which often go together, 
both in Uexkiill's notion of Umwelt and in the concept of scheme: organi­
sation, which may derive from structure or configuration, and relevance, 
which may or may not be a result of organisation. It is clear that in lan­
guage, as Saussure understands it, relevance is a result of organisation, 
and more exactly of structure. In Uexkiill's notion of Umwelt, it rather 
seems to be a product of the configuration.60 Lacking the competence, I 
prefer not to pronounce myself in the case of genes. 
t0 My reason for saying so is that Uexküll insists that the three properties to 
which the tick reacts form a whole, or an experiential world, to the animal. This is 
the sense in which the Umwelt is a subjective concept (cf. Brier 2001). In denying 
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It is useful also to distinguish relevance from filtering, although they 
do have something in common: the picking up of a limited set of fea­
tures from the totality of the environment. However, relevance, strictly 
speaking, does not exclude anything: it merely places some portions of 
the environment in the background, ready to serve for other purposes. 
Thus, in the case of language, properties, which are not relevant for de­
termining the meaning of the words and sentences, still may serve to 
inform us about the dialect, or even identify the person speaking 
(Hjelmslev's "connotational language"). Indeed, relevance lets the dif­
ference between immediate object and dynamical object subsist, in the 
vague sense which they retain in the hermeneutical interpretation of 
Peirce: that which is directly given, in contrast to that which is poten­
tially given for further exploration. Thus, the principles of "abstractive 
relevance" and "apperceptive supplementation" still apply. In contrast, 
filtering simply strikes out that which is not let through the filtering de­
vice. 
The difference between relevance and filtering no doubt has some­
thing to do with the capacity to be aware of the borders of one's Um­
welt. It requires some kind of "metacognition", or, as cognitive scien­
tists are want to say, "a theory of mind". To the tick, to paraphrase 
Wittgenstein, the limits of its language are the limits of its world, but 
not so to human beings. Or rather, the limits of our Umwelt are not the 
limits of our Lebenswelt. 
3.3. The Umwelt as Lebenswelt: 
from neural networks to Jakobson's law 
Edmund Husserl introduced the term "Lifeworld" to describe the world 
taken for granted and shared by all human beings, as opposed to the 
constructed world of the physical sciences.61 Smith (2000; Smith, Varzi 
1999) invokes ecological terminology to describe the Lifeworld as the 
niche in which human beings stake out their life. It is found on a 
the robot an Umwelt, Emmeche (2001) also puts his emphasis on the experiential 
whole. Not being a biologist, I have some difficulty seeing why we have to sup­
pose any connectedness between the features to which the tick reacts. 
This is thus not the same concept of the "Lifeworld" referred to by Habermas, 
which is opposed to the "System world'". From a Husserlean point of view, the 
latter would remain a part of the former. 
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mesoscopic level, in between the microscopic and the macroscopic lev­
els described in physics, but, in Smith's view, this level is real in the 
same sense as the latter two. If it is a niche, then it could perhaps also be 
described as an Umwelt. 
Curiously, there is at least one other domain of semiotics, which 
shares with biosemiotics a concept of meaning that has nothing to do 
with signs. It is the semiotics of culture, as first defined by the Tartu 
school. In cultural semiotics, something has a meaning to the extent that 
it is part of our particular portion of the Lifeworld, what is, from our 
egocentric perspective, the Culture. Something coming to Culture from 
the outside, Non-culture, must first be translated into a text of Culture in 
order to acquire meaning. If it is declared a non-text, it looses its mean­
ing (cf. Sonesson 1998a; 2000b; 2004). Thus, Culture takes the form of 
a filtering device. Indeed, if we follow the criteria offered by the Tartu 
school for the definition of culture, the latter even seems to have a lot to 
do with meaning as organisation, as scheme of interpretation, that is, as 
Umwelt. This may seem in many ways a limited model of the world, but 
it does account for some ways in which we tend to think about the rela­
tionship between different societies, in the contemporary world as well 
as throughout history. 
According to the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch (1974), we may 
talk about different sociocultural lifeworlds, apart from the common 
structures of the Lifeworld, which we all share as human beings. Such a 
socio-cultural lifeworld would then correspond to a culture, in the sense 
of cultural semiotics. However, the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz 
(1967) suggested there really are "multiple provinces of meaning", such 
as dreaming, religious experience, the art world, the play world of the 
child, and that esoteric practise we know as science. The peculiarity of 
the Lifeworld, in this context, is that it offers access to the other worlds, 
and is accessible to all of them. In this sense, the human Lebenswelt is 
different from the Umwelt of other animals. Or at least it has the capac­
ity to be different. 
In Peircean terms, human beings may reach for the dynamical ob­
jects beyond the immediate ones. They may try to transform Non-
culture into Culture. However, as Wittgenstein observed, even if we had 
a common language game, we would perhaps not have so much to talk 
about with a lion. The lion, presumably, does not try to go beyond his 
own Umwelt to grasp the properties of the objects that lie behind it. 
There is, so to speak, no dynamical object beyond the immediate one to 
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him. And this is why there may not be much hope for us ever being able 
to discuss semiotics with a chimpanzee. 
In spite of his background in biology, Deacon's concept of meaning 
is certainly not that of biosemiotics. To all appearance, relevance carries 
no interest to Deacon, and organisation only becomes interesting at a 
level of complexity that has nothing to do with the Umwelt of the tick. 
The biosemioticians and Deacon go fishing for very different concepts 
in the Peircean current of ideas. And yet I think our reconstruction of 
the biosemiotic concept of meaning will allow us to understand much 
better a crucial part of Deacon's theory. 
It will be remembered that one formulation given by Deacon to what 
I have termed Deacon's problem is the difficulty of explaining the non­
existence of simple languages, that is, something which is similar to 
human language while being in some respects less complex. As a cor­
relate, consider the fact that children, at an age when they are unable to 
learn many other things (because of their inability for sustained atten­
tion, their brief span of working memory, etc.), are better at learning 
language than they will ever be later. Together with the fact that the 
language data offered the child, that is, existing languages, are under-
determined with relation to the rules, this observation prompted Chom­
sky's postulation of a "universal grammar" functioning as a kind of in­
nate "language acquisition device". However, Deacon (1997: 122ff) 
very plausibly suggests that these facts can be given another explana­
tion. It is, as he puts it, the very immaturity of the child that allows it to 
discover language structure. Taking a clue from Elisa Newport, he sug­
gests that "less is more": children's advantages consist in their not being 
able to take in all there is. Jeff Elman, quoted by Deacon (1997: 129ff), 
showed that while an unconstrained neutral network could not pick out 
correctly the structure of a language sample, because it got bogged 
down by low-level regularities, the network produce much more ade­
quate results when starting out from a small sample of simple sentences 
which was gradually extended, or when "noise" was periodically intro­
duced into the machinery. If this is what happens when children learn 
language, innate rules of universal grammar are not needed. 
Deacon's own interpretation of these facts is reminiscent of our dis­
cussion in the last section. First, he claims that, in the neural network, 
"what was available for learning at early stages was 'filtered' [...], so 
that only some aspects of the input were available at any time" (Deacon 
1997: 134). Here the very term of "filtering" appears. Then, proceeding 
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to talk about children, he suggests that "the relevant large-scale logic of 
language 'pops out' of a background of other details too variable for 
them to follow, and paradoxically gives them a biased head start" (p. 
135). This passage more directly suggests the concept of relevance. 
Perhaps we should not disregard this difference in terminology. Rele­
vance, as opposed to filtering, implies the availability of a dynamical 
object, beyond the immediate one. It roughly corresponds to what Vy-
gotsky calls the "zone of proximal development". 
If the Umwelt is an organised network of filters and/or relevancies, 
as I suggested in the last section, maturing in the child seems to consist 
in breaking out of one Umwelt and going on into another, broader one, 
until reaching the human Lifeworld. Between each Umwelt and the next, 
which encompasses it, there is always a zone of proximal development. 
In this sense, ontogenesis itself forces us to go through a series of "finite 
provinces of meaning", in the sense of Schütz. A temporal dimension is 
thus added. If it is still needed, it might also be said that, from the earli­
est stage to the later ones, with the introduction of structure, the child 
also passes from features in the form of Peircean "tones" (Deacon's 
icons) to "types". 
Understood in this way, our Russian doll model of Umwelten does 
not lack precedents. One clear case seems to me to be Jakobson's 
(1942) conception of the development of phonological distinctions, 
which, according to his claims, follows a more or less fixed order in all 
the languages of the world. Jakobson's law really comprises three dis­
tinct theories: about the language learning of the child, the language loss 
of the aphasie, and the common traits of all languages. As I noted in 
another context (cf. Sonesson 1989a, 1.3.4), none of these systems of 
precedence relations (except perhaps the last) necessarily coincides with 
the set of units that the normal adult perceives in his language, in par­
ticular if this is a system "où tout se tient", as the structuralist saying 
goes. In the heyday of universalism, Jakobson's theory was interpreted 
as involving a subset of language universals, together with the colour 
terms, and of course Chomsky's syntax (cf. Holenstein 1985). But just 
as Deacon says with reference to the precedence relations between col­
our terms according to the theory of Berlin and Kay, there is no need to 
interpret Jakobson's system as being in any sense innate. At least as 
applied to the child, the principles simply say that it starts out attending 
to only that which is common to a set of similar units in the language of 
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the adult. The rest is "filtered" out, but remains at the margin, being 
incorporated in later versions of the child's Umwelt. 
When I referred to Jakobson's law in an earlier publication, my main 
purpose was to find out to what extent a parallel development could be 
found in quite a different domain, that of visual shapes (cf. Sonesson 
1989a, II.3.6. and note 9 to 1.1.). For our present purpose, this is inter­
esting to the extent that it would show that such principles, if they are at 
all innate, are not specific to linguistic development. There unfortu­
nately are very few empirical investigations to base any such theories 
on. Therefore, the main basis of my discussion was Lotte Hoffmann's 
(1943) investigation into the way children, between 2.2 and 9.7 years of 
age, behave when they are urged to imitate some simple geometrical 
configurations using readymade material, like sticks, plates, and rings.6-' 
The youngest children offer what Hoffmann (1943: 39ff) calls "Et­
waslösungen", i.e. the solution through anything whatever. Interest­
ingly, no matter which configuration is imitated, the objects used are 
predominantly the round ones and those that are filled rather than those 
having contours. Later the child will produce "Sowaslösungen" (Hoff­
mann 1943: 55ff), again using only one piece, not to imitate proper 
parts of the configuration, but to render properties, or attributes, of the 
configuration, such as being closed, angular, pointed, having holes, and 
so on. Even though all configurations have contours, and some are an­
gular, the child will often choose objects to imitate them which are 
filled and rounded, and which furthermore share some other property 
with the object imitated. Unfortunately, Hoffmann's indications are in­
sufficient to build an hierarchy as complete as that suggested by Jakob-
son, but at least we can sketch a provisional model, in which an initial 
"tone" of "anything at all" is represented by a filled circle, which later 
gives way to a distinction between the straight line and the filled circle, 
further branching out into the opposition between the filled and the 
contoured circle. 
The general principle thus seems to hold true. Of course, this hap­
pens much later in child development, and it is most definitely a case of 
relevance rather than filtering: the child certainly perceives everything 
that is does not care to represent. 
Explanations based on the child's limited manual dexterity could be ruled out 
because of the ready-made material used for the task. 
26 
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4. Concluding remarks 
In this essay, I have tried to show that semiotic concepts in general, and 
the concept of sign in particular, are useful for discussing many of the 
issues relevant to cognitive science. More specifically, I have suggested 
that scholars who, like Deacon, take an interest in semiotical develop­
ment, need to use a more complex terminology when talking about phe­
nomena endowed with meaning. The semiotic function, it has been sug­
gested, is quite separate from iconic, indexical, and symbolic grounds, 
and may or may not be combined with them. And system character may 
be found or not in symbolic signs. The advantage of this terminology is 
first and foremost to allow for the formulation of a series of questions 
which may be empirically investigated, bearing on the systematic as 
well as temporal interconnectedness of symbolicity, the sign function, 
and systematicity. Specifically, by defining the sign independently of 
the particular type of motivation connecting expression and content 
(iconicity, indexicality, symbolicity) as well as of the system character 
joining it to other signs, a number of hypotheses concerning semiotic 
development (in phylogeny and ontogeny) can be formulated and tested. 
Even if iconicity and indexicality as such precede the emergence of the 
sign, it is conceivable that true signs first appear as symbols. And even 
if system character and arbitrariness come together in verbal language, 
it is possible that they are quite independent, or that one of them serves 
as the cause of the other. Deacon's theory embodies a specific hypothe­
sis within this framework: that sign function, symbolicity and system 
character necessarily go together. But he presents no theoretical or em­
pirical arguments for this hypothesis. He takes the relationship for 
granted. 
In the second part of the essay, we looked at a much broader concept 
of meaning than that of the sign, used in biosemiotics as well as in cul­
tural semiotics, and we showed that it was not only a prerequisite for the 
sign, but that it also had a use of its own. Even if meaning, in this gen­
eral sense (as organisation and most of all as relevance) is implied in the 
sign concept, we cannot know whether it is contemporaneous with it, or 
develops even earlier. In this case, however, the second hypothesis 
sounds more reasonable. Indeed, we used Deacon's description of how 
language learning is possible to illustrate the workings of this broader 
concept of meaning, and we added a parallel from the development of 
visual shapes. In the end we therefore had to conclude, not only that by 
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making our terminology clear, we can shed some new light on Deacon's 
theory; but Deacon's ideas have also helped in developing some frag­
ments of the theory of semiotic development. 
It has been suggested by Kalevi Kull (2005) that there is a primary 
semiotic threshold opposing physics (that which is not alive) to biology 
(living things, including internal biological processes, known since Se-
beok as endosemiotics), and that there is a secondary semiotic threshold, 
which opposes the latter to that which is language-like (discussed in 
sociology and semiotics of culture).63 In view of the earlier discussion, 
it seems to me that further thresholds could be usefully introduced (Fig. 
7). I would posit the first threshold, just as Kull does, between that 
which is not alive and that which is alive: non-semiotic vs. semiotic. I 
would, however, separate that which only becomes meaningful to the 
investigator, such as endosemiotic processes, from that which can only 
function as such when seen as semiotic, which would oppose that which 
is purely meta-semiotic to that which is semiotic sui generis. Within the 
latter domain, I think we should at least separate purely mediational 
semiosis from sign-based semiosis. This latter distinction is the one 
which is at stake in Deacon's book. It is, also, I think, the one with 
which we must be involved, if we really want to understand the differ­
ence between human beings and other species.64 
63 Lecture given in the framework of the SGB-seminars [Spräk, gester och 
bilder— "Language, Gestures and Pictures in the Perspective of Semiotic Devel­
opment"] at Lund University, May 20, 2006. 
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Значение значения в биологии и когнитивных науках: 
семиотическая реконструкция 
Цель статьи — объединить разные концепции значения, разработан­
ные в семиотике, биологии и когнитивных науках, чтобы стало 
возможным формулировать вопросы, касающиеся эволюции. Кон­
цепция знака в семиотике, как и понятие репрезентации в когни­
тивных науках, зачастую либо использовались настолько широко, 
что стали бессодержательными, либо же их отвергали вообще. Мои 
более ранние исследования о понятиях иконичности и «картин­
ности» заставляли меня формулировать понятие знака в традиции 
как Пирса, так и Соссюра. Мои работы последнего времени об 
эволюции семиотических средств (как, например, язык, жест, кар­
тина) доказали необходимость обращения к более точному понятию 
знака. Для дефиниции понятия "знак" я опираюсь на понятие 
семиотической функции (в понимании Пиаже) и на понятие аппре-
зентации, взятое у Гуссерля. В первой части настоящей статьи я 
сравниваю семиотику и когнитивные науки, в особенности в связи с 
трактовкой параллельных понятий репрезентация и знак. Вторая 
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часть касается книги Терренса Дикона The Symbolic Species, которая 
является до сих пор самой влиятельной попыткой объединить се­
миотику и когнитивные науки. Я показываю, что употребление Ди-
коном понятий иконичность, индексальность и символичность 
является не только противоречащим канону Пирса, но и довольно 
бесплодным для понимания эволюции и развития семиотических 
средств. Именно это является причиной, почему я предпочитаю 
отгородить понятие знака от понятий иконичности, индексальности 
и символичности, которые только при комбинировании со знаком 
могут стать основой для иконов, индексов и символов, но которые 
имеют кроме этого и другое, более элементарное употребление в 
области перцепции. В третьей части рассматриваются некоторые 
биосемиотические употребления понятия значения, которые рас­
ходятся с пониманием знака, представленным в первой части. Тут 
мы имеем дело с значением в его общем, связанном с отбором и 
организацией, значении. Хотя я считаю возможным соотнесение 
пирсовской интерпретации с идеей функционального круга Юкскюл-
ла и со значением как функцией, как это описывают Эммехе и 
Хоффмейер, — все же я утверждаю, что подобное понимание значе­
ния отличается от концепта, содержащегося в знаке. В заключение я 
предлагаю, что для охвата различий "значения" (в широком смысле) 
и "знака" (специфицированного в традиции Пиаже-Гуссерля) нужно 
использовать большее количество порогов значения, чем это пред­
лагается, например, Калеви Куллем. 
Tähenduse tähendus bioloogias ja kognitiivteadustes: 
semiootiline rekonstruktsioon 
Artikli eesmärgiks on ühendada semiootikas, bioloogias ja kognitiiv­
teadustes välja arendatud tähenduse kontseptsioone viisil, mis võimaldaks 
evolutsiooni ja arenguga seotud küsimuste formuleerimist. Märgi kont­
septsiooni semiootikas, nagu ka representatsiooni mõistet kognitiiv­
teadustes on kasutatud kas sedavõrd laiana, et nad on muutunud peaaegu 
sisutuks, või on nad pikemata tagasi lükatud mõne eelarvamuse tõttu 
nende tähenduse kohta. Mu varasemad uurimused ikoonilisuse ja pildili-
suse mõistete kohta on sundinud mind sõnastama märgi mõiste vaikimisi 
eeldatud tähendusi nii Saussure'i kui Peirce'i traditsioonis. Mu viimase 
aja tööd semiootiliste vahendite (nagu näiteks keel, žest ja pildid) evolut­
siooni ja arengu kohta on tõestanud vajadust pöörduda täpsustatuma 
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märgi mõiste poole. Et defineerida märki, võtan ma lähtekohaks semioo­
tilise funktsiooni mõiste, nii nagu seda on iseloomustanud Piaget, ja ap-
presentatsiooni mõiste, nagu seda on defineerinud Husserl. Käesoleva 
artikli esimeses osas vaatlen ma kognitiivteaduste ja semiootika mõnin­
gaid sarnasusi ja erinevusi, eelkõige seoses paralleelsete mõistetega rep­
resentatsioon ja märk. Teine osa puudutab Terrence Deacon'i teost The 
Symbolic Species, mis on seni ilmselt kõige olulisem katse ühendada kog-
nitiivteadusi ja semiootikat. Ma näitan, et mõistete ikoonilisus, mdek-
siaalsus ja sümbolilisus kasutus Deacom poolt pole mitte ainult väär 
Peirce'i kaanoni suhtes, vaid ka üsna kasutu, mõistmaks semiootiliste 
vahendite evolutsiooni ja arengut. See on põhjuseks, miks ma eelistan 
eristada märgi mõistet ikoomlisusest, indeksiaalsusest ja sümbolilisusest, 
mis alles kombineerudes märgiga saavad panna aluse ikoonidele, indek­
sitele ja sümbolitele, kuid millel on lisaks sellele ka teine, elementaarsem 
kasutus taju valdkonnas. Kolmandas osas vaatlen ma mõnesid bio-
semiootilisi tähenduse mõiste kasutusi, mis, nagu ma näitan, ei mõista 
märki säärasel viisil, nagu seda on iseloomustatud käesoleva artikli 
esimeses osas. Seal on tegu tähendusega üldisemas, valiku ja organisat­
siooni mõttes, mis on tähenduse elementaarsem tähendus. Olgugi, et pean 
võimalikuks Peirce'i interpretatsiooni, milles on vastavus Uexkülli 
funktsiooniringi ideega ning tähendust kui funktsiooni, nagu seda on kir­
jeldanud eeskätt C. Emmeche ja J. Hoffmeyer, väidan ma, et sellise tähen­
duse mõiste sisu on teistsugune kui märgi kontseptis sisalduv. Lõpetuseks 
panen ma ette, et tähenduse (laias mõistes) ja märgi (nii nagu seda on 
täpsustatud Piaget'-Husserli traditsioonis) erinevuste hõlmamiseks on 
vaja rakendada veelgi rohkem tähenduse lävesid kui seda pakub välja 
näiteks K. Kull. 
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Abstract. Thomas A. Sebeok's global semiotics has inspired quite a few fol­
lowers, noticeably Marcel Dan esi, Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio. 
However, for all the trendiness of the word, the very concept of global should 
be subject to more rigorous examination, especially within today's ecological 
and politico-economic contexts. With human and natural disasters precipi­
tating on a global and almost quotidian basis, it is only appropriate for global 
semioticians to pay more attention to such phenomena and to contemplate, 
even when confined to their attics, the semiotic consequences of disasters. The 
paper probes into the semiotic implications of the tsunami disaster that 
claimed quarter of a million lives in South and Southeast Asia during the 
Christmas holidays in 2004, and proposes a semiotics of disaster, developed 
from the discussions of the eighteenth-century British Empiricist philosopher 
Thomas Reid and the contemporary semiotician David S. Clarke, Jr. As the 
word's etymology indicates, disaster originally referred to a natural pheno­
menon, i.e., 'an obnoxious planet', and only by extension was it later used to 
cover man-made calamities, be it political or economic. Although the 
dichotomy of nature versus culture no longer holds good, the author uses the 
word disaster in the traditional sense by referring to 'natural' disasters only. 
At an international seminar devoted to the theme of global semiotics, 
it seems only appropriate to pay homage to the founder. This paper is 
no exception.1 When the late Thomas A. Sebeok used the phrase 
This paper was originally presented at Seminar 2, 'Global Semiotics', at the 
International Semiotics Institute held in Imatra, Finland on 11-19 June 2005. The 
occasion explains the specific rhetoric of the essay. However, under the frivolous-
sounding wordplay and the chiasmatic substitution of 'global semiotics' and 
'global disasters' and hence 'disaster semiotics', is a rather serious questioning of 
Thomas A. Sebeok's concept of global semiotics. 
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'global semiotics' in 1994 to lavish his plenary lecture at the IASS 
Berkeley Congress with gusto, he was presumably aware of the 
linguistic sign's reiterability and interpretability, not only within the 
boundaries of life, but often beyond them. To begin with, Sebeok 
evokes two never-really-alive master tricksters in Shakespeare: 
Prospero and Hamlet. Whilst Prospéra plays on the double denotation 
of our planet and the South Bank Theatre called The Globe, Hamlet 
likens his own skull to the 'distracted' globe, thus rehearsing the trite 
Elizabethan themes of micro-macrocosmic identification, and dia­
lectics of illusion and reality as well as that of life and death. These 
histrionics serve to usher in, firstly, Sebeok's short list of connota­
tions: 'all-encompassing', 'comprehensive', 'international', 'limit­
less', 'pandemic', 'unbounded', 'universal', 'cosmic'; and secondly, 
his inventory of nations from A to Y, viz. from Argentina to Yugosla­
via, short, however, of Zimbabwe and, short, alas! of the geopolitical 
foresight for the collapse of Yugoslavia. The author characteristically 
rambles amongst disciplines, from disciplines to the meta level of 
interdisciplinary method, and finally arriving at his darling bud of 
biosemiotics, where the master trope of geo-bio-semiosphere allows 
him to draw a full circle of his global semiotic circumnavigation. 
'What forgetfulness', then, is left 'after such knowledge?' to 
paraphrase another procrastinating anti-hero Alfred J. Prufrock created 
by the poet T. S. Eliot. It seems little can be said of global semiotics 
except sequels in piecemeal added here and there to the alphabet of 
nations on a distracted world atlas. Today the word globe is so loaded 
that it has lost its sensus communis, i.e., 'global' sense. Compare, for 
instance, Sebeok's list of redundancies above and a left-wing social 
critic like Anthony Giddens' (1998) condemning sense of the word 
(Wisner 2003), and you will know the heterogeneity rather than 
homogeneity underlying the usages.2 Nevertheless, because of its 
2 Felling (2003a), following Giddens (1998), notes that 'most aspects of 
globalization are disputed'. One consequence of such globalization processes as 
capital transfer, e-culture, and labour migration is the change of 'geography of risk 
and disaster' (Felling 2003a: 5-6). He could have added another process in 
relation to the topic under discussion: tourist mobility. Incidentally, Sebeok uses 
'global' in the metaphorical sense of 'holistic' (Sebeok: 2001: 27) in his 
description of animal groupings as 'global semiosic systems', without the 
awareness that the literal sense of 'global' (of the biospheric globe) has stolen in. 
The example is not self-defeating, but it shows that global is a both natural and 
cultural construct. A reader of the manuscript has kindly referred the present 
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over-use, one is under the quotidian bombardment of 'global 
warming' as if it were global warring; one struts and frets in a 'global 
e-village' as if in a virtual Disneyland; and one takes for granted the 
now too familiarized but still estranged bedfellow called, grotesquely, 
'glocalization' (Swyngedouw 1997). 
Echoing, unwittingly, Sebeok's 'pandemic', I have worked towards 
a semiotics of parasitism, which touches upon a global epidemic when 
the SARS outbreaks claimed hundreds of lives in Southeast and East 
Asia (Chang 2003). It was only after I had the paper published in Sign 
Systems Studies 31(2) was I able to see Sebeok's book, to find therein 
a curious book jacket displaying the computerized Creator's hand, 
apparently lampooning Michelangelo, indicating a sketched parasite 
instead of Adam. In the same line of parodied argument for life-
claiming semiosis (rather than the life-generating semiosis dear to 
Sebeok), I shall address myself on the semiotic implications of a 
recent global event, in fact a disaster, that has affected not only where 
it happened (topia or heterotopia?) but where it didn't (here or there?), 
namely, the earthquake and tsunamis in South Asia that claimed nearly 
a quarter million of lives, many of whom were from this remote 
Nordic part of the disoriented world. 
What are disasters? How are they encoded as they are decoded? 
Why haven't we semioticians paid sufficient attention to it, save 
perhaps René Thom from a probabilistic-topological perspective 
(Thorn 1972; 1983) and Maurice Blanchot (1986) from a hermeneutic-
rhetorical point of view, whereas secondary literature in risk and 
hazard studies, from the perspectives of geoscience and human 
sciences, such as economics, have been well-documented?3 Given 
writer to Jean Baudrillard's essay (Baudrillard 2002) where the French thinker 
disparages globalization as an undesirable but inevitable product of violent 
(virulent) technologization, which gives rise to all kinds of terrorism for its own 
penalty. 
There is, however, a substantial literature on hazards or risk research in human 
geography and political ecology. See El-Sabh, Murty 1988; Hewitt 1983; 1997; 
Beck 1992; Etkin 1999; Dore, Etkin 2003; Klein et al. 2003; Kondratyev et al. 
2002; Pelling 2003b. Etkin 1999, with its model of risk assessment, planning and 
transference, is particularly relevant to semiotics. In terms of geology and 
paleontology, Kalevi Kull has notified me about the fact that René Thorn's 
concept of catastrophism can be traced back to Cuvier, and that the French 
tradition of non-gradualist evolutionism can be seen as opposed to British 
gradualism of Lyell and Darwin. See n. 6 below. I have since also consulted 
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Umberto Eco's observation that 'Any natural event can be a sign' 
(Eco 1984: 15), why hasn't there been a semiotics of disaster?4 For all 
our zeal in globalization, why hasn't there been a semiotics of global 
disasters? Surely Sebeok's semiotics of life is not to blame. 
The catastrophe on Christmas 2004 has forced us to reflect upon 
the semiosis of a network of systems, both natural and cultural. The 
polysystem of that magnanimous earthquake and its subsequent killer 
sea surges is so intricate that it merits in-depth semiotic analysis. It is 
a network consisting of multiple scientific and folkloric interpretations 
of series of transformations amongst iconic, indexical and symbolic 
signs, one interpretation giving rise to another; reported animal and 
human responses to semiotic actions and reactions, where humanity is 
segregated into national, ethnic and social groups, some of which, like 
those minorities in the Andaman archipelagos, have been hitherto 
shrouded in mystery (Greenway 2005). The results are sound geo­
physical readings plus myriads of petits récits, eyewitness narratives 
of various points of views, a lot of which are semantically overcoded 
by religion and superstition, such as animals saving human lives, etc. 
Tourism, media, charitable organizations, disaster-relief groups, 
debris, bodies — all these had a role to play in forming this miserable 
medley of cosmic scale. 
Whilst Eco would suggest that all these coded texts fall into the 
category of encyclopedic semiotic practice, one envisages a semiotics 
of disasters in both the restricted and non-restricted senses. In one of 
his many illustrations of the triad, Peirce describes a person, in his 
dreamy state of existence (as a First), being hit by a brutal force from 
without, e.g., 'a loud and prolonged steam whistle' (Second) (Peirce 
1998, 2: 4). Such a bodily shock forces him to interpret the 
phenomenon as, for example, an earthquake or otherwise through the 
Rudwick 1997 which includes the English translations of Cuvier's 'Preliminary 
discourse' and other earlier essays before his Recherches sur les ossemens fossils 
(1812). 
4 U. Eco says, 'The process of recognition of natural events which generates 
sign-proposition takes place in the same manner [i.e., as inference]. Perception is 
always interrogative and conditional and is invariably based (even if we do not 
realize it) on a bet. If certain perceptual data are present, then (there is) perhaps 
smoke, as long as other contextual elements authorize me to think that the 
perceptual interpretation is appropriate. Peirce was aware of the fact that 
perception is always presumptive evidence, a source of potential semiosis' (Eco 
1984: 35). 
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functioning of interprétant (Third), e.g., after looking, as people in 
Taiwan are wont to do, for other indexical signs (swinging ceiling 
lamps, turbulent water surface in the flush toilet bowl). Whereas a 
seismologist could tell us that the magnitude nine quake off west 
Sumatra was only an indexical sign in the wake of, and pointing to, 
the spasmodic slide of two tectonic plates underneath; and the 
tsunamis, in turn, are indexical to, and in the wake of, the quake, and 
all these could be graphically (i.e., as iconic signs) represented 
through computerized imaging, the actual disaster that claimed a 
quarter million lives calls for a semiotic study of both nature 
(including animal cognition and behaviour that would appeal to 
zoosemioticians) and culture, in particular, the impact of inter­
continental tourist mobility, especially those seeking brighter and 
warmer sun, and the global reactions to the event. 
This paper will, therefore, attempt to explore into a semiotics of 
disasters, incorporating the theories of Peirce, his predecessors and 
critics, in particular, a relatively slighted semiotician of our times, 
David S. Clarke, Jr., as well as human geographers and hazard 
researchers like Kenneth Hewitt (1983; 1997) and David Etkin (1999), 
and drawing on textual materials from literature (e.g., the Rousseau-
Voltaire debate on Lisbon comes immediately to mind), media, and 
subculture. The product will be, finally, a tribute paid to Sebeok for 
his sustained interest in pre-human geo- (i.e. 'global') semiotics. 
Those of us who are familiar with Sebeok's writings on the history 
of semiosis will surely recall his account of the prehistoric stage of 
semiosis. But this part of history is global only in the narrow physical 
sense of the word, descriptive of a world yet unsullied by human 
traces. Despite that even such a pre-human world is not a transparent 
fact, but always already a construct of human geophysical knowledge, 
a gaia hypothesis, if you like, its semiosis is far from being global in 
the sense of human geography. Ask any fellow semiotician, and you 
will find the role humanity plays in global semiotics, let alone disaster 
semiotics. Isn't, one may ask, Sebeok's 'global semiotics' based on 
nationality a concept of human geography? 
The immediate task for us in formulating a disaster semiotics is to 
define disasters rather than semiotics. Traditionally, as the word's 
etymology of malevolent star suggests, a disaster is understood as a 
celestial and, by inference, natural phenomenon. In one of his out­
bursts into lyricism, Blanchot says, 'If disaster means being separated 
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from the star (if it means the decline which characterizes dis­
orientation when the link with fortune from on high is cut), then it 
indicates a fall beneath disastrous necessity'. (1986, 2) But a natural 
phenomenon can be interpreted as disastrous and its extent gauged 
only in relation to its impact on human beings — or, for that matter, 
other living organisms; the old dichotomy of nature versus culture was 
already undermined in the very beginning when the expression was 
used. The editor of a recent volume on disasters, Mark Felling 
(2003b), succinctly defines 'natural disaster' as 'shorthand for huma­
nitarian disaster with a natural trigger'. (Felling 2003a: 4). He 
continues, 'Whilst physical phenomena are necessary for the 
production of natural hazard, their translation into risk and potential 
for disaster is contingent upon human exposure and a lack of capacity 
to cope with the negative impacts that exposure might bring to 
individuals or human systems' (Felling 2003a: 4)... 
Then one needs to outline the domains of natural hazards. 
Interestingly, as if echoing Vladimir Vernadsky, risk researchers have 
classified natural hazards according to the traditional division of the 
planetary environment into spheres; they include atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, lithosphère and biosphere — short, though capable, of 
anticipating the Lotmanian semiosphere (Hewitt 1997: 63). Into these 
four categories fall such hazards as the atmospheric heatwaves and 
typhoons, the hydrological floods and droughts, the geological move­
ments, like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and the biological 
influenza and parasitism. Fortunately, hitherto, there have not been 
semiospheric hazards, and we certainly hope that such apocalyptic 
visions will be deferred. To parody Jacques Derrida, 'No apocalypse, 
not now' (1984). There is no doubt that some disasters are of mixed 
origin. For instance, the tsunami is construed as 'simultaneously a 
geological (by origin) and hydrological (regarding its consequences) 
phenomenon' (Kondratyev et al. 2002: 22). 
All these accounts date back to the discussions of natural signs in 
the early history or pre-history of semiotics. The identification of 
semeion with tekmerion, or sign and evidence, clearly indicates how a 
natural event observed in praesentia, like the tectonic slide, can stand, 
by inference, for a future event in absentia, in this case, tsunami 
waves (Clarke 1987: 12); or it can stand for a message of the divine 
(Manetti 1993: 15). In ancient Greece, one type of divination, mantike 
technike, refers to the analysis of perceptible signs produced in the 
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external environment, such as lightning or eclipses, in relation to the 
larger cosmic order (Manetti 1993: 19-20). Many narratives of the 
tsunami disaster under discussion are very much of this folkloric na­
ture; these include animistic belief in the rage of sea god (Goodnough 
2005), ghosts haunting Phuket after the disaster (Burdett 2005^), and 
animals' sixth sense saving their lives (Reuters, Dec. 30, 2004). How 
to cope with such folk wisdom becomes increasingly international 
relief groups' major problem (Greenway 2005). From a semiotic point 
of view, these disaster narratives qualify what Eco (1983) terms as 
encyclopedic semiotic practices. 
These small narratives {petits récits), often first-person narratives, 
are seen joining forces with such grand narratives {grands récits) as 
catastrophism, which, thanks to the disaster, is staging a grand 
comeback.6 A proponent of popularised catastrophism in our days, 
5 Suffice it to quote from two news clips. On 14th January 2005, the Inter­
national Herald Tribune features John Burdett's article, 'The ghosts of Phuket'. 
The author intrudes in the course of his story by alluding to the religious back­
ground: 
[W]hen Theravada Buddhism came to dominance here in the 13th century, 
it had to accommodate Hinduism and native animism. Detachment is all 
well and good, but spirits must be appeased, the dead cannot be left to roam 
aimlessly — and something must be done to feed that ravenous sea god 
who expressed his rage by eating 5,300 people. 
This is followed by a brief conversation between the narrator and a Thai barmaid. 
'How do Thai people like you feel about it now, two weeks later?' I asked 
Pui ... 
'The ghosts are a problem,' she replies without hesitation. 
'Thai people hate ghosts and now Phuket is full of them. I won't go down 
there again.' 
On 24th January 2005, The New York Times reports the minority tribe the Moken 
who survived the disaster. One survivor named Salama said 'his people believed 
that tsunamis came because the sea was angry.' The report continues: 
Another group of Moken, who lived on a different island and are now at a 
refugee camp in Takua Pa, about 110 kilometers north of Phuket, on the 
Thai coast, said they, too, thought that the wave was punishment from the 
spirits. They said some dolphins they saw appeared to be agitated shortly 
before the tide receded that morning, a sign that something was coming. 
(Quoted from International Herald Tribune, p. 4 — Goodnough 2005). 
In his discussing of nineteenth-century debate between two schools of geo­
logy, the uniformitrarians and the catastrophists, in particular Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882) and his mentor Charles Lyell (1797-1875), Rudwick (1992) points 
out the catastrophists' theoretical difficulty and discursive solution, in his words, 
'a style of theorising': 
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Antony Milne, being apparently very excited about this development, 
went so far as to predict that 'The Indian Ocean disaster could well 
lead to catastrophism moving to centre stage in future conferences 
about the fate of the world'. In the wake of the said disaster, I had 
searched online for a cheaper copy of Milne's Doomsday: The Science 
of Catastrophic Events without success. All these constitute another 
dimension of disaster discourse, belonging to a different semiotic 
order. For now, let's return to the initial stage of disasters. 
In his fourth Harvard lecture delivered on 16th April 1903 (MS 
309), Peirce discusses how Thirdness operates in Nature. He begins by 
talking about the fall of a stone. 'I know that this stone will fall if it is 
let go, because experience has convinced me that objects of this kind 
always do fall.' Here Peirce has coupled a natural phenomenon and 
experience as well as the habit or law, engendered from experience, 
which eventually serves as interprétant. The famous example of one's 
waking up to a sound does contain a tripartite structure in causal and 
temporal order, but one is legitimate in questioning the availability of 
interprétant in the initial stage. 
Regarding the archetype of fall, Blanchot would say there is no law 
in celestial disasters: 'Would law be the disaster? The supreme or 
extreme law, that is: the excessiveness of uncodifiable law — that to 
which we are destined without being party to it' (Blanchot 1986: 2). 
Given his interest in human disasters, Blanchot's statement is delibe­
rately ambiguous. To counter Peirce's assertion of law as interprétant 
that governs our interpretation of signs, David S. Clarke, Jr. alludes to 
Most of the best earth scientists of the early nineteenth century felt that the 
evidence available to them obliged them to be in some sense catastrophists. 
They felt that in trying to explain some phenomena they had no option but 
to invoke causal agencies far greater in intensity than those we can now see 
at work in the world around us, or even those of which we have reliable 
human records. But they also felt compelled by the evidence to infer that 
some of these geological 'causes' had acted with such intensity only on 
very rare occasions in Earth history. Such events, they concluded, fully 
deserved to be termed 'catastrophes', and they themselves were content to 
be known as 'catastrophists' (Rudwick 1992: 81). 
For its twentieth-century development in geology, see, for example, Ager 1993. 
For the relationship between catastrophe and evolution theories, see Zeeman 
1992. 
International Herald Tribune, January 20, 2005, p. 7. 
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the immediate perception propounded by the eighteenth-century 
Scottish empiricist Thomas Reid (1994 [1863], 2: 195). 
It would be anachronism to reinstate the argument of an empiricist 
after the linguistic turn in the early twentieth century. Given the fact 
that Nature is always a semiotic construct embedded in socio-histo-
rical context, there cannot be a transparent Firstness, nor can the facile 
dichotomy of nature/culture be maintained. However, for all the 
primacy granted to the interprétant, the Peircian mapping of evidential 
inference in terms of indexical sign could be construed as a way of 
naturalising natural events, as if they were independent of language 
mediation. Take for example the tsunami disaster: The tribal elders in 
the Andaman sea region noticed the incoming tide and alerted his 
people to flee and seek higher shelters. His alert is indeed linguistic or 
possibly paralingual, given the urgency of the moment. Here the 
interprétant is no doubt the Peircian 'habit', but habit is already 
linguistically mediated or, at any rate, when the message was 
communicated, the natural signs have to be translated to linguistic 
signs. Clarke argues that before the experience is communicated, the 
immediate perception of natural disorder can be free from language 
mediation. Unconvinced by Peirce, he proposes the distinction 
between natural sign and logically more primitive 'natsign\ the latter 
being a 'short-range' sign, which is produced not for communication 
and can be interpreted without inference (Clarke 1987: 50). 
As Clarke sees it, natsign precedes comsign — sign for commu­
nication, and lansign — the higher order of human linguistic sign, and 
is therefore a more primitive sign in both the logical and evolutionary 
sense. Clarke alludes to Thomas Reid's classification of natural signs: 
'What we commonly call natural causes might, with more propriety, 
be called natural signs, and what we call effects, the things signified' 
(Reid 1994 [1863], 1: 122). This amounts, in fact, to only the first 
class of natural signs, where the thing signified is 'established by 
It is curious to reinstate the argument of an eighteenth-century empiricist after 
the epistemological divide effected by linguistic turn in the early twentieth 
century. Thomas Reid asserts that there is a close correspondence between 
'original' perception and natural language. 'The signs in original perception are 
sensations, of which Nature hath given us a great variety, suited to the variety of 
the things signified by them. Nature hath established a real connection between 
the signs and the things signified; and Nature hath also taught us the interpretation 
of the signs — so that, previous to experience, the sign suggests the thing 
signified, and create the belief of it' (Reid 1994 [1863], 2: 195). 
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nature, but discovered only by experience' (Reid 1994 [1863], 1: 121). 
Reid gives examples of mechanics, astronomy, and optics, which are 
'but connections established by nature, and discovered by experience 
or observation, and consequences deduced from them (Reid 1994 
[1863], 1: 121). One may, no doubt, add seismology to the list. 
This definition may serve as the point of departure for our investi­
gation into natural disaster as sign. Whether it's an earthquake or a 
tsunami, a natural disaster involves at least three phases: (1) a natural 
happening; (2) the interpretations of it; (3) after effects of the hap­
pening. It must be remembered that the word 'natural' is used pro­
visionally. According to Clarke, whilst in classical evidential signs or 
Peircian indexical signs, the cause and effect can be remote, 'the 
referent occasion of a natsign as an object of dynamic interpretation is 
spatially contiguous or temporally proximate to the sign' (Clarke 
1987: 67). One type of natsign would be 'an environmental event 
discriminated from a background, with a significate occurrence being 
an environmental event recognized at a referent occasion' (Clarke 
1987: 64). A brief explanation of the two terms coined by Clarke is 
necessary. A significate occurrence refers to 'the occurrence of what is 
signified by a given sign token', and the sign's referent occasion 
refers to 'the spatial-temporal occasion at which we recognize a 
significate occurrence or non-occurrence' (Clarke 1987: 61). Because 
of its lack of subject-predicate structure characteristic of language, its 
lack of intention for communication, and its lack of rules of inter­
pretation, the natsign appears ubiquitously in lower animals and 
indeed all the organisms. 
How can one be sure that a natsign will give rise to significate 
occurrence rather than non-occurrence? Clarke says, 
If there is an occurrence y of Y as the type expected, then there is recognition 
of a significate-occurrence [...]. Repeated recognition of non-occurrences has 
the effect of changing the significance of a sign of type X for the interpreter or 
replacing it with another sign X' with the same significance. (Clarke 1987: 61) 
The example he gives is the non-occurrence of thunder after heat 
lightning, which violates the popular inferential logic that thunder fol­
lows lightning. After the Boxing Day earthquake, there have been a 
couple of big ones, but, contrary to general expectation, they failed to 
effect tsunamis. 
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The distinction between significate occurrence and non-occurrence 
can be a serious matter, in fact, a matter of life and death if the 
occurrence proves to be a disaster. Look at the following eyewitness 
report on the tsunami. On the beaches, people saw two subsequent 
occurrences: first, wave surge receding, and second, fish being ex­
posed and stranded. The distinction between natural sign and natsign 
aside, these two occurrences are contiguous in space, proximate in 
time, and causal in relationship. Though being natsigns, and thus free 
from intention of communication, they did send signals. And how 
signals (or signs, if you like) were interpreted made all the difference. 
There were, in fact, two opposing interpretations that led to different 
actions and consequences. One interpretation survived its interpreters 
and through the mouth of others: some took the fish to be gifts from 
Nature and went down to catch the fish, not knowing that a third 
significate occurrence, a major one, and disastrous one at that, was 
impending. Others, better informed, i.e., decoding the first two occur­
rences rightly with a different interprétant coupled with experience 
and habit, managed to escape and thus survived their hapless fellow 
interpreters. What makes the difference? One can no longer explain 
away such a matter of life and death by suggesting a conflict in 
interpretation. Among other things, a major difference is that the 
second group of interpreters took the first two occurrences not at their 
face value, but as referent occasion for another significate occurrence, 
as Clarke would say, or, in Peircian parlance, as an indexical sign to 
still another sign. Blanchot has a paradoxical but powerful argument 
on disaster's 'imminence'. 
When the disaster comes upon us, it does not come. The disaster is its 
imminence, but since the future, as we conceive of it in the order of lived 
time, belongs to the disaster, the disaster has always already withdrawn or 
dissuaded it; there is no future for the disaster, just as there is no time or space 
for its accomplishment. (Blanchot 1986: 1-2) 
As the above example of fish suggests, a disaster occurrence never 
comes isolated but enters into a chain of causality. What's more 
important, whilst natural disasters seem to be bona fide natural signs, 
they are such only in terms of their impact on human beings. Disaster 
researchers Dore and Etkin observe, 'Natural disasters occur when an 
event such as an earthquake or storm reveals social vulnerability, and 
consequent damage to the physical and social fabric exceeds the 
29 
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ability of the affected community to recover without assistance' 
(Dore, Etkin 2003: 75). Here, 'social vulnerability' and 'recovery' 
amount to what Felling describes above as the 'translation' of natural 
hazard into social risk and human reaction to cope with it. From the 
perspective of semiotics, the process involves system mutations (e.g., 
from natural to social) or transcoding of signs and entails social 
pragmatics. Such pragmatics, according to Etkin, consists of the 
following procedures: (1) 'response and recovery', (2) 'mitigation', 
and (3) 'preparedness'. 'These activities alter future vulnerability (and 
therefore the construction of future disasters), reducing risk if they are 
done wisely, or not if they are done otherwise' (Etkin 1999: 69). The 
three overlapping activities form a 'disaster adaptation cycle' (Etkin 
1999: 70), as shown in Figure 1. 
Risk 
Vulnerability 
—> Root Causes 
—> Social Forces 










Figure 1. Disaster adaptation cycle. A disaster typically triggers a cycle of 
human response of response and recovery, mitigation and preparedness. 
This response can alter vulnerability and thereby influence future 
disasters. (From Etkin 1999: 70.) 
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A semiotics of disasters will have to articulate the complicated 
network of transformations among numerous natural and social 
systems that are only global in scale. This returns us to the question of 
global semiotics. Why the global community today is paying more 
attention to disasters? Apart from the noble cause of humanity that no 
man is an island, the answer lies in the dynamic process shown in 
Figure 1 above: increased social vulnerability and hazard mitigation, 
manifesting, for example, in international reliefs and cost-sharing; risk 
transference, from more frequent, low-impact events to unpredictable 
high-impact future disasters (Hewitt 1997); and the rupture or dis­
continuity between probability prediction and actual distribution of 
damage. Blanchot has warned us, disaster writing is an impossibility, 
for when it does occur, writing ceases to be, so does semiosis. 
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Семиотика бедствия — альтернатива "глобальной семиотике"? 
"Глобальная семиотика" Томаса Себеока инспирировала многих 
семиотиков, таких, например, как Марсель Данези, Сьюзан Петрил-
ли и Аугусто Понцио. Все же это модное понятие глобальность 
нуждается в более точном рассмотрении, особенно в современном 
экологическом и политико-экономическом контексте. Задача гло­
бальных семиотиков — обращать по мере своих возможностей боль­
ше внимания на человеческие и природные катастрофы, которые 
встречаются глобально и повсеместно, и рассматривать возможные 
последствия таких катастроф. В статье расследуются семиотические 
последствия цунами, которое пронеслось во время Рождества 2004 
года и унесло четверть миллиона человеческих жизней. Предла­
гается семиотика бедствия, которая основывается на идеях бри­
танского философа-эмпирика 18 века Томаса Рида и современного 
семиотика Д. С. Кларка. Как показывает этимология слова disaster, 
первоначально оно указывало на природные явления и только потом 
его употребление распространилось и на создаваемые человеком 
бедствия (политические или экономические). Хотя дихотомия куль­
тура — природа неудачна, автор все же пользуется здесь словом 
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disaster именно в традиционном значении, указывая только на при­
родные бедствия. 
Õnnetuse semiootika: Alternatiiv 'globaalsemiootikale'? 
Thomas Sebeok'i 'globaalsemiootika' on inspireerinud mitmeid semioo­
tikuid, nimetaksin neist Marcel Danesi't, Susan Petrilli't ja Auguste 
Ponzio't. Siiski, vaatamata selle sõna trendikusele, vajab globaalse mõiste 
täpsemat vaatlust, eriti tänapäevases ökoloogilises ja poliitökonoomilises 
kontekstis. Globaalsemiootikute ülesanne on oma võimaluste piires pöö­
rata enam tähelepanu inimlikele ja looduslikele õnnetustele, mis glo­
baalselt ja peaaegu igapäevaselt ette tulevad, ja vaadelda selliste õnnetuste 
võimalikke tagajärgi. Artiklis uuritakse semiootilisi järelmeid tsunamile, 
mis leidis aset 2004. aasta jõulupühade ajal ja nõudis veerand miljonit 
inimelu Lõuna- ja Kagu-Aasias. Esitatakse õnnetuse semiootika, mis 
toetub 18. sajandi briti empiritsistlikule filosoofile Thomas Reid'iie ja 
tänapäeva semiootikule David S. Clarke'iie. Nagu sõna disaster etümo­
loogia näitab, viitas see esmalt looduslikele nähtustele, 'ebameeldivale 
planeedile', ning üksnes hiljem laienes ta kasutus inimese loodud 
hädadele, olgu poliitilistele või majanduslikele. Kuigi looduse ja kultuuri 
dihhotoomia pole enam hea ega asjakohane, kasutab autor sõna disaster 
traditsioonilises tähenduses, viidates üksnes looduslikele õnnetustele. 
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Abstract. The study of natural disaster and its discursive dimensions from a 
semiotic perspective can provide a theoretical frame for the scientific commu­
nication of global catastrophes. In this paper I will suggest two models; one is 
a semiotic model on the natural catastrophic events and the other is a hexagon 
model composed of semiotic dimensions of natural disaster discourse. The six 
main modules include narration, description, explication, visualization, pre­
vention, and recovery action. 
1. Introduction: Context 
Tsunami, Katrina, Kashmir, we have rarely witnessed human tragedy 
on these scales. Contemporary natural catastrophes are often repre­
sented in media with rhetoric and imagery taken from the Tsunami. 
This paper does not deal with how media visualize the event of the 
Tsunami itself, but focused on the semiotic implications of the Tsu­
nami discourse represented in media. It considers natural disasters as a 
semiotic object and a discourse of enormous cultural capital and ar­
gues that the persistent recurrence of natural catastrophes and the 
practice of its transfer images raise many important questions for the 
economy of representation in narration, description and explication of 
news events. In the global appropriations of cultural meaning of natu­
ral catastrophes a significant shift has happened from the natural dis­
aster as event to natural disaster theory: the use of the natural catastro­
phe and its cultural representation as a political and critical tool and as 
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a genre, as well as its commodification within and for contemporary 
media discourse production. With this shift, the Tsunami has been 
integrated into global scientific consciousness. According to Marc 
Augé (2005), it signaled the planetary consciousness of global threats. 
With increased removal from its primary referent, the natural catastro­
phe itself and the uses of its images turns more and more into an 
imaginary, the French idea of 'imaginaire' as the constructed mental 
landscape of collective aspirations. 
2. Objective and method 
Tsunami should be able to play an important role in the development of 
a semiotics of catastrophes. In the representation of catastrophic events, 
Tsunami has come to influence and structuralize the media's narratives 
of natural disasters. Tsunami has also come to generate the critical appa­
ratus for theorizing this representation: the various epistemological and 
semiotic approaches, ideas about the role of the media in catastrophic 
events, about how to disseminate and construct a communication strat­
egy of such event and ultimately about how to analyze and gain a semi­
otic understanding of contemporary natural disaster discourses. 
The question is what kind of scripts has been formed out of natural 
disaster discourse about how to represent, think and experience sci­
ence in the face of catastrophe. The purpose of this paper is to conduct 
a preliminary speculation on what kind of epistemological move has 
been performed when production and consumption of natural disaster 
discourses took place within the framework of Tsunami event. The 
topic will be considered with a focus on the uses of Tsunami imagery. 
This paper will bring three areas of expertise (structural semiotics, 
discourse analysis, and scientific communication) together to this end 
and make an attempt to explore the techniques of constructing highly 
ambivalent images that represent sciences either as adjuvants or criticize 
them as powerless, incapable of resolving this kind of natural event. 
3. Natural disasters and globalization: 
Ambivalence of sciences in an era of globalization 
In modern "risk society", everybody is obliged to deal with uncertain­
ties and their consequences (Beck 1992). Facing risks has been part of 
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everyday life nowadays. In fact, in global ecological threats, a lack of 
confidence in science may result in various, contradictory fears. Peo­
ple may fear the possibility in which science is powerless in the face 
of natural disasters. In other cases, people may also be concerned 
about that science is so superhumanly powerful that some scientific 
inventions could be even harmful to the human benefit. 
In sum, recent natural disasters have caused an increased feeling of 
insecurities and a mixture of great expectations and fear about science. 
If it is correct to refer to the popular perceptions of the sciences as "a 
mixture of great expectations, fears, utilitarian interests, curiosities, 
ancient prejudices, and superstition" (Gerbner 1987: 110), other visual 
médias such as Film and TV can be interpreted as a major source for 
these ambivalent attitudes represented in public images. 
When confronted with the applications of scientific research, or 
with new technologies, people may be torn between a frenetic desire 
to consume, particularly when given with new possibilities of com­
munication, and ancestral fears reactivated and updated, like the fear 
of the year 2000. Such two kinds of contradictory feelings are all re­
lated to transformation of world view. The world of news and images 
which submerges us merely confirms our feeling that we are living in 
a global situation from which no escape is possible. The future of our 
societies, indeed the future of the planet as an array of societies, can­
not be imagined without science (Augé 2005). 
The paper's working premise is that contemporary natural disasters 
should be considered as effects of, as well as media and catalysts for, 
processes of globalization. They are distinguishable from earlier large-
scale disasters by the various forms of transnational causal chains in 
which they are involved. Because contemporary natural disasters are 
embedded in globalizing processes, they should be studied in the 
context of the various facets of globalization. In this regard, it's timely 
helpful to get ideas from global semiotics which focuses on the inter­
connection among signs and all forms over the planet, and their rela­
tions of interdependence. In this vein it seems to me relevant to apply 
a theoretical framework of global semiotics to the phenomena of natu­
ral disaster (Chang 2006). 
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4. Socio-semiotic features 
of contemporary natural disasters 
Let me briefly mention some semiotic features of contemporary natu­
ral disasters. 
4.1. Social constructedness 
Unlike ordinary natural disasters, the social constructedness of these 
events is a crucial aspect of the experience of those who undergo or 
witness a natural catastrophe. What characterizes contemporary natu­
ral disasters is the fact that nature has been entirely socialized and 
natural causal chains cannot be disassociated from social ones. 
4.2. Multi-dimensionality and liminality 
Compared to their precedents, then, contemporary natural disasters 
might be determined as large scale, multi-dimensional events that 
transcend any specific boundaries and resist to conventional causal 
explanations and traditional ways to contain and manage the rapid 
dissemination of their destructive effects. 
Some of the most terrible natural disasters do not obey such model 
of the demarcated event as its relatively clear delimitation between 
center and periphery, event and context, before and after. Such catas­
trophes are not concentric, site-specific events, and can be perceived 
only as a multiple network, or a rhizome (to use Deleuze and Guat-
tari's notion). They lack any clear temporality, and their effects are 
still being disseminated over vast and distinct regions (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987). 
4.3. Interdependency between globalization and natural catastrophe 
As the news reports have made clear about the Tsunami catastro­
phe, this natural disaster can properly be called a planetary catastro­
phe. Although many scientists would easily agree that natural disasters 
today could not be studied out of the context of globalization, one 
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could invert this line of thought, and study globalization itself through 
the special perspective obtained through contemporary natural disas­
ters. Natural disasters will be interpreted as productive events, i.e., not 
only as effects of, but also as media and catalysis for, processes of 
globalization. 
This paper's thesis is that contemporary natural disasters enhance 
novel global orders of human existence, transform social cultural and 
economic relations, promote new forms of morality and shape new 
forms of political governance. 
5. Semiotic configurations of natural disasters 
5.1. Semiotic modeling of natural disasters 
Given Umberto Eco's (1984) recognition that any natural event can be 
a sign, it might be possible to conceive a semiotics of natural disaster 
in the framework of natural semiotics. In this context Eco underlined 
an essential role of diverse inferences which are at work at every level 
of semiosis in the understanding of natural signs, in order to demon­
strate that "the understanding of signs is not a mere matter of recogni­
tion (of a stable equivalence); it is a matter of interpretation" (Eco 
1984; 43). 
Here I would present a morphodynamic model of René Thorn's 
(Thom 1983). His ideas from a morphosemiotic and topological per­
spective is an example of semiotics of natural disaster par excellence. 
There is semiosis — participation of the semiotic — in all morpho­
logical process of (spatio-temporal) transfer: Source-Message-Re­
ceptor that one can symbolize as the Figure 1 (Thom 1981: 301). 
This model may raise some objections especially because it lacks 
subject-predicate structure characteristic in language, intention for 
communication, and rules of interpretation. There are processes of 
purely physical transfer, for them, a priori, which cannot be accepted 
as a semiotic interpretation. Therefore, when Tsunami took place, no­
body imagined some semiotic configuration. However, in this process 
of Tsunami, some dynamic elements are actually contained in the en­
tire processes of conventional communication. An essential criterion 
(a priori) of semiotic characteristic of a transfer concerns the inten­
tionally of sender subject who wishes that the content of message 
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would be absorbed by the receiver. If one interprets natural disasters 
semiotically, one might invoke the effect of a malevolent intentional­
ly which used a giant wave of water as an instrument. There was an 
assertion that nature was not so small and diminished but more power­
ful than our plans and impositions. 
Figure 1. Catastrophic schema: Source (S) — message (M) — receptor 
(R). 
Thorn's model poses some very subtle questions concerning the 
agency of interpretation, the inferential nature of sign and also re­
minds us of the notions of natural signs in the pre-history of semiotics 
(Manetti 1993; Peirce 1998). In the case of Tsunami the tectonic slide-
tsunami waves connection as a sign of possible future event would 
indeed lack both a sender and a message-goal. But, it might be admis­
sible to argue for the existence of a natural phenomena as a kind of 
sign producer or source in this case and the sign-receiver or destina­
tion serving to designate whoever might observe the tectonic slide and 
make a connection that produces an intelligible sign indicating poten­
tial tsunami waves. 
5.2. Syntactics, semantics, pragmatics 
The discussion above may serve as the point of departure for our in­
vestigation into natural disaster as sign. Whether it is an earthquake or 
a tsunami, a natural disaster involves at least three phases: (1) occur­
rence of a natural event, (2) representations of it, and (3) after-effects 
of the happening. 
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This brings us to a number of principles of narratology, which 
center on the concepts of transformation, desire, and lack. As a narra­
tive, natural disaster is a form of expression that deals with transfor­
mations. This is illustrated by Arthur Dan to's tripartite formula for an 
event, defined as a transformation in time and of time (Danto 1968). 
( 1 ) X is F at time t\ 
(2) E happens to X at time ti 
(3) X is G at time 1Ъ 
In the present case, X is the affected place by natural disasters. Narra­
tives are about protagonists attempting to attain a goal, that is to say 
an object of value, which they attain or do not attain. Taking the prin­
ciples of desire and transformation together, we can say that all trans­
formations lead to a conjunction or a disjunction. In common lan­
guage the word "disaster" is used to refer to a distinct event that inter­
rupts habitual flow of everyday life. It seems very interesting to re­
mark that the narrative structures of disasters are similar to Aristotle's 
rules of drama: there are a beginning and a middle and an end. On the 
contrary, Tsunami disaster does not adhere to all the rules of plot in 
generating epistemological confusion and ontological uncertainty. 
5.3. Syncretism of nature and culture 
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, defines natural disaster as 'the con­
sequence of a natural hazard and human activities. The key concept 
here is the human vulnerability which determines the translation of 
natural hazard into structural human and cultural losses. This point is 
demonstrated by biosemiotics. The impact on both nature and culture, 
resulting from the tsunami, is considerable, particularly with regard to 
damage of coastal ecosystems and of cultural assets. Such losses may 
affect the rich cultural life in crisis-stricken countries and can threaten 
traditional livelihoods. Given the fact that there are different Natures 
in semiosphere embedded in cultural and cosmological context, there 
cannot be a transparent naturalness (Kull 1998). The explanatory divi­
sions between nature and culture are no longer consistently sustained. 
These points suggest that we live, as Haraway might put it, in "nature-
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cultre". In this vein I want to propose the following typology of dis­
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Figure 2. Semiotic square of natural disaster. 
6. Semiotic dimensions of natural disaster discourse: 
A hexagon model 
The paper's key point is to present a semiotic approach to contempo­
rary natural disaster discourses that takes into account their visual, 
narrative and scientific aspects. I propose a hexagon model which 
shows semiotic constitution of natural disaster discourse (see Fig. 3). 
6.1. Visual discourse: Ecology of images 
Photography, film and electronic media are the most popular sources 
of pictures which shape and influence collective memory. Very little is 
known about the formation of popular images of science in general 
Semiotics of natural disaster discourse in post-tsunami world 239 
and even less in relation to the impact that visual media could have on 

















Figure 3. Semiotic dimensions of natural disaster discourse. 
The images of the Tsunami cause distress. They serve to make us feel 
ourselves present at the site of disaster, to make visible, imaginable 
what has happened. They also bring about as much empathy as under­
standing. The dimension of pathos is most conspicuous here. 
Susan Sontag suggested that photographs must be weighted against 
the obliviousness they dispel as well as against the cruel disregard 
they might drive, the exploitation they might cause, and the perils of 
interpretation. In her most recent book, Regarding the Pain of Others, 
S. Sontag remarked that being a spectator of natural or human disas­
ters taking place in another country is fundamentally modern experi­
ence. She argued that we should construct an ecology of images to 
maintain feeling of compassion. What is now most striking now about 
Sontag's argument is that it is not so much about visual image but 
about compassion, an emotion and an ethic that visual can awaken or 
undermine (Sontag 2001; 2004). 
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6.2. Narrative discourse 
Narrative dimension of natural disaster discourse forms a network 
consisting of multiple scientific and folkloric interpretations of series 
of transformations amongst iconic, indexical and symbolic signs. In 
fact, many narratives of the tsunami disaster under discussion corre­
spond to this folkloric nature, including animistic belief in the rage of 
sea god and animals' sixth sense saving their lives, etc. (Chang 2006). 
In fact natural disasters are represented as acts of God or caprices of 
amoral nature. Consequently, there is always a dimension of narrativ-
ity (a story to be told about them), and deontic and ethic dimensions (a 
moral lesson to be drawn from them, always a share of blame to be 
assigned). There are many genres of narratives from sound geophysi­
cal readings to eyewitness narratives of various points of views. It is 
possible to talk of 'the public interpretation' of natural disasters al­
though these interpretations based upon Peirce's abduction and Eco's 
encyclopedia are often overcoded by religion and superstition. In sum 
it is important to recognize the yawning gap between the big stories 
like scientific narratives of explication and the small local forms of 
testimony. 
6.3. Media's reporting discourse 
Most of the information we have about natural disaster discourse 
comes to us by the way of the mass media. But, it does not, for the 
most part, come as explicit reporting about risk. Instead, most report­
ing about hazards and their associated risks comes in the guise of 
news and feature stories about accidents, illnesses, natural disasters, 
and scientific breakthroughs. 
6.4. Science's explicative discourse 
The scientific discourse on the natural disasters is causal in nature. 
Not surprisingly, the central cause target of such explanation is the 
elucidation of cause-effect relationships among variables of interests. 
Although the scientific discourse is upon the observation of natural 
phenomena, scientists confess they cannot explain everything. Seien-
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tific discourse does not always address the most fundamental causes 
of the disaster; when, where and why to happen, etc. 
The semiotic analysis of scientific discourse is framed by a sophisti­
cated theory of how language and other semiotic resource systems are put 
together as the means through which meanings are fabricated. In this vein, 
we need to investigate actantial structures and deontic doing of scientific 
discourse (Greimas 1976). This has important implications for a general 
semiotic theory on the processes of social meaning. 
The social heteroglossia should demonstrate how the meaning-
making practices of a given community construct systems of relations 
among texts, or give voice to, the different cultural positionings and 
social view in a given community. 
6.5. Recovery actional discourse 
Contemporary natural disasters exemplify a field of interaction be­
tween scientific organizations that try to address the root causes of 
catastrophes and those organizations that specialize in relief opera­
tions and the delivery of aid in emergencies. While subjects of the first 
type address themselves to the wider context of catastrophes (which 
are usually yet to come), agents of the second type underline the black 
hole itself in which whole life-world including cultural defenses has 
been collapsed. Humanitarians are gradually establishing themselves 
as prominent mediators of moral sensibility and responsibility. The 
two parties, however, have tendency to manipulate different ideologi­
cal and semiotic discourses. 
6.6. Preventive discourse 
The core idea of prevention discourse is that prevention is the best 
defense against natural disasters. We can reduce the damage from 
these disasters through effective prevention measures. In order to bet­
ter protect communities under threat from natural disasters, it is cru­
cial to fully integrate disaster prevention into reconstruction efforts. 
For example, UNESCO is extending its long experience in tsunami 
mitigation, for the establishment of an Early Warning System for the 
Indian Ocean, as the first step towards a global alert system. First of 
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all, the distribution in time and space of these phenomena must be 
evaluated through the scientific means at our disposal. Indigenous 
prevention measures are also an important factor. In the area of natural 
disasters, semiotics' role is to bring about a better understanding of the 
semiotic features of this preventive discourse. Semiotically oriented 
scientific communication can contribute, with others, against disasters 
in world communities, through a better awareness of the seriousness 
of these natural disasters and the need to promote means of prevention 
as an integral part of sustainable development. 
7. Conclusion 
This preliminary study is a semiotic approach to the semiosis of natu­
ral disaster and semiotic constitution of natural disaster discourses. In 
order to implement this semiotic modeling, the parameters must be 
more precisely defined and some empirical research should be done to 
testify the validity of this model. 
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Семиотика природных катастроф: 
теоретическое обрамление 
Изучение природных катастроф и их дискурсивных измерений в 
семиотической перспективе нуждается в теоретическом обрамлении, 
позволяющем развить научную дискуссию о сущности глобальных 
катастроф. В данной статье предлагаются две модели: семиотическая 
модель природной катастрофы как события и шестиугольная (гекса­
генная) модель семиотических измерений дискурса природной ка­
тастрофы. Основные шесть модулей последней модели: наррация 
(рассказ), описание, выражение, визуализация, предотвращение и 
восстановление. 
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Looduskatastroofi semiootika tsunamijärgses maailmas: 
teoreetiline raamistik 
Looduskatastroofide ja selle diskursiivsete dimensioonide uurimine 
semiootilises perspektiivis vajab teoreetilist raamistikku, mis võimaldaks 
arendada teaduslikku diskussiooni globaalkatastroofide üle. Artiklis 
pakutakse välja kaks võimalikku mudelit: üks on looduskatastroofide kui 
sündmuste semiootiline mudel ja teine — looduskatastroofidiskursuse 
semiootiliste dimensioonide heksagonaalne mudel. Viimase kuus põhi-
moodulit on jutustamine, kirjeldus, väljendus, visualiseerimine, prevent­
sioon ja taastamine. 
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Impact or explosion? 
Technological culture and the ballistic metaphor 
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School of Communications and Arts 
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Abstract. The term 'impact' has become the kind of word which, when it re­
lates to the evaluation of technological advances in contemporary culture, 
suggests signs of erosion, debilitation and evasion. The misinformed and in­
discriminate use of the term in the most varied of contexts has created an im­
passe in the cultural semiotic approach, where sign systems are viewed in 
terms of borders and relations. The objective of this article is to examine the 
trivialisation of the use of the ballistic metaphor in this explosive moment of 
the culture. For this, we will refer to the formulations presented by the semi-
otician, Juri Lotman, in his book, appropriately entitled Culture and Explo­
sion. To what degree is the concept of explosion presented as a counterpart to 
the notion of impact? The desire to find answers to this question is what moti­
vated this inquiry. 
Introduction: Technologies, degree zero 
What could the ideas of the philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) 
have in common with modern digital-electronic technology? Perhaps 
neither Marilena Chaui, the teacher of philosophy who has been 
studying the Spinoza's essays for many years, nor the mega-magnate, 
Bill Gates, could say. However, for many theoreticians or media pro­
fessionals, there is at least one aspect in common between the prod­
ucts of technology and the work of the philosopher: both are capable 
of provoking an impact on the life of people, culture or society. For 
the journalist who announced the publication, in Brazil, of Chaui's 
new book dedicated to the study of the thought of Spinoza, "the ob­
jective of the work is to demonstrate the impact of the ideas of the 
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Dutch philosopher on all areas of Western thought".1 I have nothing 
against his evaluation. After all, if technologies can be responsible for 
certain impacts on the contemporary world, why can't the ideas of a 
philosopher have an equal impact? My inquiry is different from this. 
I do not doubt that ideas are capable of forcing an action on hu­
manity, on culture, on society. I also recognize that advances inside 
the world of ideas and the field of knowledge usually provoke sharp 
upheavals. My doubt, however, lies in the notion that 'impact' is so 
naturally connected to modern digital-electronic technologies so as to 
produce an ignominious effect on culture. Today, there is not a call for 
a meeting or conference, a book, an article in a scientific magazine or 
journalistic material on technology that does not make use of the word 
'impact', thus neutralising adverse positions to an irreconcilable de­
gree. It is possible that such a precise semantic background can define 
such adverse manifestations without running the risk of trivialisation? 
Either the phenomenon of "impact" in fact obscures mysteries re­
quiring a global inquiry or we are faced with a serious epistemological 
mistake. 
The impasse tends to grow when related to an understanding of an 
anthropo-semiotic conception of culture; from the time that Clifford 
Geertz took upon himself the task of examining "the impact of the 
concept of culture on the concept of man" (Geertz 1989: 45-66). 
Could it be that the anthropologist had it in mind to situate culture 
outside humanity? 
Whilst it is the kind of word used in contemporary culture, it is 
necessary to evaluate the relevance of the use of ballistic metaphor as 
the degree zero of the explosive movements of culture. The coherence 
observed in the field of anthropology, does not hold up when related 
to the semiotic evaluation of an event. The notion of 'impact' can, 
quite simply, be trivialised by the inability of the thought to reach the 
reality of its object. When all is said and done, such a revolutionary 
moment as that unleashed by digital-electronic technologies does not 
fit into the limits of 'impact'. On the contrary, new technologies are 
eruptions which arise from a gradual, slow process, created by the 
accumulation of continually evolving dynamic processes, between 
time and eternity, if we were to paraphrase Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine, 
1 Article published in the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, March 24, 1999 (Ilus-
trada, p. 3) on the occasion of the publication of a book by Marilena Chaui 
(1999). 
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Stengers 1988). It is something comparable to the Big-Bang, the ex­
pansion of which cannot be denied. This is the problem that needs to 
be examined if we are to take a path which eliminates neutralisation. 
Geertz's impact 
Clifford Geertz was not without cares in announcing his concept on 
the impact of the concept of culture on the concept of man. Fearing 
that the heading of his essay could excite controversy, Geertz began 
by clarifying that his definition of culture is essentially semiotic: "man 
is an animal chained by the web of meanings he himself has conceived 
(Geertz 1989: 15). It is a concept which revisits the memorable sen­
tence of the Russian, Mikhail Bakhtin: "when we study man, we 
search and we find signs everywhere and we try to understand their 
significance" (Bakhtin 1986: 114). Geertz's intention was to defend 
the symbolic system as a fundamental tool of culture; and this he per­
ceived as having an impact on the concept of man. After all, neither 
the concept of man propagated by the Enlightenment, based on innate 
ability, nor the definition of man from behaviour, as became typical in 
the social sciences, had admitted such a possibility. "A web of mean­
ings" is neither innate nor reproductive of concrete standards of be­
haviour, such as habits, customs, traditions. For Geertz, these refer to 
mechanisms of control aimed at governing behaviour. Such mecha­
nisms are developed by culture. Herein lies the core element of 'im­
pact', once the evolutionary arrow has been redirected: biological and 
cultural development begin to be understood as interactive rather than 
causal movements. On the basis of such redirection, the major element 
in the definition of man lies not in "the empirical trivialities of human 
behaviour" and still less in human innate abilities, but in the mecha­
nisms of control without which human behaviour would be unman­
ageable. Geertz recognizes that his ideas are not new, however 
certain recent developments, as much in anthropology as in other sciences 
(cybernetics, information theory, neurology, molecular genetics) had become 
susceptible to a more precise affirmation, in order to afford them a certain de­
gree of empirical support which they did not previously possess. (Geertz 
1989: 57) 
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In this sense, culture functions as a centre of production for the 
mechanisms of control to directing behaviour. If it were 
not directed by cultural norms — organized systems of symbolic signs — the 
behaviour of the man would be virtually unmanageable, a simple, meaningless 
chaos of acts and emotional explosions [...]. This means that culture, rather 
than being added, so to speak, to a finished or virtually finished animal, is an 
ingredient, and an essential ingredient, in the production of exactly this ani­
mal. (Geertz 1989: 58, 59) 
On the basis of this position, Geertz's intention is to show that man 
not only creates signs, but he is controlled by them (a position also 
defended by the Russian semiotician V. V. Ivanov (1977: 27-38) who 
defines a convergence with cybernetics, a hypothesis also considered 
by Geertz). The major sign systems (languages, art, myth, rituals, me­
dia and the sign systems of contemporary culture) have become sys­
tems of feedback, control and organization of the biological system. 
Soon, there will be no human nature without culture: "we are incom­
plete and unfinished animals, and are completed through culture". 
Culture fills the informational gap of man (Geertz 1989: 61). 
The controversial position of Geertz has regard, therefore, to the 
interconnection between biological and cultural mechanisms through a 
principle of complementarity. He clearly states that human is an un­
finished being, constantly developing and seeking completion. For 
him, "the discovery of that most of the biological changes produced 
by modern man, apart from man's more immediate ancestors, oc­
curred in the central nervous system, and especially in the brain" 
(Geertz 1989: 58), is an undeniable sign of incompletion. Therefore, it 
is in the development of tools, manuals and intellect that the intercon­
nection appears most appropriate. If it is true that man must learn in 
order to function, it is equally true that man needs to learn to think in 
order to develop. Development, here, represents completion. 
The Geertzian notion of impact is, therefore, justified. It intervenes 
with consolidated conceptual fields, undoing beliefs and distinctions, 
as the polemical opposition between nature and culture. 
Will this be the case of the notion of impact in the field of contem­
porary technological culture? This is what we will now consider. 
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Semiodiversity of technological culture 
Before moving on, it is necessary to make a precise determination as 
to whether the concept of technology represents a redirection of cul­
ture, in Geertzian terms, so that we can reflect on the issue of 'im­
pact'. As a starting point, let us consider the definition presented by 
McLuhan: "Technologies", affirmed the theoretician, "are ways of 
translating one kind of knowledge into another" and "translation is, 
thus, a 'spelling-out' of forms of knowing" (McLuhan 1998: 56). 
Technology is explicitness. So, explicitness is a mechanism responsi­
ble for the improvement of technological tools that permit, amongst 
other things, the expansion of different sign systems, codes and cul­
tures. In this sense, technologies appear as part of a gradual process, 
proper to all evolutionary technique, as it was conceived by Juri Lot-
man (1994; 1999). However, each new technology represents an ex­
plosive movement in culture, but as a crossroads rather than a causal 
effect. Evidential proof of this process is to be found in a currently 
increasing semiodiversity. When situated in the gradual scale of ex­
plicitness, that is, against the background of semiodiversity, the idea 
of 'impact' starts to show signals of fragility and inadequacy. So much 
has been said about the notion of the 'impact' of digital-electronic 
technologies on writing and this controversial example is as much 
polemic as it is enlightening; fertile ground for the current reflection. 
Firstly, it is worth remembering that writing as technology is a de­
scendent of the gradual process of the explicitness of technological 
culture. The fact that it consisted of extremely simple codes or discreet 
signs did not prevent it from becoming our first technology, referred 
to by the anthropologist Jack Goody as: "the technology of the intel­
lect". Its devices had already experienced diverse explicitness and 
expansion, most likely initiated by the Sumeri ans and is far from be­
ing complete. Writing has already explored diverse areas of possibil­
ity: alphabetical writing has already been handwritten, typographical 
and, today, it is digital-electronic. The character of explicitness is em­
bedded in the concept of writing in such way that, naturally, it may be 
used for writing sign systems which are not articulated by an alpha­
betical code, for example, as is the case when drawing an image. Thus 
writing is a designation of the semiodiversity of technologies of the 
intellect; and is entirely in contrast to any idea of impact. However, it 
32 
250 Irene Machado 
has also been one of the most expressive ways of demonstrating the 
effect of the impact of modern technologies. 
For many lauded scholars of culture, electronic technologies not 
only have an impact on society, they are becoming a great threat to 
writing!... The Brazilian linguist, Maurizzio Gnerre, leads the stream 
of critics who take this point of view. For him, 
writing, and the reflection of the impact of writing on human society, appears 
to be an object of interest when it, whilst being practised inside traditional 
forms, seems to have already reached its apogee and appears ready to become 
an obsolete activity. Whilst important decision-making centres manipulate 
billions of data and information through a whole range of new technologies, 
traditional writing is slowly losing its position — previously exclusive — in 
this process, it also becomes an object of reflection. (Gnerre 1991: 41-42; 
italics are mine — I. M.) 
For the linguist, digital technology has nothing to do with writing; it 
can, therefore, threaten it and exterminate it. With this, traditional 
writing (sic!) is becoming an archaeological artefact to be examined, 
perhaps even relegated to visiting in major museums of the scholastic 
world which defined it. 
Perhaps the position of the Brazilian linguist is not entirely unjusti­
fiable. After all, we live in a country whose literary culture includes a 
high degree of illiteracy. In this case, one could affirm that writing in 
the alphabetical language runs the risk of obsolescence: not everyone 
who, today, manipulates a digital keyboard with great dexterity pos­
sesses the textual ability to write even the most trivial note in their 
mother tongue, everything is dominated by the process of typing and 
digitalisation. The suspicion of the writer Alberto Moravia is thus con­
firmed when, for sure, we can affirm that the problem of our time is 
that now illiterate people know how to read... A paradox that could be 
synthesized by the idea that we are creating the most cultured illiter­
ates on the planet. 
Whilst the exception is made, electronic technology need not pro­
ceed to lead to the obsolescence of writing. If the linguist identifies 
traditional writing, distinguishing it from that of modern digital writ­
ing, it is because "writing modifies itself'. It has not disappeared and 
it has shown itself to be even more necessary. The proof of this is that 
the text in which he declares the obsolescence of writing was written 
and printed in a technological way, or better, digitised and copied by 
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an electronic system. Such arguments reproduce a commonality of the 
type of mistake that Plato fell into when condemning writing for all in 
a generation who could only access his ideas through a written com­
position. 
If we recognize the interactive function as an elementary mecha­
nism of contemporary technological culture, we cannot admit to a no­
tion about the impact on culture which is so exaggeratedly dissemi­
nated, especially between the "written" and the "digital system". As 
N. Negroponte never ceases to affirm, we are talking about a "differ­
ence between atoms and bits", nothing more. There is nothing of im­
pact, because, overall, the bit does not possess colour, size, volume, 
depth and, much less, weight, even so it has the capacity to travel at 
the speed of the light. "To be digital it is to have license to grow", to 
expand, to be open to possibilities and not to gravitate around any old 
centre (Negroponte 1997: 19, 46). Growth, however, does not appear 
out of nothing; it only can appear via atoms. Or better, in terms of an 
interaction between atoms and bits and also of the mixtures of bits. 
The bits, move in a fluid network; and this is what creates open ex­
pansion. This may also be of interest for economics or sociology [of 
this I have few doubts] but it is fundamental for semiotics. Without 
interactivity, there is no semiotic chain, much less semiosis. This did 
not pass unobserved by Clifford Geertz. 
Explicitness becomes confusion in the revolution of strong im­
pacts; whereas technology is ejected from culture as if it were a body 
alien to it. In such a situation the so-called ballistic metaphor of the 
impact on culture emerges in a huge way. It is time to approach a 
more declarative approximation of the word 'impact' in the domain of 
semantics and conceptual achievments. 
Defining ballistic metaphor 
It was previously affirmed that, in any reflection on the culture of to­
day, the word 'impact' appears as a natural appendix of technology, 
thus forming a basic conceptual nucleus of all that relates thereto. 
There are as many fervent allies of "new" technologies as there are 
cruel adversaries of "advance" or "impact". My doubt lies in this neu­
tralising association of dissenters. If culture represents the collective 
intellect of management, gradual processes, control mechanisms, how 
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can we identify the linking of its learning, of its successes, if in the 
present moment an alien body is causing a short circuit in the flow of 
its development? 
Advance does not necessarily imply impact which is no more than 
a poor metaphor. The sociologist, Pierre Lévy, has very much dis­
qualified the metaphor of impact so naturally applied to the advance of 
the current technologies. For Lévy, in this metaphor where "technol­
ogy [is] comparable to a projectile (rock, howitzer, missile) and cul­
ture or society to an ambulant target...", a minimum condition for the 
verification of the management of cultural knowledge, its discoveries 
and the generating tools of cultural systems do not exist. The totality 
of the project of propagated intelligence of cognitive ecology is en­
gaged. And Lévy, very ironically, asks: "Could it be that these tech­
niques come from another planet, the world of machines, cold, emo­
tionless, stranger to all human meaning and value, as a certain intel­
lectual tradition tends to suggest?" (Lévy 1997). Evidently not. We 
learnt in Lotman's (1990) studies on the semiosphere that in the semi­
otic space, extra-semiotic elements are carriers of translations and, 
between them, create border relations. 
Nevertheless technologies are products of society and culture. So 
we have to agree with Lévy when he says, 
not only are these techniques imagined, manufactured and reinterpreted for 
human use, but it is the proper intensive use of tools that constitutes humanity 
as such (together with complex language and social institutions). It is the same 
humanity who speaks, buries her or his dead and cuts the stone. [In this 
sense,] it is not a case of evaluating impacts, but of discovering the irreversi­
ble, the uses to which they would lead. (Levy 1997: 3) 
This affirmation is sufficient to suggest that the semiodiversity of 
technological culture is something which it is much more important to 
preserve and to disseminate than the notion of impact. Thus technolo­
gies can only be considered tools through which the process of cere­
bral completion looks to develop its search for complementarity, so 
doing via notions of "interior'' and "exterior" which are treated as be­
ing translators and border-generating processes. 
Moreove the proper etymology of the word 'impact' precludes the 
misinformed use of the word, and is unsuitable for semiotic studies. 
Impact, a term originating from the Latin term impactu, as a semantic 
encounter entails the notion of force, and from that to the specific or 
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encountered domain of war, or better, the traumatic effect of a projec­
tile, missile or bomb as it meets another body or surface. Thanks to 
the notion of shaking, the impact registers the resultant emotional 
manifestations as great traumas or disturbances. There is no other 
meaning for the word impact in ambient technology. In this field of 
research, the study of impact seeks to account for the risks and prob­
lems that a specific area may suffer if, into it, is inserted a strange, 
artificial element. For example: given the damage that the construction 
of a highway, or the installation of an industrial complex, or a dam, 
can cause to the environment where should they be installed? Anyone 
who lives in the city of Sao Paulo, in Brazil, knows very well what 
happened after the transformation of the nearby village of Cubatao 
into the biggest concentration of iron and steel industry of Latin 
America. Its impact on the environment (acid rains and all types of 
pollutant gases) was horrific for animals, plants and human beings. 
There was no one person who was not shocked when media tired of 
showing smoky images of the region, started to report on the birth of 
babies with bad cerebral malformation or proven cases of encephalitis. 
Events such as these speak radically of the nature of impact: an action 
directed, from one to another one, usually with harmful results. The 
action of impact proceeds from the exterior to the interior; there is no 
border capable of being translated. In this case, really, it is industrial 
technology whose economic purposes cause an undeniable impact not 
on culture, or the environment and its population, but on life. It is im­
possible to apply the same scale of values to the sign systems of cul­
ture. 
Is this, in fact, what scholars in all areas have in mind when they 
refer to the impact of digital-electronic technologies on culture, on 
individuals, on society? I am fully convinced that we are confronted 
here by completely different situations, thus, we cannot mistake the 
issues by playing with a semantic domain which is apparently unique 
and neutral. It is impossible to create novel words, much less strate­
gies of neutralisation. 
Evidently the situations reported here show that it is not the se­
mantic domain of the damage that is intended to be valued. I believe 
that the word impact gained ground even before understanding ad­
vanced in the domain of the object itself. The field of medical re­
search, for example, takes us into another sphere in the use of the 
technology. In the same edition of the periodical which announced the 
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publication of the Marilena Chaui's book on Spinoza, Bill Gates, dis­
cussing medicine, confesses his admiration for the medical profession 
and, on a specific level, affirms: "good doctors enjoy sufficient per­
sonal and professional freedom and exert a great positive impact on 
the life of people" (Gates 1999: 2). What it would a "positive impact" 
be? 
We know of the impact (in the strict sense of damage) that certain 
accidents, certain illnesses, provoke to the body. Thanks to equipment, 
rendered more perfect each time by technology, much of this damage 
can be repaired, so long as there is a full acceptance by the organism. 
It is seen, for example, in the case of human prostheses. For those 
whose lives are threatened by the loss of organic functions, of agency 
and limbs, could it be that new technologies might provoke an impact 
which is comparable to the damage of the accident or illness itself? It 
seems not. On the whole, this is due to the fact that the insertion of 
such devices in the body offers the only opportunity to keep on living 
or to carry out vital tasks. Thus, for the mutilated body, to be com­
pleted through products derived from an advance in knowledge in a 
given period of cultural development — such as in the case of a by­
pass, a leg or a mechanical arm, a metal valve or bolt — has no im­
pact. The device serves to repair the damage. Despite the immense 
emotional trauma and the strangeness of the aesthetic arrangement, the 
impact of the technology inserted or connected to the body is of little 
account in such circumstances. And what are these devices? Tech­
nologies. No more than this. They did not come from another planet, 
nor are they forces that seek to provoke destruction on humanity. On 
the contrary, they are complementary objects without which many 
would not have the pleasure of eating, walking, getting dressed, hear­
ing the beat of their heart, pushing a supermarket trolley, even if it 
remains impossible to retrieve the warmth of an embrace... Evidently, 
we are talking of a technological object of the exterior world which, 
translated by the organism, becomes a complement to the body, a 
semiosphere where the interior and exterior elements of the system 
live on the borders, but do not suffer any type of neutralisation. 
Let me talk about two particular examples. In 1998 the famous 
Brazilian top model Ranimiro Lotufo was seriously injured in an acci­
dent and, unfortunately, he lost one of his legs. This man would defi­
nitely have lost his career if he had not been able to remain erect and 
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walk, thanks to a mechanical leg. And so he did. During 'M. Officer'" 
summer fashion collection show of 99, Ranimiro appeared showing 
his mechanical leg in tennis shoes. Everyone who saw his photo on 
advertising billboards was shocked. Not much time later, the media 
announced the cruel accident that cut off the leg of the yachtsman Lars 
Grael during a competition. A few months later he could be seen 
walking with the aid of a mechanical leg. 
Perhaps these examples are enough to show that although positive 
impacts exist, the inadvertent use of the word impact does not elimi­
nate paradoxes. I believe that such use is a result of the precariousness 
of our understanding of cultural discoveries that complete us. From 
this comes the need to review concepts, to re-position the facts and, 
above all, to ponder the meanings of the semantic domain of the term 
used. 
Impact or explosion? 
The notion of impact is applied to products which are so heterogene­
ous that instead of generating meaning they empty the object of any 
sense related to it. If it is true that the cultural development of man 
follows the path of a gradual process, tied to cerebral improvement, a 
new tool or technology cannot so much be considered from the per­
spective of its immediate effect. To classify a tool in positive terms 
can be interesting, but it does not take into account of the irreversibil­
ity that its growth causes. Its significance lies in the process of cultural 
conquests. To achieve such an understanding it is necessary to change 
the method of discussion. 
In studies dedicated to culture and its semiosphere or, alterna­
tively, its semiodiversity, the Russian semiotician, Juri Lotman, pro­
vides for the concept of the border and the dynamic transformations of 
cultural processes where the products are the result of what are de­
fined as explosive moments which take place in the interior of gradual 
processes of development. The Lotmanian notion of explosion is the 
counterpart of the notion of impact. In it, it is possible to consider 
some technologies semiotically, as part of the semiosphere, or alter­
natively, as part of the semiotic space where different sign systems 
2 M. Officer. Summer 99. Catalogue, vol 7, no. 10. See also www.ranimiro.com. 
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occupy the borders and, what is more important, where the various 
extra-systemic constituents can be translated by that which is inside 
without the use of force. This is because semiotic translation does not 
occur through impact, but through explosion. 
Before moving on, it is necessary to clarify the fact that the explo­
sion conceived of by Lotman is a philosophical concept and not a 
physical phenomenon, even though so much has been formulated on 
the latter in the light of the great explosion provoked by the Big-Bang, 
a landmark of the expansion of the universe. In fact, it is not so much 
the phenomenon as the process that lies at the origin of the Lotmanian 
concept. An explosive moment, once it has occurred, is completely 
ignorant of the chain of events. We are talking about a timeless and 
plurisecular moment, a time in which the present 'snapshot' emerges 
from the past, whilst containing all the possibilities of future devel­
opment. 
The moment of explosion interrupts the chain of cause and effect and projects 
onto the surface a space of equally probable events, from which it is impossi­
ble, in principle, to say which will be fulfilled. The moment of explosion lo­
cates itself in the intersection of the past with the future in an almost timeless 
dimension. (Lotman 1994: 35) 
None of this is confused with impact because explosion implies, more 
than anything, interactivity. 
Lotman probably considered that his way of thinking went devel­
oped against the flow of some generalisations on culture. 
At the present moment, European civilisation (including American and Rus­
sian) is experiencing a period of general discredit against the very idea of ex­
plosion. Humanity lived through a penod between the 18th and 20th centuries 
which may be described as the realisation of a metaphor: socio-cultural proc­
esses found themselves under the influence of the image of explosion not as a 
philosophical construct, but rather in terms of its vulgar relationship with gun­
powder, dynamite and nuclear fission. Explosion as a phenomenon of physics, 
transferable to other processes only in the metaphorical sense has, to the con­
temporary man, come to be associated with ideas of devastation and has 
turned into a symbol of destruction. But if, at the core of our representations 
of today, there lies the kinds of associations that existed during periods of 
great openness, such as the Renaissance or art in general, then our under­
standing of the concept of explosion would evoke in us such phenomena as 
the birth of a new living creature or any another creative transformation of the 
structure of life. (Lotman 1999: 22-23) 
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Herein resides the core argument which separates impact from explo­
sion. If, by explosion we are considering the physical phenomenon, 
invested with atomic power, then we will be dealing in this case with 
the idea of impact and the ballistic metaphor suggested by it. How­
ever, if the explosion is an overlapping expansion of a gradual process 
and is, therefore, capable of dialogue with each one of the links of the 
chain without reproducing any of them, then we will be approaching 
culturally explosive processes. Impact expresses the vulgar side that 
trivialises all objects in the vicinity, whether this be a powerful com­
plement to life, such as is the case with human prostheses, or a pro­
jectile, or even an intellectual tool such as digital-alphabetical writing. 
Conclusion 
To consider contemporary culture as an explosive moment is to trav­
erse "the great time of cultures" as conceived by M. Bakhtin (1986), 
as soon as digital-electronic technologies create dialogic relations with 
the past, they point to future possibilities. Just as, in the heat of the 
dazzlingly wonderful accomplishments of the computer and of its 
networks, speculations about life in the next millennium grow at a 
dizzying pace. Future conquests and possibilities inhabit the same se-
miotic space. The future becomes a phenomenon of the extra-system 
which can be translated by the constituent elements of the system. 
Past, present and future live on the borders. In the semiosphere, there 
is not the least risk that an extra-systemic element can attack the inte­
rior. It is not for nothing that Lotman appealed to the mathematical 
theory of sets to elaborate his concept of the border. Thus, in the 
semiosphere, the border corresponds to a modelling process of that 
which lies in the exterior and, therefore, can be translated by that 
which is interior and vice versa (Lotman 1993: 125). 
So far as the border in the semiotics of culture is concerned, the 
main consequence of explosion is the decentralisation between sys­
tems and the redistribution of the borders that exist between them. In 
this sense, Lotman sees explosion as a key to understanding culture 
from a global perspective. In the notion of culture as text, that is, as a 
dynamic system capable of multiplying itself in multiple semiotic 
systems it becomes fundamental. Explosion as an accelerator of the 
development of systems hides the radical transformations that occur in 
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the interior of culture in the form of a chain which promotes the ex­
pansion of systems rather than their destruction. 
What we see in technological culture is the agency of electronic 
objects and something similar to the explosion which Lotman speaks 
of is anchored in the discoveries of Prigogine. In this sense, writing 
would be the most explosive component of the system. If, in culture, 
the scholar explodes orally, in eras of electronic information, writing 
expanded in notational and numerical systems, in the case of digitali-
sation. As the anthropologist and poet, Antonio Risério confirms: 
writing is born in one factor that is already human: graphology. A graphical 
foundation does not exist in the world external to humans — the scribbles of 
monkeys are linked to a potentiality which we only see occurring in captivity, 
with monkeys being submitted to special training [...]. And as with homo 
sapiens, it is risk that converts this into a symbol. The set of traces is in the 
brain. But, in order for it to materialise elsewhere, it requires that the hand be 
put in motion — and that the hand in motion dominates not only its own 
rhythm, but also the technique through which it inscribes. (Risério 1998: 50-
51) 
The movement of the system is always explosive: "the sudden expan­
sion" happens in the interior of a compressed space, a force, which, 
here, is not a gas, but rather the explosive movement of intelligence. 
Something like the dynamic of the Big-Bang which imprinted on cul­
ture the paradigm of explosive manifestation. 
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COPENE. 
Столкновение или взрыв? 
Технологическая культура и баллистическая метафора 
Термин "столкновение, воздействие" (impact) стало словом, которое 
при использовании его в связи с оценкой технологических дости­
жений в современной культуре означает эрозию, ослабление и укло­
нение. Такое неразборчивое употребление этого термина в самых 
разных контекстах привело к необходимости использовать подход 
семиотики культуры, где знаковые системы рассматриваются в 
терминах границ и отношений. Цель настоящей статьи — анализи­
ровать тривиализацию использования этой баллистической мета­
форы в момент культурного взрыва. Для этого обратимся к формули­
ровкам, представленным Юрием Лотманом в его книге "Культура и 
взрыв". В какой мере понятие взрыва противопоставлено понятию 
столкновения? На этот вопрос пытается ответить данная статья. 
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Kokkupõrge või plahvatus? Tehnoloogiline kultuur ja 
ballistiline metafoor 
Termin 'kokkupõrge, mõju' (impact) on saanud sõnaks, mis, kui ta käib 
tehnoloogiliste saavutuste väärtustamise kohta tänapäeva kultuuris, mär­
gib erosiooni, nõtrust ja kõrvalehoidmist. Selle mõistmatu ja hoolimatu 
kasutamine kõige erinevamates kontekstides on loonud tarviduse kultuuri-
semiootilise lähenemise järele, kus märgisüsteeme vaadeldakse piiride ja 
suhete termineis. Käesoleva artikli eesmärk on analüüsida ballistilise 
metafoori kasutuse trivialiseerumist kultuurilise plahvatuse käigus. Sel­
leks pöördume semiootik Juri Lotmani poolt tema raamatus Kultuur ja 
plahvatus esitatud sõnastuste poole. Mil määral on plahvatuse mõiste 
esitatud kokkupõrke mõiste vastandina? Püüd vastata sellele küsimusele 
on motiveerinud käesolevat uurimust. 
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Abstract. Oleg В. ZaslavskiL Structural paradoxes of Russian literature 
and poetics of pseudobroken text. Traditionally, the Pushkin's work "My 
provodili vecher na dache..." is considered to be uncompleted. However, on 
the basis of structural arguments, we show that, in fact, it is completed as an 
artistic whole. Taking also into account the results of previous analysis of 
works by Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol', we introduce a new notion of 
"pseudobroken texts". Their distinctive feature consists in the structural corre­
spondence between the break of a plot and a break as the theme of the text — 
such, that it is the break of a text which confirms that the text is finished. 
From the general viewpoint, such a paradoxical phenomenon can be viewed as 
modeling the impossibility to destroy art and culture. 
Введение 
Вопрос о том, закончено ли произведение или нет, является 
иногда далеко не очевидным. Особенно актуальной эта проблема 
представляется применительно к поэтике Пушкина — здесь пре­
дельная лаконичность не раз вводила исследователей в заблужде­
ние. В результате ряд оставшихся в рукописном виде произведе­
ний, которые в действительности представляют собой закончен­
ное художественное целое, считаются незавершенными, что не 
может не вести к обеднению и искажению их смысла. В пред­
лагаемой работе мы рассматриваем статус одного из таких про­
изведений — "Мы проводили вечер на даче...", который до сих 
пор печатается в разделах "Отрывки и наброски собрания его 
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сочинений, — и приводим аргументы в пользу его закончен­
ности. 
Рассматриваемая проблема имеет также аспект, связанный с 
более общими вопросами структуры художественного текста. В 
серии предыдущих работ (Заславский 1999; 2003; 2004; 2006) 
нами был уже рассмотрен ряд произведений русской класси­
ческой литературы, не доведенных авторами до публикации в 
окончательном виде и традиционно считавшихся незакончен­
ными. Их анализ, проведенный в цитируемых работах, привел к 
другому выводу — что в действительности эти произведения 
полностью завершены. Мы увидим, что независимые разборы 
совершенно разных произведений (включая предложенный в 
настоящей работе) приводят к сходному результату, причем на 
основании сходных аргументов структурного характера. Это 
естественным образом приводит к обобщению полученных ранее 
частных выводов: мы предлагаем выделить в отдельную кате­
горию тексты, в которых имитация оборванности не только 
является значимым фактором их внутренней структуры, но и 
парадоксальным образом удостоверяет их завершенность как ху­
дожественного целого (они названы нами псевдооборванными). 
"Мы проводили вечер на даче..." 
Произведение Пушкина "Мы проводили вечер на даче..." 
(в дальнейшем для краткости МПВД) традиционно рассматри­
вается как неоконченный отрывок. Такой взгляд закономерно 
приводит к тому, что данному произведению отказывают в са­
мостоятельной значимости, рассматривая его лишь как предшест­
венника ''Египетских ночей". Исключением является мнение 
Ахматовой, которая сравнила МПВД с маленькими трагедиями и 
определенно высказалась в пользу законченности этого про­
изведения. Хотя в своей заметке о МПВД Ахматова (1977: 197— 
200) продемонстрировала глубокую читательскую интуицию, она 
тем не менее не привела филологически значимых аргументов. 
Основание для распространенного вывода о незаконченности 
МПВД лежит на поверхности — сюжет действительно обры­
вается, так что дальнейшая история Алексея Иваныча и Вольской 
в ее соотнесенности с "анекдотом" о Клеопатре остается не­
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известной. Вместе с тем, сам факт обрыва сюжета еще не обяза­
тельно означает незавершенности художественной структуры: 
обрыв может тематизироваться и приводить к тому, что "неза­
вершенность" оказывается намеренной (ниже мы приводим ряд 
таких примеров). Сейчас мы покажем, что аналогичное 
обстоятельство действует и в данном случае, так что в действи­
тельности МПВД является законченным. 
Обратим внимание на следующие факторы: (1) возможность 
повторения условий Клеопатры в современном для персонажей 
мире предполагает, что жизнь подражает тексту, (2) в МПВД 
дано изложение истории о Клеопатре в виде незавершенного 
текста, введенного внутрь основного текста ("поэма", начатая, 
но брошенная);1 (3) после получения явственного намека, что 
условия Клеопатры подтверждаются, текст заканчивается, при­
чем таким образом, что главный герой "встал и тотчас исчез". В 
результате исчезновение оказывается двойным — из помещения 
и из текста, а сам текст при этом обрывается как раз на слове 
"исчез", демонстрируя параллель между текстом об обрыве 
жизни и исчезновением персонажа. Более того, ключевая идея 
произведения — о преждевременном и противоестественном об­
рыве жизни — получает в этом случае непосредственное вопло­
щение в структуре самого текста. Читатель никогда не узнает о 
том, что случилось с Алексеем Иванычем и Вольской — подобно 
тому, как не случится дальнейшая жизнь Алексея Иваныча, если 
условие Клеопатры будет принято и исполнено. 
Обратим еще внимание на акцентирование темы отрицания, 
отбрасывания в самом конце, чем еще раз утверждается парал­
лель между обрывом, т.е. отрицанием текста, и отрицанием жиз­
ни. Алексей Иваныч задает вопрос: "Вы не обманываете меня?" и 
получает ответ: "Яет". Обман уже означает отрицание правды, в 
вопросе добавляется частица "не", а ответ, утверждающий 
условие, дается через отрицание. 
Все это заставляет сделать вывод, что обрыв является мнимым 
и художественно значимым — как раз благодаря ему основная 
1  Отметим еще, что обстоятельства, связанные со структурой типа "текст в 
тексте", важные для определения статуса МПВД, оказываются существен­
ными и для определения статуса "Египетских ночей". См. об этом К. 
Штедтке (1986: 138-141). 
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идея произведения и получила воплощение в его художественной 
структуре. Поэтому МПДВ является законченным произведением. 
Другие примеры псевдооборванных текстов 
В этом разделе мы даем краткий обзор ряда аналогичных свойств 
других произведений (за подробностями мы отсылаем читателя к 
цитированным статьям), которые приводят к необходимости 
выделения подобных текстов в отдельную категорию. 
"Рославлев" 
Центральная для произведения патриотическая тема реализует 
себя, в том числе, при помощи мотивов "кастрации", отсечения. 
Это проявляет себя, например, в высказываниях Полины, которая 
восхваляет "самоотрубание" рук народом, который поджег 
собственную столицу, и представляет гибель жениха героини на 
войне как высшее благо и счастье — через мотив несостоявше­
гося брака и фразеологизм "отдать руку" последнее также при­
обретает кастрационный оттенок (более подробно это обсуж­
дается в работе Заславский 1999, раздел 4.2. "Рославлев"). Закан­
чивается "Рославлев" обмороком рассказчицы при известии о 
гибели жениха: пресекается жизнь персонажа, происходит обмо­
рок как заместитель смерти и пресекается текст. Такой парал­
лелизм, в сочетании с общей значимостью мотива отсечения, 
приводит к выводу, что обрыв сюжета является намеренным и 
служит художественным воплощением идейной проблематики 
произведения. Это согласуется с мнением о законченности "Рос-
лавлева", сделанным ранее на основании анализа сюжетной 
интриги с учетом "психологической мотивированности жанра ме­
муаров" (Филиппова 1962: 58). 
"Сказка для детей" 
Здесь значима тема ускользающего, вырывающегося слова 
("Свой стих за хвост отважно я ловлю"). В конце концов стих 
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вырывается и улетает, в руках же у автора остается дефектный, 
оборванный текст — отсюда и кажущийся (но в действитель­
ности значимый) обрыв сюжета. К этому нужно прибавить, что 
свойства таких категорий как начало и конец текста сами 
обыгрываются в произведении и тем самым тематизируются, 
причем формально отсутствующему концу соответствует не 
объясненная и не вполне локализованная в тексте "завязка" ("Ее 
волшебно-темную завязку Не стану я подробно объяснять"). 
Более того, игра категориями начала и конца имеет в произве­
дении парадоксальный характер, подчеркивающий условность 
обрыва: "хвост" — задняя, концевая часть, — упоминается в 
начале, а эпиграфы ("эпиграфы неведомых творений") — признак 
начала — в самом конце. 
"Очами в очи" 
Вспомним последнее предложение произведения: "Так угаснув­
ший огонь еще посылает на воздух последнее пламя, озарившее 
трепетно мрачные стены, чтобы потом скрыться навеки и". Здесь 
заканчивается текст в целом, а кроме того обрывается его 
последняя фраза, причем содержанием этой оборванной фразы 
является как раз момент обрыва (длившийся процесс угасания 
заканчивается последней вспышкой) — получается тройное 
структурное соответствие. Поскольку в произведении речь идет о 
процессе угасания жизни, указанные композиционно-темати­
ческие соответствия означают, что обрыв последней фразы — не 
просто намеренный, но воплощает в себе центральные коллизии 
сюжета, связанные с преждевременным обрывом жизни персо­
нажа, так что произведение является полностью законченным 
художественным целым. 
"Отрывок" 
Проведенный в работе (Заславский 2006) анализ текста в целом 
приводит к выводу, что резкий обрыв едва начавшегося повество­
вания может рассматриваться как выражение художественной 
автономии творца. А именно, на приставания публики по поводу 
34 
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создания новых произведений в 1-  части произведения следует 
ответ — обрыв повествования и демонстративное предъявление 
публике отсутствия текста, которое однако на другом (недоступ­
ном ее пониманию уровне) является содержательным и пред­
ставляет собой органическую часть завершенного целого. Кроме 
того, в произведении особую роль играет лейтмотив отрица­
ния — таким образом, что текст рассказывает об отрицании и при 
этом отрицает сам себя, превращая такое отрицание (в том числе 
обрыв сюжета) в содержательный фактор. 
"Египетские ночи" 
Выше мы уже упоминали работу К. Штедке (1986: 138-141), в 
которой на основании анализа идейной проблематики произведе­
ния и с учетом его структуры был сделан вывод в пользу закон­
ченности произведения. Сейчас мы хотим добавить к этому 
другие соображения структурного характера, которые приводят к 
сходному выводу. История о Клеопатре звучит в исполнении 
импровизатора — тем самым внезапность симметричным 
образом относится как к ее началу (происходит импровизация на 
заранее не предсказуемую тему), так и ее концу (где происходит 
обрыв). История о Клеопатре представлена как текст в тексте, 
причем с учетом последней строки ("Глава счастливцев отпадет") 
обрыв оказывается тройным: упоминается отсечение головы, 
"отсекается" последующий текст импровизации и произведения в 
целом. К этому нужно добавить, что (как и в МПВД) темой здесь 
является противоестественный и преждевременный обрыв жизни. 
Все это свидетельствует в пользу законченности "Египетских 
ночей". 
Обрыв текста как признак его целостности 
Приведенных выше примеров вполне достаточно, чтобы вы­
делить в самостоятельную типологически значимую категорию 
художественные тексты, названные нами псевдоборванными. Их 
отличительный признак состоит в том, что сюжетный обрыв 
оказывается в них иконическим знаком обрыва как темы про­
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изведения в целом, причем таким образом, что здесь получается 
структурный парадокс: именно кажущаяся незаконченность текс­
та (обрыв сюжета), оказываясь мощным генератором смысла, как 
раз и удостоверяет его законченность.2 Подчеркнем, что при этом 
парадоксальность3 является не только свойством изучаемого 
текста как заранее фиксированного объекта, но выделяет и отгра­
ничивает сам этот объект, делая его завершенным целым. 
Если говорить о возможных реализациях отмеченных законо­
мерностей, то, как показывают рассмотренные примеры, харак­
терными являются здесь тема смерти (обрыва жизни персонажа) 
или тема обрыва (отсутствия) текста как такового. Последнее 
обстоятельство показывает значимость метапостроений для об­
суждаемого типа текстов. Кроме того, в их композиции особую 
роль могут играть и структуры типа "текст в тексте" (Лотман 
1981), которые благодаря удвоению актуализуют и делают 
особенно значимым структурные аспекты, включая границу, на 
которой обрывается текст. С обрывом (отрицанием) текста может 
также сочетаться повышенная роль отрицательных предложений. 
Сказанное может быть практически использовано в конкретных 
литературоведческих изысканиях: если в тексте рукописи с 
оборванным сюжетом содержатся указанные особенности, иссле­
дователь должен задаться вопросом, не явл яется ли текст худо­
жественно законченным. Более того, благодаря простоте и 
четкости критериев задача определения статуса текста может 
оказаться "точно решаемой" (или, по крайней мере, вывод о ста­
тусе текста как законченного может быть сделан со степенью 
строгости, относительно высокой по литературоведческим крите­
риям). 
С семиотической точки зрения, обсуждаемое явление можно 
рассматривать как особый случай текстов с отмеченной катего­
рией конца. По наблюдениям Лотмана, 
2  Не является ли столь необычная особенность таких текстов как раз при­
чиной, по которой их авторы не решились их опубликовать (по крайней 
мере целиком — Пушкин опубликовал в "Современнике" лишь отрывок из 
"Рославлева")? 
3  Подход к парадоксальности как самостоятельному явлению, заслужи­
вающему отдельного изучения, был ранее продемонстрирован выходом 
сборника с характерным названием "Парадоксы русской литературы" 
(Маркович, Шмид 2001). 
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кажущаяся неоконченность или неначатость является в художественном 
произведении особенно маркированным конструктивным приемом. Ср. 
имитацию неоконченности в "Сентиментальном путешествии Стерна, 
неначатости ("Вступление" помещено в конце седьмой главы) и неокон­
ченности "Евгения Онегина", перенесение действия за пределы рампы в 
драматургии Пиранделло и ряд др. примеров. (Лотман 1970: 56) 
В примерах, приведенных Лотманом, законченность произведе­
ния заранее очевидна (в том числе и благодаря такому внешнему 
фактору как окончание книжного текста), а обрыв выступает на 
фоне ожидаемого продолжения как демонстративное нарушение 
норм повествовательного текста — именно поэтому такая 
"неоконченность" и оказывается "особенно маркированным 
конструктивным приемом". В нашем же случае статус текста 
заранее не очевиден, и сама его оконченность удостоверяется 
именно обрывом. (Возможны и промежуточные случаи, когда 
благодаря игре категориями начала и конца обрыв текста 
тематизируется, однако сам факт целостности оборванного текста 
следует из других обстоятельств. Скажем, "Иван Федорович 
Шпонька и его тетушка" демонстративно обрывается на словах, 
что замысел тетушки станет известен читателю в следующей 
главе, однако уже из вводной части читателю известно, что 
рукопись сохранилась не полностью, что и объясняет статус 
произведения.) 
В обсуждаемом явлении есть еще один аспект. 
Устойчивость культуры проявляется в ее необычайной способности к 
самовосстановлению, заполнению лакун, регенерации, способности пре­
образовывать внешние возмущения в факторы внутренней структуры. В 
этом смысле культура проявляет свойства таких организаций, как живой 
организм и произведение искусства. (Лотман 1970: 105) 
Поскольку псевдооборванный текст восстанавливается и оконча­
тельно завершается как единая художественая целостность имен­
но в результате сюжетного обрыва, то этот тип текстов модели­
рует на своем собственном примере неуничтожимость искусства 
и культуры как таковых. 
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Struktuursed paradoksid vene kirjanduses ja 
pseudokatkestatud teksti poeetika 
Traditsiooniliselt peetakse Puškini "Me veetsime õhtut suvilas..." lõpeta­
mata tekstiks. Tuginedes strukturaalsetele argumentidele väidame, et see 
on lõpetatud kunstiline tervik. Võttes arvesse eelnevaid Puškini, Lermon-
tovi ja Gogoli samalaadsete tekstide analüüse, viime sisse uue mõiste 
"pseudokatkestatud tekst". Neid eristavaks tunnuseks on strukturaalne 
seos süžee katkemise ja katkestuse kui teksti teema vahel. Just näiv teksti 
lõpetamatus (süžee tasandil), olles võimsaks tähenduse generaatoriks, 
kinnitab teksti lõpetatust. Üldistavalt võib öelda, et taoline teksti tüüp 
modelleerib kunsti ja kultuuri hävitamise võimatust. 
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